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ABSTRACT 
The Nordic economies of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden outperform on 
average nearly ever OECD country in the share of value added stemming from the 
information and communication technology (ICT) sector. Early investments in computing 
and telecommunications, supportive social democratic institutions, and effective 
innovation/technology policy, help to explain overall Nordic ICT performance. Cross-
country variation persists in sector outcomes, however, and cannot be reduced to 
differences in institutions and policy. Denmark and Sweden have moved toward 
liberalization while Finland and Norway maintain commitments to social democracy and 
yet Finland and Sweden outperform Denmark and Norway in ICT sector development. 
Institutionalists explain the successes of Finland and Sweden through lighthouse effects, 
cluster dynamics, institutional adjustments, and policy initiatives, however there has been 
comparatively less research on the lagging countries of Denmark and Norway where 
none of the aforementioned conditions fully explain aggregate outcomes. 
My analysis focuses on the underperformance of Denmark and Norway by 
identifying the role of intra-sectoral dualism in which institutions and policy favor 
certain firm types over others. The research indicates that limited liberal reforms in 
Denmark benefit startups and small firms through increased labor freedoms, risk-based 
financing, deregulation, and strong cluster dynamics. Conversely, the dismantling of 
  iii 
institutional supports, organizational restructuring, and labor redundancies has 
eviscerated large incumbent firms. In Norway, statist social democratic institutions and 
innovation/technology policy entrench domestic incumbent firms through state 
ownership, regional protectionism, and extensive regulation. Startups and small firms are 
less successful due to crowding out in labor and financial markets, cluster fragmentation, 
and the lack of targeted sector supports. Taken together, Danish and Norwegian outcomes 
in ICT are lower on aggregate because institutions and policy favor certain firm types 
over others causing intra-sectoral dualism.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden1 are universally 
recognized for their highly innovative, technologically-advanced economies. As part of 
the wider knowledge economy, the Nordics have developed significant information and 
communication technology (ICT) sectors over several decades. Depicted in Figure 1.1, 
the Nordic ICT sector averages 10.1 percent of total value added2 exceeding every other 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country except 
Ireland and Korea (2010). 
Figure 1.1 ICT Share of business sector value added 
 
Source: OECD 2010. 
 
                                                
1 The Nordics also include Iceland and the autonomous regions of the Åland Islands, the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland. They are excluded from this study because of their relatively small size comprising less than 1.8 
percent of the total Nordic population. 
2 Unadjusted four-country average. 
 
  2 
Along with other sectors and industries in the knowledge economy, the ICT sector 
provides exceptional contributions to total gross domestic product (GDP), greater 
employment opportunities, higher compensation, high value-added export potential, and 
spillover effects improving productivity and innovation in other sectors (European 
Commission 2010; Malerba and Nelson 2011). Because of the clear benefits stemming 
from ICT production, several governments and especially those from the advanced 
economies represented by the OECD have prioritized ICT sector development, actively 
supporting advancement to that end. The variation in ICT production levels across OECD 
countries, however, shows that certain countries are more successful in ICT production 
possibly indicating that multiple factors may be necessary for sector development. 
Economists, political scientists, and other researchers consequently seek to determine the 
most relevant factors and locational contexts in which ICT sectors tend to develop or not. 
Economists and political scientists generally agree on the necessity of labor, 
capital, and technology investments but diverge on the relevance of other factors. The 
main point of contention with the economic three-factor model is that technology is not a 
fixed exogenous residual but directed by multiple endogenous factors (Romer 1990). 
New growth economists then include aspects of human capital, learning, innovation, and 
other factors (Lundvall et al. 2002) in which local context then becomes increasingly 
relevant. Economic geographers address localization effects by augmenting new growth 
theory along with cluster effects between producers, consumers, and other agents to more 
fully explain endogenous technological change (Krugman 2000; Porter 2001). Political 
scientists recognize the contributions of economists and geographers though prioritize 
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institutions and government policy in directing the behaviors of economic actors and 
consequently determining sectoral outcomes (Casper 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001a). In 
the case of the Nordics, high levels of capital accumulation, education/skill attainment, 
and technological diffusion partially explain aggregate performance in knowledge sector 
development but are less powerful in explaining intra-regional variation. As such, this 
thesis asserts that differences in Nordic institutions and policy help to explain differences 
in ICT sector development. 
The Nordic countries embody social democratic ideals where egalitarianism, 
social solidarity, and separation from the market nexus are central. The commitment to 
wider social wellbeing contributes to rising levels of, and increased quality, in education, 
a factor largely recognized as necessary for ICT sector development (Karlsson and 
Klaesson 2002). It also engenders flat organizational structures and inter-firm 
collaboration, both of which support rapid innovation in ICT clusters (Saxenian 1994). 
Conversely, egalitarianism may also constrain market incentives necessary for radical 
innovation consistent with ICT sector development ( Hall and Soskice 2001a). Most 
notably, the lack of risk-based financing can be a significant impediment to sector growth 
(Casper and Soskice 2004). 
The differentiated character of the Nordics then presents a puzzle to researchers 
and policy advocates interested in determining which institutional forms, policy 
instruments, and associated combinations therein are most relevant for knowledge 
economy development. If we assume a relatively undifferentiated institutional and policy 
model across the Nordics, why do we then see variation in overall ICT sector 
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development? Alternatively, have Nordic countries adapted institutions and government 
policy in support of ICT sector development? As a necessary corollary, then, do Nordic 
ICT firms leverage domestic institutions and government policy in unexpected ways? My 
research project seeks to resolve these questions by first recognizing institutional/policy 
divergence across the Nordics but also identifying differential effects within cases 
through the dynamics of intra-sectoral dualism in ICT. 
While the Nordics all made early advancements in computing and 
telecommunications and share comparable economic institutions and 
innovation/technology policies (ITP), the variation observed across the Nordics in ICT 
sector development hints at the possibility of institutional and policy divergence. In fact, 
the Nordic countries diverge in certain important ways that help to explain variations in 
sectoral outcomes. Denmark and Sweden have moved toward wider liberalization 
through regulatory reform, divestiture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), increasing 
market-based finance, and lowered regulatory oversight, especially in labor markets. 
Conversely, Finland and Norway maintain more statist approaches in directing their 
corresponding economies through active ITP, labor protection, and institutional supports 
for domestic firms. 
In comparing institutional/ITP divergence with ICT sector outcomes, the Nordics 
present a puzzling combination between independent and dependent variables. Statist 
Finland leads in ICT production with more liberal Sweden close behind, while Denmark 
and Norway are on opposite ends of the Nordic capitalism spectrum but with comparable 
outcomes in sector development. Comparativists explain the observed variation in 
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outcomes through leadership effects by dominant firms or “lighthouses” (Casper and 
Glimstedt 2001). Finland and Sweden both have lighthouses, though Norway does as 
well. Other researchers cite the importance of state-led ITP and institutional change in 
supporting the development of an entrepreneurial startup cluster favorable for high 
technology venture creation (Mazzucato 2013). Finland and Sweden again have 
developed startup clusters but so has Denmark. The empirics indicate that both a 
lighthouse and a developed startup cluster are required to yield above average 
performance in ICT-sector development, but that institutions and ITP can vary within the 
general class of Nordic social democratic countries. 
The short answer is that institutions and ITP do matter but that they operate 
differently for specific firm types within the same sector. While researchers have focused 
on specific types of firms and/or sectors, few studies assess the differentiated role of 
institutions and ITP on all firm types. What I find is the presence of intra-sectoral dualism 
in both Denmark and Norway leading to lower on aggregate sector outcomes when 
compared to other Nordic countries. Denmark’s partial reforms toward liberalization 
through increased labor mobility, lower regulatory requirements, and improvements in 
access to risk-based capital enable a growing startup community and the proliferation of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Conversely, increased liberalization has 
dismantled institutional supports for large, incumbent firms through government 
divestiture of SOEs, privatization of government ICT departments, increases in 
organizational restructuring, and redundancies for legacy ICT professionals. 
 
  6 
In Norway, I observe quite the opposite with statist social democracy and ITP 
favoring large, incumbent firms through extensive state ownership of enterprises (i.e. 
SOEs) and financial markets, limited competitiveness in government and SOE 
procurement, economic concentration in specific sectors (especially oil and gas), and an 
insular focus on domestic enterprises. The specific conditions of the Norwegian economy 
then constrain growth in startups with higher regulatory requirements, non-targeted 
innovation policies, and the crowding out of finance and labor market which favor SOEs 
and incumbent firms. My findings indicate that institutional and policy orientations do 
indeed matter in sector development but that they operate differently for specific firm 
types. The challenge in developing knowledge-intensive sectors, then, is in crafting 
institutions and ITP in such a way that benefits all firm types, as Finland and Sweden 
have done. 
Topic: Nordic ICT 
A fundamental challenge for comparativist researchers and policy analysts 
interested in economic development is determining the environmental conditions 
conducive for sector growth and sustainability. Institutions and policies are proximate 
structures and drivers shaping the preferences of economic actors, namely firms, in 
developing strategies to optimize revenues, profitability, and market share. Institutions 
and policy, however, continue to diverge significantly in space and time, defying 
arguments of convergence on the one hand but also complicating efforts to identify 
distinct institutional/policy models with discernable internal operating logics that lead to 
observable outcomes in the economy. Complications increase for researchers focused on 
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certain sectors like those contained within the knowledge economy because these sectors 
exhibit high technological change, increasing innovation, global ubiquity, and heightened 
relevance of local factors. Such sectors like ICT, defy straightforward classification and 
the identification of “ideal” forms most amenable to favorable outcomes. 
What we do know are that some countries lead while others lag in the relative 
development of knowledge economies and long-term growth. As noted in the above, the 
Nordic countries excel in ICT sector development while also adhering to a general 
institutional and policy model based on social democracy. Egalitarianism is the defining 
characteristic of Nordic social democracy through collaborations between the state, 
industry, and society to support every citizen as the country undergoes economic and 
political change. The causal mechanisms between Nordic social democracy and 
knowledge sector development focus on investments in human capital, competitiveness 
through increasing economic openness, and ongoing adaptation aided by pragmatic 
governance. These factors enable a high skilled labor force that prioritizes innovation in 
developing new solutions to address domestic and international markets. 
The general contours of the Nordic model and the associated outcomes in ICT 
sector development become less clear when assessing the underlying processes between 
specific institutions/policies and certain firm types. The generalities of social democracy 
then give way to a wide range of institutional adaptations and policy implementations 
across the Nordics that continue to influence the behaviors of certain firm types 
differently, consequently yielding variation in economic outcomes. Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden all initially followed comparable pathways to sector development 
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through knowledge sharing and collaboration while each sought to build national 
champions to complement their domestic economies and strengthening the sector across 
the region. Since then, the Nordics have undergone transformations in institutional forms 
and policy as the ICT sector itself radically evolved due to technological advancement, 
rapid diffusion, and increasing application. The result has been a shift from a single 
Nordic model and sector development path in ICT to one of increasing heterogeneity 
with variable outcomes. 
The Nordics have all engaged in pragmatic experimentation aimed at institutional 
change and policy advancement to promote improvements in economic outcomes. 
Denmark and Sweden adopted more liberalizing reforms while Finland and Norway 
strengthened the role of the state and/or retained steadfast commitments to social 
democracy. However, there has not been a clear association between institutional/policy 
development and sector outcomes in ICT. Finland and Sweden lead in the contribution of 
ICT to total value added while Denmark and Norway do not. Other factors may also 
contribute to the observed variation in outcomes, though my analysis finds the presence 
of intra-sectoral dualism in Denmark and Norway and its absence in Finland and Sweden 
leading to suboptimal aggregate outcomes in the former but not in the latter. 
Intra-sectoral dualism along with other aspects of economic dualism is not an 
altogether new concept. Lewis (1954) and Fei & Ranis (1964) described a dual-economy 
model in which “backward” agricultural and “modern” industrial sectors followed 
disparate development trajectories leading to variable and unequal outcomes (Stifel and 
Thorbecke 2003). Thorbecke (1993) then advanced the concept of a “dual-dual” economy 
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by expanding the original “backward/modern” model to incorporate informal/formal 
divisions within sectors and again variable outcomes due to single policy frameworks 
(Stifel and Thorbecke 2003). More in line with my analysis, Rhodes employed a similar 
approach when assessing French technology development during the 1980s in which 
policies favored national champions at the expense of small firms who were left to the 
vagaries of international competition and subsequently failed (1988). 
Appreciating the contributions of these authors but also seeking a contemporary 
analysis that addresses recent developments in comparative capitalism and innovation 
systems, my application of intra-sectoral dualism in the case of Nordic ICT expands the 
concept to include a more expansive set of relevant factors and dynamics. Through the 
application of intra-sectoral dualism on micro-foundational process, my analysis 
identifies how institutions and policies benefit certain actors over others leading to 
suboptimal outcomes. The analysis includes a wider scope of institutions and policies that 
influence innovation patterns and firm strategy to advance ICT sector development. I 
conclude that Danish liberalizing reforms are supportive of small firms and high growth 
startups, while dismantling the supports for large incumbent firms. Norwegian 
commitments to statist social democracy then engenders a different form of intra-sectoral 
dualism by supporting large incumbent firms though limiting growth potential for small 
firms and startups. 
With a focus on process and in an effort to minimize endogeneity, I necessarily 
limit my analysis of antecedent and descendant causation. Concerning antecedent 
causation, I inferentially but not formally test dummy hypotheses that explain 
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developments leading to Danish liberalization and Norwegian statist social democracy. In 
both instances, structural factors within the context of political pragmatism appear to 
have directed each country’s institutional and policy advancement. Due to limited 
financial and physical resources, Denmark has endured economic volatility requiring 
pragmatic reforms to sustain broad commitments to social democracy. Under a cohesive, 
yet decentralized political structure partial and selective liberalization emerged as the 
most advantageous if not necessary strategy. Buoyed by deep oil and gas reserves and a 
more feudalistic political structure, Norway has been able to maintain strong 
commitments to social democracy and statist policies that favor local governments with 
protected industries. In effect, global competitiveness forced the hand in Denmark while 
Norway remains largely unaffected.3 
Concerning descendant causation, I again limit my analysis connecting ICT 
sectoral outcomes and other direct processes due to scope limitations. First, ICT sector 
development engenders positive externalities increasing productivity and innovation in 
proximate sectors, if not the economy as a whole. Second, ICT is a high value-add/high-
income sector providing disproportionately greater contributions to overall economic 
growth and corresponding tax revenues. In both instances, the manifold contributions to 
economic development are complex and multidirectional. While I explicitly identify the 
opportunities for more expansive analyses of ICT across the wider economy in the 
concluding chapter, I cursorily engage second order outcomes throughout the chapter. 
                                                
3 Recent declines in oil and gas prices could change the Norwegian status quo, though such arguments are 
entirely speculative 
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Application: ICT, institutions, and policy 
Defining ICT and the ICT sector 
Originally defined as information technology (IT) and telecommunications, 
increased convergence of the two technologies led to the unified term of information and 
communication technology (ICT). The essential characteristics of ICT involve the access, 
storage, manipulation, and transmission of information using hardware and software 
systems. On the consumption side, ICT is embodied in user devices and associated 
services including roughly seven billion mobile phone subscriptions, nearly three billion 
internet users, and over two billion personal computers (Yates 2007; ITU 2014). The 
supply side of ICT includes the infrastructure, equipment, software, and content 
demanded by producers and end users. Because ICT underpins an increasing number of 
activities and processes, it is considered a general-purpose technology (GPT) influencing 
the growth and direction of entire economies (Lipsey, Carlaw, and Bekar 2005). Other 
GPTs from history include steam power, electrification, and mechanization - all of which 
demonstrably altered broad-based economic production. As ICT becomes globally 
ubiquitous, it is now regarded as “…arguably the most powerful agent for change in 
advanced societies” (Koski, Rouvinen, and Ylä-Anttila 2002, 145). 
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The OECD classifies the ICT sector using the ISIC Rev.4 system.4 The specific 
economic activities comprising the sector are, however, contested and revised 
periodically (OECD 2002; OECD 2007). Definitional uncertainty is a given in sectors 
like ICT where rapid innovation, transformation, and diffusion into related sectors is 
typical. The ICT sector includes manufacturing, trade, and service industries further 
delineated by class codes but with specific exclusions (OECD 2007). The OECD also 
identifies a related “Content and Media Sector” that when taken together with the ICT 
sector constitutes both the demand and supply sides of the “Information Economy” 
(2007). My focus remains on the ICT sector (i.e. supply side) as specified by the OECD 
in Table 1.1.  
                                                
4 The United Nations (UN), OECD, and European Commission (EC) all use the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev.4) system. 
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Source: OECD 2007. 
 
It is immediately apparent that top-level industries as well as lower-level code 
classifications constitute a diverse group of economic activity, each with distinct factor 
requirements. Amongst others, capital intensity, forms of financing, aspects of 
innovation, trade considerations, regulatory requirements, and labor requirements 
immediately surface as important distinguishing characteristics both between and within 
each code classification. As an example, “Computer programming activities” includes 
bespoke coding services as well as more complex and structured software development. 
Overlap is also an issue in classifying economic activities with firms such as IBM and 
Apple encompassing manufacturing, trade, and service industries. Still, industry 
segmentation helps separate pure ICT manufacturing firms from services where capital 
intensity, producer scale effects, and skill requirements vary significantly. 
 
  14 
ICT manufacturing produces physical hardware but can also include integrated 
software, trade and support services (e.g. Apple’s MacBook computer, OS X operating 
system, Apple Store, and Apple Care, respectively). Conversely, microprocessor 
production was historically an integrated manufacturing process though it is now 
fragmented into fabrication-less or “fabless” design firms decoupled from downstream 
manufacturing and assembly firms. ICT trade involves the purchase, resell, and 
distribution of ICT equipment yet again firms often provide a range of related services 
including supply chain management, design requirements, delivery, implementation, and 
repair services. 
Lastly, ICT services include multiple distinct activities and are arguably the most 
heterogeneous within the wider ICT sector. Services include economic activity from five 
distinct groups: “Publishing activities”; “Telecommunications”; “Computer 
programming”, “Consultancy and related activities”; “Information service activities”; and 
“Repair of computers and personal and household goods”. As before, skill requirements 
vary significantly. IT consulting involves the implementation, customization, and 
ongoing maintenance of complex software systems whereas end user support (e.g. help 
desk) and IT facilities management are less skill intensive. Data processing, information 
provisioning, and telecommunications occupy a middle position usually requiring higher 
capital investment and a mix of skill sets ranging from engineers and technicians to 
customer services support agents. 
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For all ICT industries and especially services, the recent transformation of ICT 
itself has lowered the barriers to entry to little more than the knowledge and organization 
required for production in some instances. Investments in physical technology (e.g. 
computers, servers, networking, and communications equipment) are limited to that 
which the firm deems necessary. Instead, firms can now obtain computer processing, 
storage, and communication services from external vendors providing decentralized, 
cloud-based solutions, relieving them of upfront fixed investment costs. Advancements in 
ICT have also improved data and voice communications, redefining the need for physical 
presences and co-located employee workspaces. Lastly, the general trend toward 
outsourcing, itself greatly enabled by ICT, allows ICT firms to offload nonessential 
functions to other specialist firms. Thus, general capital investment are less relevant for 
the contemporary ICT firm and instead localized institutions and policy directing skill 
development, firm organization, governance, competitive environments, regulations, 
markets, and inter-firm relations now factor more prominently. 
Trends in the overall ICT sector indicate sustained, high growth rates less affected 
by economic recession. Within the OECD the sector grew at six percent annually from 
1995 to 2008 with slow but still positive growth during the early 2000s dot.com collapse 
(OECD 2010)5. ICT was not immune to the 2008 financial crisis, although by 2009 it had 
already reversed course in increasing employment by four percent in 2010 and six 
percent in 2011 (OECD 2012). The annual European market value for all ICT is €660B 
(European Commission 2010) and the worldwide addressable market for IT services 
                                                
5 Six percent is the computed compound growth rate for the 14-year period. 
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alone was $500B in 2008 (Sudan et al. 2010). As depicted in Figure 1.2, the OECD’s 
long-term trend is toward ICT services with ICT manufacturing moving to countries with 
lower labor costs, especially in Asia. 
Figure 1.2 Growth of ICT sector, total value added 
 
Source: OECD 2010. 
A decomposition of the aggregate trends by country lends support to the overall 
measures but also highlights differences between countries. Figure 1.3 shows that with 
the exception of Korea, every OECD country is more engaged in ICT services than 
manufacturing. Further, there is significant variation across the Nordics with Finland 
heavily committed to manufacturing, Sweden less so, and Denmark and Norway 
decidedly involved in ICT services. Telecommunication equipment manufacturers Nokia 
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Figure 1.3 2008 ICT sector distribution of manufacturing and services 
 
Source: OECD 2010. 
Along with other knowledge economy sectors, ICT generates high-income 
employment, attracts large capital investment, contributes to knowledge spillovers 
(Malerba and Nelson 2011), and innovation spillovers in other industries (Ornston 
2012a).6 While relatively small in overall employment, it contributes disproportionately 
more to productivity and economic growth (National Research Council (U.S.) 2007). The 
European Commission (EC) agrees, finding that the ICT sector directly provides 20 
percent of overall productivity growth with wider ICT investments contributing another 
30 percent (European Commission 2010, 4). For these reasons, policy makers and 
researchers alike are interested in understanding the conditions required for ICT sector 
development. The EC’s Europe 2020 strategy is one of several initiatives setting a 
“digital agenda” for advancing economic prosperity, social cohesion, and environmental 
                                                
6 Mowery states that the computer software industry is sui generis in gaining influence in all other 
industries (1999). More colorfully, technology luminary Marc Andreessen claimed that software is “eating 
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sustainability (European Commission 2010). That said Figure 1.1 in the introduction 
profiles the high variation in ICT production across Europe with the EU 15 average 
occupying a modal position below the OECD average. Overall, the mean distance 
between the highest and lowest performers is 10 percentage points, compounding overall 
economic growth potential by 20 percent. 
The role of institutions and policy 
Because of the relatively low barriers to access through limited upfront capital 
investment, contextual and localized factors embodied in institutions, government policy, 
and firm behavior factor more significantly in ICT sector development. Beginning with 
institutions, they direct social organization and interaction by constraining and enabling 
the actions of individuals and groups. Often beginning as generalized habits and routines, 
institutions harden over time into permanent structures (Hall and Soskice 2001, 65). 
Institutional rigidity is not a given, however, as ongoing power dynamics reflecting the 
interests of dominant actors shape them in new ways (K. Morgan 2004, 14). Economic 
institutions generally include financial markets, governance systems, labor markets, skill 
development systems, and firm interaction dynamics (Hall and Soskice 2001a; Jackson 
and Deeg 2006; Thelen 2012) although welfare provisions also matter, especially in 
Nordic social democratic countries (Amable 2003; Kristensen and Lilja 2011; Ornston 
2012b). 
Beyond economic organization, institutions also structure the ways in which firms 
innovate through the production and circulation of new knowledge. Innovation includes 
any improvement in product, process, or organization that is new to the firm, if not the 
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world (Nelson 1993). Schumpeter differentiated “Mark I” sectors undergoing significant 
creative destruction from “Mark II” sectors in which cumulative technological 
advancement is more common (Malerba 2004). Subsequently deemed “radical” and 
“incremental” innovation, this basic typology endures as an initial heuristic guiding 
comparative studies on innovation processes and firm organization (Hall and Soskice 
2001b; Asheim and Coenen 2005; Casper 2007). ICT includes both forms of innovation 
as well as instances of neither but is generally considered highly innovative and more 
radical than incremental (Hall and Soskice 2001a; Casper 2007). 
Related to institutions, governance is defined as “… those mechanisms by which 
the behavioural regularities that constitute institutions are maintained and enforced…” 
(C. Crouch 2005, 20). Governance can operate at a number of levels and through multiple 
channels, but government is the most common agent (Rosenau 1995). Government action 
in the economy begins with increasing the stock of physical and human capital by 
investing in public goods like infrastructure, education, and primary R&D. More 
contentiously, governments enact industrial and/or innovation/technology policy by 
providing a source of demand, directed investment, subsidization, market protection, and 
institutional change (Nelson 1993; Casper 2000; Lazonick 2007; Lange 2009). Industrial 
policies can also include innovation priorities to incubate nascent clusters or attempt to 
build them outright (Porter 2000). Finally, governments can regulate the degree and form 
of internationalization. As Kristensen and Morgan note, government regulations both 
enable and limit domestic firm access to external institutions or conversely, the access of 
international firms to domestic markets (2007). 
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Institutions and government policy are highly relevant in directing firm behavior 
but firms have agency as well (Crouch 2005; Crouch, Schröder, and Voelzkow 2009) and 
act differently depending on their size and position within the domestic economy (Casper 
and Glimstedt 2001). On one end of the spectrum, large incumbent firms deemed 
“lighthouse firms” establish a foundation for which a productive ecosystem can emerge. 
Geographers studying cluster effects note the tight collaboration between established 
firms, their suppliers, and customers in fostering rapid innovation and increased 
economic activity (Maskell 2001). Such firms also have the critical mass to set their own 
institutional framework, defecting from dominant local institutions or selecting those 
most amenable to their particular strategies and dispensing with the rest (Crouch 2005; 
Casper 2007). On the other end are startup firms with greater agency due to limited 
regulatory oversight because of their small size and lack of historical encumbrances 
binding them to status quo institutions and government policies. Accordingly, 
institutional analyses of economic activity must recognize the type of firm to understand 
different firms operate in the same institutional and policy environment. More directly, I 
assert that distinct firm types can and do behave differently within the same institutional 
and policy environment with some types thriving while others struggle. 
The Nordic model 
Having fully described aspects of the ICT sector, the role of institutions, 
government policy, and firm agency, I now apply these themes briefly to the Nordic 
countries and the particulars of the Nordic model. Categorized as mixed, coordinated, 
continental, or social democratic (cf. Hall and Soskice 2001a; Amable 2003; Boyer 
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2004), the Nordic economies blend social welfare provisions and non-market 
coordination with limited, market-based institutions. The Nordic model realizes 
economic growth under global competition by maintaining social cohesion and human 
capital development through communitarian and egalitarian institutions and policy 
(Vartianen 2004; Asheim 2011a).7 By enabling the individual and society, Nordic firms 
benefit from highly skilled employees operating in flat organizational structures, 
collaborating across firms and industries. These characteristics are highly relevant in 
other locations in enabling highly successfully ICT sectors (Saxenian 1994). 
Conversely, the Nordic model includes certain characteristics generally 
considered non-conducive to ICT sector development. Specifically, the lack of risk-based 
financing is viewed as a limiting factor in scaling startup firms along with the lower 
equity financing available for late stage firm growth (Mayer 1998; Herrmann 2008; 
Revest and Sapio 2010). Welfare provisions act as an enabler and a hindrance in ICT 
sector development. Advocates claim that generous social safety nets insulate firms from 
the negative consequences in risk taking (Casper and Soskice 2001), while detractors cite 
the concomitant high taxation and a risk adverse culture as detrimental aspects of the 
welfare state (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier 2012; Rooney 2013).8 
                                                
7 According to Kristensen, Nordic social protection provides equal opportunities in education to prepare 
individuals for risks and change, social mobility across life-phases, industries, and income situations, and a 
system supportive of individual experimentation (2011) 
8 Acemoglu et al. refer to the Nordic model as “cuddly capitalism”; charitable to its citizens through the 
welfare state but lacking the necessary incentive structure of liberal “cutthroat capitalism” to develop 
radical innovations in high technology sectors (2012). 
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Following arguments from Gerschenkron (1962), the Nordics addressed their 
relative industrial backwardness through what was then known as “commercial policy” 
(Delegationerne for Nordisk Økonomisk Samarbejde 1939). In the period of early 
industrialization, the Nordics followed a consistent general strategy relying on foreign 
capital, lowered trade duties, technology investments, union formation, and social policy 
(Delegationerne for Nordisk Økonomisk Samarbejde 1939).9 More recently, the Nordics 
have pragmatically moved toward differentiated policies and institutions, reflecting 
domestic priorities and path dependent industrial development while continuing to adhere 
to the general contours of social democracy.10 Each country maintains innovation 
agencies with a mandate to promote, sponsor, and develop innovation within firms and to 
grow firms in innovative sectors. The agencies differ in important ways including the 
rates and forms of funding, services offered (e.g. legal, business, facilities), and sectors 
targeted. Denmark has made technology diffusion a priority (Edquist and Lundvall 1993), 
while Sweden and Finland invest more in research and development (R&D). Norway’s 
policy continues to address the considerable effects of oil and gas with a need for a more 
diverse economy. Consequently, Norway supports a mix of broad-based policies while 
targeting strategic sectors through significant state ownership. 
The Nordics have always held a prominent position in ICT. Most notably, the 
Nordic states jointly developed the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) standard as the first 
                                                
9 As late as 1937, only Sweden managed to become an exporter of capital (Delegationerne for Nordisk 
Økonomisk Samarbejde 1939, 2d rev. ed.:17) 
10 Gustavsen characterizes Nordic society as having “… a strong element of constructivism in the form of a 
belief in the ability of people to break historical patterns, institute new economic orders and generally 
control their own fate” (2011, 9). 
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fully automatic mobile phone system and were the first to implement the current world 
standard Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) system. Early movements in 
mobile communications enabled lighthouse firms like Ericsson in Sweden, Nokia in 
Finland, and Telenor in Norway to become global competitors. Beyond mobile 
communications, the Nordics are also highly relevant in other ICTs, software, and 
gaming. Notable technologies include Bluetooth for short-range data communications, 
object-oriented programming, the programming languages C++, C#, Erlang, Pascal, 
Ruby on Rails, the Linux operating system, and Apple’s voice-recognition software Siri. 
Successful software and electronic gaming firms include iZettle, King, Klarna, Mojang, 
Navision, Nets, Opera, Qt, Rovio, Skype, Spotify, Supercell, Tradeshift, Unity 3D, and 
Zendesk. 
The puzzle of Nordic ICT 
The combined contributions from Nordic ICT are substantial in absolute terms 
and especially on a per capita basis. However, each country has fared differently in the 
overall size and composition of their corresponding ICT sectors. In aggregate outcomes, 
Finland and Sweden outperform Denmark and Norway by nearly four percentage points 
on average, as measured in percent of total value added. To put the disparity in 
perspective, the percentage difference equates to twice the size of the OECD and four 
times the size of the EU agricultural averages (The World Bank Group 2014). Regarding 
institutions and ITP, Finland and Norway remain more oriented toward statist social 
democracy while Denmark and Sweden have moved toward limited liberalization and 
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more diffused policy. In each case, differentiated pathways have directed ICT sector 
development but in less obvious ways. 
Thus, the first order puzzle is that we observe variation in both the dependent 
variable (ICT sector development) and the independent variable (institutions and ITP). 
The puzzle becomes more manageable when one considers the types of firms in the 
causal equation. Specifically, Nordic ICT sector development is an aggregate measure 
that includes outcomes from large, incumbent firms or “lighthouses”, as well as SMEs 
and startups. Therefore, Finland and Sweden outperform Denmark and Norway because 
they continue to support lighthouse firms while also growing competitive SMEs and 
startup firms. Conversely, Denmark exhibits muted aggregate performance because it 
lacks a large, incumbent firm but does have a growing startup community. Norway has 
just the opposite of Denmark with Telenor as a leading incumbent firm though limited 
developments in revenue growth for SMEs and startups. 
Because of Finland and Sweden’s exceptional performance, researchers have 
extensively analyzed the two cases resulting in a wealth of extant literature. In both cases, 
researchers cite the relevance of a lighthouse firm in directing the development of a 
cluster supportive of SME and startup growth (Casper and Glimstedt 2001; Casper and 
Whitley 2004). The cases of Nokia in Finland and Ericsson in Sweden offer compelling 
support for their respective advancement in ICT, but they do not explain how Denmark 
has developed a strong SME/startup community without a lighthouse or why Norway 
failed to do so with the 12th largest wireless carrier Telenor. Alternative explanations for 
SME/startup development then rely on the efforts of states to reorient domestic 
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institutions and engage in active ITP (Herrmann 2008; Ornston 2012a; Mazzucato 2013). 
However, institutional pragmatism and active policy can operate differently for specific 
sectors and firm types, benefiting one group at the expense of the other. 
To resolve this apparent puzzle for the cases of Denmark and Norway, I posit that 
institutions and ITP have led to intra-sectoral dualism, yielding relative 
underperformance on aggregate in ICT sector development. The empirical evidence 
corroborates my argument with Denmark’s movement toward limited liberalization 
supporting an advanced SME/startup community but also eviscerating large, incumbent 
ICT firms. High labor mobility, effective risk-based capital, and lower regulatory 
requirements are all strong supports for SMEs and startups while large, incumbent firms 
have lost direct supports, undergone privatization, restructuring, and intractable labor 
redundancies. 
Conversely, Norwegian statist social democratic institutions and policies support 
the ICT lighthouse firm Telenor but undermine the development of a startup community 
and SME growth. SOEs, government holdings in equities and bank loans, limited 
competitiveness in government procurement, wage setting practices, and market 
protection all favor incumbents at the expense of SMEs and startups. 
Innovation/technology policy has done little to reverse the trend by favoring established 
and low innovation sectors over ICT, supporting incumbent firms over startups, and 
allocating scarce funding to regions where ICT development is limited. Taken together, 
these factors then explain the variable outcomes in Danish and Norwegian ICT. 
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Relevance of the research 
The study is relevant to researchers interested in comparative political economy, 
the role of institutions and ITP, and the outcomes for sectoral development. The 
exceptional performance of the Nordics in ICT production and commitment to social 
democracy demonstrate that coordinated economies with generous welfare states are not 
constrained in their knowledge economy development. Following this argument, the 
study also explains how countries can pragmatically alter institutions to favorably direct 
sector development. The Nordic model continues to adapt to competitive pressures and 
each country has done so differently with distinct outcomes. Instead of assuming a 
uniform institutional model, the study provides new insights for researchers focused on 
the Nordics through an analysis of lower level processes in setting firm strategy as a 
result of higher order institutional/policy divergence across the region. 
Beyond a general institutional assessment, the study evaluates specific 
government policies with additional relevance to political science researchers as well as 
governments seeking possible pathways to knowledge sector advancement. While 
international and regional institutions have constrained the ability of governments to 
enact protectionist industrial policy, investments in technology (especially infrastructure), 
R&D, education, and entrepreneurship all fall under the less contentious purview of 
“innovation and technology policy”. Understanding the optimal form of ITP within a 
particular institutional context is less well understood for the two cases under review, as 
well as the impacts on specific firm types. 
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Next, the study focuses on the outcomes of specific types of firms and how they 
respond to institutions and policy. Researchers have independently focused on lighthouse 
firms and startups but less so on the combined landscape for a given sector (cf. Casper 
and Glimstedt 2001; Casper 2003; Herrmann 2008; Lange 2009). Economic geographers 
and systems of innovation scholars do examine firm diversity but often relegate the 
analysis to producer/supplier relationships. Firms address market opportunities where 
institutions and policies are optimal. Small firms provide niche solutions and/or support 
other small firms, whereas startups address emergent demands and/or address existing 
ones in fundamentally new ways. Large, established ICT firms have the scale required to 
support other large firms, extensive requirements, complexity, and/or diverse markets. 
Yet all firms have access to the same breadth of institutions and government policies. 
Understanding which structure works for which kind of firm is the focus of my research. 
Way forward 
The objective of the study is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Nordic model with regard to ICT growth, how it has adapted over time, the different 
strategies employed by each country in developing their ICT sectors, the corresponding 
outcomes in sector size and growth, and the impacts on different types of firms. The next 
chapter extends the introduction by fully reviewing the Nordic economies and their paths 
to ICT sector development. The third chapter evaluates the Nordic model against the 
current comparative capitalism and systems of innovation literature, identifying 
consistent themes and points of departure. I then advance my hypotheses explaining the 
distinct development trajectories followed by the selected cases of Denmark and Norway 
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and how this informs outcomes in their corresponding ICT sectors. Following the 
introduction, I test my hypotheses against the empirical evidence comprised of structured 
interviews, standing datasets, and secondary information resources and literature. I then 
conclude the analysis with a thematic comparison of the two cases drawing conclusions 
and identifying opportunities for subsequent research.
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CHAPTER TWO: NORDIC CAPITALISM, POLICY, OUTCOMES, AND 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Because of shared investments in ICT, universal commitments to social 
democracy, and comprehensive advancements ITP, the Nordics exhibit qualities that are 
generally comparable but also entail cross-country variation in notable areas that have 
evolved over time. The purpose of this second chapter is to provide an overview of the 
Nordic countries in the areas of ICT, institutions, and policy to understand outcomes in 
sector development and specify the rationale for evaluating the selected cases of 
Denmark and Norway. The chapter relies primarily on macro level statistics, secondary 
research, and to a lesser extent, interviews with Nordic ICT professionals. At this point, I 
do not seek to prove or disprove direct causality between institutions, policy, and sector 
outcomes and instead intend to develop a working heuristic enabling the formulation of 
specific hypotheses in the following chapter. Underscoring the aforementioned caveat are 
the cases of Finland and Sweden, which are not under detailed review or extensive 
analysis. 
Origins of Nordic ICT 
The relative affluence of the Nordics along with their longstanding practice of 
looking abroad for solutions to domestic needs led to an early and extensive uptake of 
ICT in all countries (Andersin 2005; Tuori 2005; Cortada 2011). Unlike the technology 
competition races in the United States, Nordic computing began as a collaborative 
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endeavor. The Nordics collectively developed a tight user community with regular 
interaction between suppliers and research institutions through reoccurring symposiums, 
conferences, and research journals (Bruhn 2005; Tuori 2005).11 Early practitioners were 
mostly agnostic as to which computing platforms were adopted, when to develop native 
solutions, how to borrow from other Nordic countries, and open to TNCs like Bull, GE, 
Honeywell, IBM, and Siemens (Tuori 2005). Platform independence extended into the 
newly established journals prohibiting commercial interests from promotion so as to limit 
influence (Bruhn 2005). Nordic collaboration continued until the 1970s and 1980s when 
IT became viewed as a competitive factor with increasing opportunities under 
internationalization (Tuori 2005). 
As with computing, the Nordics exceeded most of Europe in the early adoption of 
telecommunication services, again through joint development leading to the creation of 
the mobile communications standard Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) in 1969 which 
would influence the current international standard Global System for Mobile (GSM) 
(Delegationerne for Nordisk Økonomisk Samarbejde 1939; Fomin and Lyytinen 2000; 
Svenolof Karlsson 2011). The consortia remained committed to collaboration through 
open standards by mandating that NMT should not be patented (Svenolof Karlsson 
2011). As global telecommunications in the 1980s began to move toward deregulation, 
privatization, and competition, collaboration turned to competition led by the actions of 
the Swedish carrier Televerket subsequently rebranded Telia. Dubbed the “Massacre of 
                                                
11 Tuori colorfully characterizes the informal relations between Nordic programmers as little more than 
“presentations and sauna” but no protocols or papers (2005, 173). 
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Oslo” in 1993, Telia established the mobile partnership Unisource with Holland and 
Switzerland, unilaterally offering token ownership to the remaining Nordics consisting of 
between five and eight percent each (Svenolof Karlsson 2011). Sweden’s actions 
prompted Denmark to fully deregulate, privatize, and partner with an American carrier in 
1998, leaving the remaining Nordic carriers scrambling for a viable strategic partnership 
or face potential obsolescence (Svenolof Karlsson 2011). 
One could characterize the current Nordic ICT landscape as a reconciliation 
between the early days of collaboration and the more recent movement to competition. 
Nordic ICT firms frequently compete through product/service development, talent 
acquisition, mergers and acquisitions. They also collaborate through open standards 
development, a fiercely independent hacker community (e.g. Sweden’s Pirate Party), and 
the proliferation of group-based organization and incentives. Still, each country has more 
recently developed differently with Finland and Norway maintaining more statist 
economies and an adherence to social democracy while Denmark and Sweden have 
moved toward limited liberalization within their social democratic systems. The 
confounding aspect of Nordic sector development is that institutional and policy 
orientations cannot explain aggregate outcomes in ICT. Finland (statist/social 
democratic) and Sweden (limited liberalization) outperform Denmark (limited 
liberalization) and Norway (statist/social democratic) in the share of value added 
originating from the ICT sector.  
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Institutions 
Through conquest, exploration, and exchange, the Nordics developed shared 
cultures and institutions that evolved into the contemporary form of social democracy. 
While many parts of Europe struggled with political and economic conflict during the 
early 20th century, the Nordics adopted a “red-green” compromise balancing the 
economic interests of agrarian communities with an increasing urban labor population 
(Arter 1999). Under social democracy, long standing egalitarianism hardened into a 
codified set of institutions protecting and enabling all citizens from the vagaries of 
capitalism (Delegationerne for Nordisk Økonomisk Samarbejde 1939). Pension funds, 
welfare provisions, unemployment insurance, universal education, and tripartite relations 
between labor, capital, and the state all became enduring aspects of Nordic social 
democracy and demonstrated that a viable “third way” between statist and capitalist 
economies was possible. 
Complementing the formal institutions of Nordic social democracy are the 
informal norms stressing the importance of the collective over the individual. The 
influential Danish-Norwegian author Aksel Sandemose (1967) set down ten social laws 
called the “Law of Jante” critical of individual success and achievement. Respondents 
repeatedly stressed the endurance of Sandemose’s social laws as enduring aspects of 
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The Law of Jante states: 
• You are not to think you are anything special. 
• You are not to think you are as good as we are. 
• You are not to think you are smarter than we are. 
• You are not to convince yourself that you are better than we are. 
• You are not to think you know more than we do. 
• You are not to think you are more important than we are. 
• You are not to think you are good at anything. 
• You are not to laugh at us. 
• You are not to think anyone cares about you. 
• You are not to think you can teach us anything. 
 
Researchers as well affirm the relevance of the Law of Jante as a foundation for 
social organization (cf. Scott 2013; Booth 2015). It informs the sustainability of social 
democratic intuitions by avoiding or at least dampening the free-rider problem by placing 
society above the individual to limit the exploitation of public goods for personal gain. 
Further, because of their small size, states like the Nordics avoid the collection action 
dilemma, enabling them to build pragmatic coalitions to enact greater social protections 
under increasing international competition (Katzenstein 2003). Under these conditions, 
every citizen benefits from wider social protections and enablers that then contribute to 
high levels of human development and income equality but limiting individualism. 
Conversely, there are negative consequences in firm creation due to the 
discouragement of individualistic behaviors like risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and profit 
maximization, all of which are fundamental aspects of emerging sectors like ICT. It 
should be note that the Law of Jante is a single perspective that contextualizes more 
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generally aspects of social democracy. While some respondents cited the relevance of 
Jante, others found little contemporary application and referenced the more objective 
aspects of Nordic social democracy. Regardless, the institutional duality of Nordic social 
democracy – with or without the normative aspects of the Law of Jante – enables and yet 
constrains growth in highly innovative sectors like ICT. 
In assessing institutions relevant in directing economic activity, authors generally 
include labor markets, skill development, and incentives, finance, firm organization, and 
intra-industry collaboration (Whitley 1999; P. A. Hall and Soskice 2001b; Thelen 2012). 
Educational institutions also factor in analyses of the ICT and other knowledge economy 
sectors as do welfare institutions, especially in assessments of Nordic economies 
(Amable 2003; Boyer 2004; Leydesdorff 2010). I focus on the aforementioned economic 
institutions with limited treatment of educational institutions per se or the particulars of 
Nordic welfare systems. The rationale in so doing is to assess the proximate institutions 
in directing sector outcomes and the variation between firm types. Where overlap exists 
as in the cases of skill development and personal incentives, I provide high-level 
assessments of the respective education and welfare institutions. 
Labor markets, skill development, and employee incentives 
Assessments of labor markets begin with measures of labor freedom. To 
determine degrees of labor freedom, the Heritage Foundation compiles an index of 
individual measures including: the ratio of minimum wage to the average value added per 
worker; hindrance to hiring additional workers; rigidity of hours; difficulty of firing 
redundant employees; legally mandated notice period; and mandatory severance pay 
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(Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal 2011).12 Since the creation of the index in 
2005, the world average has consistently held a score of roughly 60 – a borderline 
ranking between “moderately free” and “mostly unfree”. According to the measure and 
as shown in Figure 2.1, the Nordics exhibit both cross-country variation and change over 
recent years. Owing to commitments in labor mobility, Denmark stands apart from the 
other Nordics and is more comparable with liberal countries like the United States and 
Ireland. Sweden occupies a modal position but has become relatively “less free” 
following the 2007/8 financial crisis. Conversely, Norway and Finland are historically 
classified as “repressed” with significant limitations in hiring/firing, market wage setting, 
and other labor protections (Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal 2011). 
Figure 2.1 Index of labor freedom 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal 2011.  
                                                
12 The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal both identify as conservative entities advocating 
liberal, free market policies and limited government. Regardless of the terminology used, the measure is an 
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While the mainline indicator shows variation across the Nordics and Denmark as 
an outlier, each country continues to maintain pro-labor social democratic institutions. 
Differences in labor institutions between Denmark and to a lesser degree, Sweden with 
that of Finland and Norway are due to varying degrees of labor market rigidities, not the 
use of active labor market policies. The Nordics are unified in their support of active 
labor market policies. These policies assist displaced workers through unemployment 
compensation and retraining programs that ensure a stable standard of living and a viable 
pathway to reintegrating back into the labor force as soon as possible. 
Denmark consequently scores high in labor freedom due to the relative ease in 
hiring/firing employees while maintaining active labor policies through its “flexicurity” 
model (Geishecker, Görg, and Munch 2010). Sweden has generally followed the Danish 
model of protecting the worker not the job. Conversely, Finland and Norway adhere to 
more protectionist measures for defined employment roles, coordinated wage setting, and 
limits in hiring/firing. Again, Finland and Norway have relatively more labor protections 
than Sweden, though Sweden’s countercyclical response to the recent financial crises has 
put it more in line with the two more statist social democratic countries. Again, the broad 
measures of labor freedom are an initial indicator but is incapable of capturing the deeper 
aspects of labor relations in the Nordics. 
Assessments of knowledge economies rely on education levels and especially 
tertiary enrolment. Denmark, Sweden, and Norway all have tertiary enrolment levels 
comparable to the OECD average of roughly 78 persons per 100 (The World Bank Group 
2011). Finland is the clear outlier in consistently leading the other Nordics by roughly 10 
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persons per 100 and second only to South Korea in the OECD (The World Bank Group 
2011) (Figure 2.2). Social democratic countries have always maintained high 
investments in education, yet discerning political orientation is less clear or how it can 
direct sector outcomes. Hall and Soskice associate coordinated market economies which 
are similar to traditional social democratic economies as oriented toward specialized skill 
development and thus more favorable for incremental innovation like engine 
manufacturing (2001b). Conversely, more liberal market economies tend toward 
generalist skill development that then leads to radical innovations in high technology 
sectors like ICT. 
Respondents in turn noted the importance of both depth and breadth as necessary 
for ICT firms. The most marketable professionals hold generalist skills in business 
marketing and product development along with specialized skills in computer 
programming and engineering. Reflecting the sentiments of interviewees is the famous 
debate between Apple’s Steve Jobs who advocated liberal arts or generalist degrees while 
Microsoft’s Bill Gates stressed the importance of hard skills, especially in programming 
and engineering (The New York Times 2011). Beyond the debate, there are some 
indications as to the orientation of each Nordic country. In terms of the number of 
generalists to specialist tertiary graduates, the data indicate that every Nordic country has 
on average more generalists than specialists, however, Figure 2.3 highlights the 
important variations across the region.13 
                                                
13 The following degree programs were selected from the OECD database and assigned by the author as 
either generalist: “Business administration”; “Humanities; and “Humanities and art” or specialist: 
“Computing” and “Engineering and engineering trades”. 
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Figure 2.2 Tertiary gross enrolment ratio Figure 2.3 Generalist to specialist 
graduates 
  
Source: The World Bank Group 2011. Source: OECD 2015. 
 
In terms of employee incentives, statist social democratic economies tend toward 
group incentives and wage-based compensation. Conversely, liberalizing economies have 
introduced individual, competitive incentives and compensation through bonuses, risk-
based stock options, and other equity stakes. Outside of negotiated wage settings, 
compensation schemes for non-officer employees are often proprietary information and 
thus difficult to quantify. Mixed compensation schemes are also possible as are 
differentiated schemes for specific roles (e.g. individualized incentives for sales 
associates and executive management). Income equality and the associated changes over 
time provide a general indicator of group-based versus personalized incentives. 
Traditional social democratic countries tend more toward income equality and 
liberalizing countries toward greater inequality. Another indicator would be the number 
of extremely wealthy individuals per capita but with the caveat that historical capital 
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While Nordic social democracy supports exceptional levels of income equality, 
Figure 2.4 shows the comparative Gini coefficients for the Nordic countries with notable 
variation across the region. Gini estimates can be problematic as they are often based on 
potentially unreliable or limited survey data (Linford 2011) and underestimate absolute 
changes in income inequality (Wade 2013). The data do show the Nordics consistently 
maintaining low-income inequality through social democratic supports in wage 
equalization and income redistribution. That said, the volatility of the measure makes the 
identification of political orientation difficult if not impossible. 
A more telling measure is the number of recent billionaires and their combined 
net worth compared with total GDP (Figure 2.5). Denmark and Finland have half as 
many billionaires as Norway and Sweden when adjusted for total population. The 
differences between countries are more pronounced when comparing the combined net 
worth of billionaires to total GDP. Sweden exceeds the next highest performer Denmark 
by more than 12 percentage points with 20 percent of total GDP equal to the combined 
net worth of 23 billionaires. Conversely, Finland is the most egalitarian with just five 
billionaires and a combined net worth constituting just three percent of total GDP. 
Norway is slightly higher with more billionaires (10) but with a combined net worth 
comparable to just five percent of total GDP.  
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Figure 2.4 Gini coefficient estimates Figure 2.5 Number of billionaires and 
corresponding net worth in 2015 
  
Source: The World Bank Group 2011. Source: Forbes 2015; The World Bank 
Group 2015. 
 
The macro measures demonstrate heterogeneity in Nordic labor markets, skill 
development, and employment incentives. Denmark tends toward a more liberal 
environment with high rankings in labor freedom, generalist skill development, and 
billionaire net worth as a percentage of total GDP. Sweden also appears more oriented 
toward liberalization with the next highest ranking in labor freedom and an outstanding 
proportion of billionaire net worth in relation to total GDP at 20 percent. However, 
Sweden also produces the highest ratio of specialist degree holders at roughly 45 percent. 
Finland and Norway both score the lowest in labor freedom and have the least amount of 
billionaire net worth as a percentage of total GDP. The two countries also have a 
comparable mix of general degree holders but with Norway holding a slightly higher 
ratio as it does in billionaire net worth as well. Thus, the broad contours of Nordic social 
democracy supportive of labor rights, egalitarian wages, skill development is more 
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Finance 
Along with labor institutions, aspects of finance factor heavily in assessments of 
economic growth and sector development (Zysman 1984). Financing provides firms the 
funds required to support current obligations and future growth. Firms can rely on 
internal financing (e.g. retained earnings) or external sources such as debt and/or share 
equity. In the case of the Nordics, each country has historically relied on bank lending 
and other debt-based financing to support traditional industries like mining, forestry, 
fishing, maritime transportation, and manufacturing. Equity financing has become more 
prevalent in recent years, with the most notable growth occurring in private 
equity/venture capital markets. 
While debt and equity markets have coexisted for centuries, each supports 
different forms of economic production. Debt markets and banking services are better at 
identifying and addressing moral hazard while competitive equity markets effectively 
mitigate issues with incomplete information about the future (Boot and Thakor 1997).14 
Established sectors operate under longer and more predictable time horizons with stable 
risk profiles making debt a more advantageous option. Emergent sectors like ICT have 
shorter development cycles due to rapid innovation and are consequently less predictable 
and riskier but with the potential for outsized investor returns. The form of financing then 
                                                
14 Mayer makes a similar argument in contrasting insider (i.e. debt markets and banking services) vs. 
outsider (i.e. equity markets) with the former more attuned to long term stakeholder strategies and the latter 
more equipped at responding to change (1998). Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic differentiate financial 
markets and banking services with the former favoring long term financing and the latter more short term 
(2000). 
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depends on the needs and strategy of the firm. In practice, firms often access a variety of 
financing options and sector differences are usually by degree, not absolute.15 
Using World Bank Data, recent trends in the Nordics indicate substantial cross-
country variation in the levels of debt and equity financing as a percentage of GDP (The 
World Bank Group 2011). In debt financing, Denmark reversed from essentially last to 
first place and is now the only country to exceed the high-income country (HIC) average 
(Figure 2.6). Sweden has the next highest levels with the exception of the 2000/1 
recession and the concomitant dot.com collapse. Finland and Norway have the lowest 
levels of domestic credit though Finland’s percentage has doubled over the 14-year 
period. Interestingly, the 2007/8 financial crisis shows little impact to debt markets while 
market capitalization fell in every country as shown in Figure 2.7. Counter-cyclical 
lending during the recent recession could explain the apparent stability in domestic credit 
across the Nordic countries. Central government debt as a percentage of GDP did indeed 
increase in the countries suffering the steepest declines in GDP, Denmark and Finland, 
whereas both Norway and Sweden showed overall declines in government debt though 
the recession (The World Bank Group 2011). Regardless, none of the Nordics 
approached the HIC peak average of 67.9 in 2012 at any time. 
Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP shows considerable volatility across 
the Nordics as it does in other HICs due to fluctuations in share price valuations. Finland 
exhibits the most volatility because of the sizeable influence of Nokia which at one point 
                                                
15 Jackson and Deeg note comparable heterogeneity at the country level, complicating efforts in 
determining “dominant financial systems” (2006). 
 
  43 
constituted four percent of total GDP but has since fallen considerably (Viita 2014). 
Following the overall trend, Nokia had a peak valuation of $250B in late 1999 before 
losing nearly 90 percent of total market capitalization to roughly $25B in the present. As 
one of the few high growth firms in Finland, Nokia’s rise and fall skews a trend that 
would otherwise approximate that of Norway with the lowest levels of market 
capitalization. Excluding Finland and the exceptional case of Nokia, Sweden consistently 
leads the Nordics in market capitalization and exceeds the HIC average. Denmark 
occupies a more distant second place though still exceeds Norway in most years. 
Figure 2.6 Domestic credit provided by 
financial sector 
Figure 2.7 Market capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP) 
  
Source: The World Bank Group 2011. 
 
Outside of formal equity stock markets, entrepreneurial firms engaged in riskier 
ventures can access private equity and/or venture capital (PE/VC).16 Firms in emergent 
                                                
16 As a point of clarification, private equity entails any shareholder investment made outside of formal 
equity or stock markets. It includes venture capital, mezzanine financing, growth financing, and buyout 
capital. Both established firms and new ventures utilize private equity, however new ventures tend toward 
private equity in greater absolute numbers due to limited access in established finance markets and the 
expertise of PE/VC investors in supporting new ventures. By definition, venture capital is used nearly 
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sectors like ICT develop unproven products and services for as of yet undefined markets 
making them inherently riskier ventures and thus requiring entrepreneurs to pay a 
premium in accessing PE/VC. Because PE/VC investors expect 90 percent of ventures to 
fail, they require a sizeable equity share to offset losses (Zider 1998). In so doing, PE/VC 
investors receive outsized returns on a few successful ventures to both cover losses from 
failed ventures and generate a positive overall return on investment. For the successful 
entrepreneurial firm, the loss of share ownership carries a considerable price comparable 
to a loan with a 58 percent compound interest rate and encumbrances that resemble those 
in debt lending (e.g. investors have first claim to assets following bankruptcy) (Zider 
1998).17 
Not unexpectedly, ICT startup firms receive the majority of VC funding in every 
region averaging 70.6 percent of an $88.3B total in 2014 (KPMG Enterprise and CB 
Insights 2015) and corroborate the findings of Casper and Soskice that VC is a necessary 
condition for entrepreneurial technology firms (2004). The United Kingdom and 
Germany obtained the lion’s share of European VC with their more developed markets, 
active government policy, and larger absolute market size. At 26 million, the Nordics 
have less than half the population of the United Kingdom and a third of Germany but are 
predicted to receive $1.5B in VC funding by the end of 2015 (Murray 2015). For 
comparison, recent annual averages for the United Kingdom and Germany respectively 
total $3.5B and $2.4B (KPMG Enterprise and CB Insights 2015), indicating that the 
                                                
17 In effect, PE/VC investors address an area of market failure but at a high price to the entrepreneur. 
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Nordics in per capita terms are on par with the United Kingdom and exceed that of 
Germany. 
We again see cross-country variation across the Nordics in the amounts of PE and 
VC as a percentage of total GDP both in industries and in markets. The European 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) produces annual measures of all forms of PE, 
including VC oriented to scaling startups, Growth funds for next stage firms, and Buyout 
funds for acquisition. The EVCA further distinguishes between the industry and market 
sides of PE/VC. The former represents investor funds irrespective of where they invest 
while the latter is the total amount of investments in a particular country, independent of 
origin. As represented in Figure 2.8, Norway and Denmark have the largest PE markets 
but have the least developed PE industries. Figure 2.9 shows Sweden and Finland with 
the largest VC markets but with Denmark having a far more developed VC industry. The 
data corroborate the perception of Finland and Sweden as having more developed ICT 
startup communities with standouts like iZettle, Jolla, Klarna, Mojang, Rovio, Spotify, 
Supercell, and others. 
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Figure 2.8 2014 PE investments            
(% of GDP) 
Figure 2.9 2014 VC investments            
(% of GDP) 
  
Source: EVCA 2015. 
 
As compared to other high income and/or European countries, the Nordics share 
some commonalities though also important differences. The wide variation in Nordic 
PE/VC markets contrasts with the relatively muted average performance in the rest of 
Europe. In debt, the Nordics have a consistently lower percentage to GDP with the 
notable exception of Denmark more recently. Nordic equities, however, generally follow 
the average for other high income countries. Looking across the Nordics, Denmark is 
most reliant on debt markets, has the most developed VC industry and a slightly better 
equity market than Norway and Finland, at least when controlling for the vagaries of 
Nokia. Denmark’s leading position in multiple areas of finance stems in part from their 
relatively early movement toward liberalization starting in the 1950s, well before every 
other Nordic country (Jonung 2008). Notwithstanding Nokia’s volatility, Finland is 
comparable to Norway in debt and equity markets, fares well in VC industry and market 
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appears to have the most developed financial markets across debt, equity, VC markets, 
and PE industry. Sweden’s ability to extend a variety of financing options helps to 
explain the existence of both large, established ICT firms, as well as several high growth 
startups. 
Firm organization 
Firm organization entails the ways in which cultural norms, rules, and hierarchies 
within the firm direct interaction between employees and management. When compared 
with other European countries, the Nordics have more firms with relatively flat 
organizational structures in which employees actively advance new ideas and challenge 
existing business practices while trusting management to set overall strategy. The ideals 
inherent in Nordic firm organization are considered both highly innovative and the most 
favorable model for launching technology firms (Saxenian 1994; Grant 1996; Fried and 
Hansson 2010). While comparative measures of firm organization are limited, an analysis 
by Lorenz utilizing results from the fifth European Working Conditions survey indicates 
variation amongst the Nordics (2013). Table 2.1 shows all of the Nordics exceeding the 
EU-38 average in discretionary learning as the dominant form of organization but also 
that Denmark and Sweden lead Finland and Norway by a wide margin. 






EU-38	 36.3%	 27.0%	 18.4%	 18.3%	
Denmark	 61.9%	 16.9%	 8.3%	 16.9%	
Finland	 42.2%	 36.5%	 9.8%	 11.6%	
Norway	 54.7%	 27.8%	 11.7%	 5.8%	
Sweden	 61.9%	 20.1%	 8.6%	 9.5%	
Source: Lorenz 2013. 
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In a survey of more than 720 firms, Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen found that 
Swedish firms have the highest trust amongst organizational units, enabling 
decentralization and increased productivity (2012). Lundvall found variation between 
Danish and Norwegian firm organization with managerial delegation and functional 
flexibility more prevalent in Danish firms (62 percent) than Norwegian firms (20 percent) 
due to greater firm/employee strategic alignment, performance-based compensation, and 
cross-disciplinary work groups (2002). Firm respondents stated that Danish and 
Norwegian firms organize under comparable flat structures, though Danish firms are 
thought to be more transparent. Respondents in both countries then contrasted Danish and 
Norwegian organization against the Swedish model, which they generally viewed as 
relatively more structured, and hierarchical, enabling effective strategy execution.18 
Conversely, the example of Nokia demonstrates how a once open, entrepreneurial 
culture hardened into an unproductive structure in which powerful yet isolated managers 
protected positions at the expense of driving collaborative innovation (Huy and Vuori 
2014). The deleterious practice extended into the executive office, where the governing 
board allowed two successive CEOs to oversee a precipitous decline in shareholder value 
over an extended duration, even as Nokia expended more than $60B in research and 
development (R&D) (Viita 2014). The overarching consensus across the Nordics is that 
egalitarianism and autonomy can be conducive to idea formation but also limit (or 
reverse) firm growth due to a lack of accountability and direction. 
                                                
18 Authors distinguish Danish firm organization in noting the prevalence of ad-hoc management and 
informal project teams (Kristen, Lotz, and Rocha 2011). Respondents noted the lack of formal structures as 
well, enabling idea formation but limiting strategic execution. 
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Inter-firm dynamics 
The dynamics between firms then complements organization within firms in 
directing overall sector outcomes. Interaction between competitors, suppliers, and 
customers within a discernable economic cluster can facilitate knowledge sharing, 
consequently enhancing ICT sector development. Inter-firm dynamics can operate under 
a more competitive or cooperative environment with developed clusters exhibiting 
aspects of both (Saxenian 1994; Porter 2000). Collaboration is more prevalent in 
coordinated economies where a holding firm enables the sharing of intellectual property 
amongst firms while not losing it to outsiders (Hall and Soskice 2001b). Conversely, 
liberal market economies tend toward more competitive inter-firm dynamics as 
cooperation could lead to a loss of intellectual property under independent ownership. 
In the Nordics, macro statistics indicate a mixed picture for inter-firm dynamics 
both across and within countries. Finland, Norway, and Sweden all rank well above the 
OECD average in the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy, which ostensibly should 
foster increased inter-firm competition (Figure 2.10). This is indeed the case for Norway 
and Sweden, both of which rank high in the intensity of local competition and are on par 
with the OECD average. Denmark, however, fares low in anti-monopoly policy 
effectiveness but high in local competition intensity while Finland shows the opposite. 
Disregarding the apparent inconsistency and possible irrelevance of monopoly policy 
effectiveness, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden all appear more oriented toward inter-firm 
competition while Finland, by corollary, should be more cooperative.  
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Figure 2.10 Measures of competition and cluster development 
 
Source: World Economic Forum 2014. 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden rank above the OECD average in cluster 
development while Denmark ranks below the average. Denmark’s high intensity in local 
competition and low state of cluster development should indicate more atomized 
competition and fewer opportunities for knowledge share. Finland’s high cluster 
development but low intensity in local competition follows the Nokia example, at least in 
the ICT sector. As a national champion, Nokia had effectively no local competition and 
instead sponsored and then acquired local startups (Wearden 2010). Still, the dearth of 
objective measures of inter-firm dynamics makes it difficult to derive general conclusions 
across the Nordics.  
Innovation/technology policy 
Innovation/technology policy (ITP) comprises a broad set of state-directed 
initiatives to promote, coordinate, or direct innovation and technology advancement. 
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development, ITP can overlap other social, economic, or industrial state initiatives. 
Further, the specific objectives of each state’s policy vary, depending on factor 
endowments, historical institutions, changes in government, and other factors. The OECD 
identifies supply side components like R&D tax incentives and innovation grants, 
demand side aspects including government procurement, and areas that encompass both 
supply and demand dynamics through promotion and public/private partnerships (Guinet 
2008). Another heuristic for rationalizing ITP is to delineate policies by degree. Porter 
advocates relatively thin institutional policies to enhance macro stability and clarify rules 
for competition as well as more intensive measures including investments in education, 
infrastructure, cluster development, and long-term economic planning (2000). Finally, 
ITP can be categorized as broad-based and diffused (e.g. basic education and 
infrastructure) or more targeted in sponsoring specific sectors and firm classes (i.e. 
SMEs, large incumbents, TNCs) (Casper 2007; Asheim 2011b). 
Given the active role of the state in supporting social democracy, each of the 
Nordics engages in policy formation to advance wider socioeconomic objectives. A 
major component of Nordic policy includes ITP with direct and indirect support for the 
ICT sector with varying priorities, orientations, and intensities across countries. Because 
of limited natural resources, Finland’s government has since the 1960s actively 
influenced the domestic economy (Suorsa 2007). Finland consequently has the most 
developed and directed ITP with support for the ICT sector administered through 
multiple state organizations including CSC, Foundation for Finnish Inventions, Sitra, 
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VTT, and most notably, Tekes (Sinno 2012).19 Conversely, Norway with an abundance of 
natural resources is regarded as a relative latecomer in ITP (Suorsa 2007; Moen 2011), 
and ranks far below the other Nordics in measures of innovation (European Commission 
2014a).20 Norway actively supports leading sectors including ICT through state 
ownership, directed R&D, and innovation funding. By contrast, Danish and Swedish ITP 
is less targeted and more diffused favoring certain sectors more than others (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz 1991). Swedish ITP has been more favorable to the ICT in supporting large 
incumbents, TNCs, and a strong startup/SME community. Denmark continues to improve 
conditions for startups and SMEs while dismantling supports for large incumbents. 
Common across the Nordics is the comparatively small ministries focused on 
planning and strategy with semiautonomous government agencies executing plans and 
programs (OECD 2009). The Nordic governance structure facilitates rapid policy 
formation to unify national objectives and ensure universal application. Regional 
disparities persist, especially for underserved remote areas (Suorsa 2007), but efforts like 
Norway’s progressive allocation of innovation funding has done little to improve 
observed inequalities. A second area in which the Nordics are all aligned is in support of 
ICT infrastructure, a priority further supported by two of Europe’s 2020 flagship 
initiatives, the Digital Agenda for Europe and Innovation Union (Veugelers 2012). As 
such, this passage addresses areas in which the Nordic countries differ in ITP as relevant 
                                                
19 Finnish Centre for Science (CSC), Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra), Technical Research Center of 
Finland (VTT), the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology Innovation (Tekes). 
20 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are all identified as “innovation leaders” with Norway dubbed a 
“moderate innovator” ranking below the EU average just above Italy (European Commission 2014a). 
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to ICT. Specifically, ITP includes ICT sector supports, R&D, funding, firm incubation, 
and promotion while excluding common factors like ICT infrastructure. 
Sector support 
Sector supports can include home market coordination/protection, subsidies, 
directed investment, and government procurement amongst others. In every instance, 
what separates sector supports from broader industry, technology, and innovation policies 
is that they are “…designed to complement or… circumvent ‘normal’ incentives and 
constraints within an economy toward particular firms” (Casper 2007, 38). According to 
Asheim, Finland and Sweden pursue national and regional innovation policies whereas 
Denmark and Norway employ less comprehensive yet specific policies favoring certain 
sectors (2011a). In the case of Nordic ICT sector development, Finnish and Swedish 
national ITP has led to sector supports for the leading firms of Nokia and Ericsson, as 
well SMEs and startups more recently. Conversely, Danish and Norwegian sector 
supports largely exclude the ICT sector and instead favor established, core sectors. 
Finland continues an active public policy of fostering innovation with the state 
leading collaboration between firms and labor organizations (Castells and Himanen 
2002). Whether ITP involves traditional R&D funding, infrastructure investments, and 
strategic planning or limited liberalization, the state has been the dominate actor (Castells 
and Himanen 2002). During the 1990s, Finland moved from one of the lowest to one of 
the highest in ICT specialization (Koski, Rouvinen, and Ylä-Anttila 2002) with ITP 
playing a significant role. Finnish ITP involved advancing national policies to improve 
R&D, advanced tertiary education, state coordination, and directed funding across 
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multiple sectors. Realizing the potential for mobile communications, Nokia divested out 
of unaligned businesses to focus on manufacturing handsets and telecommunications 
equipment in an environment in which the state would provide considerable support to 
potentially develop a technology national champion. 
Nokia’s success enabled it to move away from state supports even as market 
share, profitability, and employment fell by nearly 90 percent over the next 15 years. 
Since then, sector supports continue to prioritize national objectives but with an increased 
focus on SMEs and startups, never to depend on a single large firm. The leading 
innovation organization Tekes has a €550M annual operating budget, Aalto University 
sponsors the incubator Startup Sauna with 126 graduates since 2010, and the Finnish 
Ministry of Employment and Economy started the accelerator Vigo (Belton 2015). In so 
doing, Finnish ICT continues to lead the OECD in share of value added due to the 
ongoing contributions of a resurrected Nokia and a strong startup/SME community 
garnering international acclaim.21 
Norwegian ITP includes direct supports, tax incentives, and R&D nominally 
geared toward increasing innovation but in practice operates as a pretext for other 
political objectives (Andersen and Freihow 2012). Norway espouses supports for more 
encompassing sector development though policy remains largely unchanged in targeting 
core sectors with few supports for ICT (Broch and Isaksen 2004; Grønning, Moen, and 
Olsen 2008; Asheim 2011b). As the leading agency tasked with implementing ITP, 
                                                
21 Following the acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent for €15.6B and the divestiture of HERE software for $2.5B, 
Nokia stands to become the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer (Boston 2015; Olson 
2015). 
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Innovation Norway has been the subject of criticism from ministerial reviews and local 
news enquires for failing to support the most innovative sectors like ICT in the most 
promising region of Oslo. Innovation Norway cites their broader mandate beyond 
innovation to include economic redistribution and regional development. Critics contend 
that the expanded mandate enables Innovation Norway to allocate funding based on 
political patronage over economic need. Still, less innovative but core sectors comprised 
of oil and gas, fisheries, and agriculture receive the majority of funding further enabling 
these industries to develop sustaining independent sectoral innovation systems while ICT 
remains excluded (Fagerberg, Mowery, and Verspagen 2009).22  
With either controlling or majority holdings in the largest firms and a 37 percent 
overall ownership in the Oslo Børs stock exchange, firm ownership by the state remains 
the most direct form of Norwegian sector support (The Economist 2013). Norwegian 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) are in the leading sectors, especially natural resources and 
finance, though the state maintains majority investments in the largest ICT firms like 
Telenor and Evry. Government procurement also favors large firms over small firms 
through projects that stipulate scale efficiencies and cost containment requirements over 
innovation, product development, and venture creation (Grønning, Moen, and Olsen 
2008). The recently elected conservative government has since pledged improved support 
for the ICT sector through a revised national policy oriented toward commercialization 
(Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). 
                                                
22 Also benefitting from ITP, the defense industry led by Kongsberg has helped with technology 
advancement though spillovers are limited and most private/public ventures have failed (Moen 2011). 
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Swedish sector supports initially favored large incumbent firms through directed 
R&D and coordinated collaboration between the state-owned telecommunications carrier 
(then called Swedish Telecom) and the equipment manufacturer Ericsson (OECD 1992). 
ICT SMEs, market competition, and entrepreneurship were effectively excluded (OECD 
1992), however demand supports through subsidized home PC ownership (Glimstedt and 
Zander 2003) provided broad-based sector support. Edquist and Lundvall agree with the 
OECD assessment and that supports benefited concentrated TNCs as well while failing to 
develop the domestic ICT sector beyond Ericsson (1993). 
Swedish ITP continued to favor large incumbents through the 1990s, though now 
augmented to include favorable tax policy on risk-based capital investments (Carlsson 
1997) directly benefitting startups. Ericsson as well shifted strategy in the late 1990s 
during the era of deregulation in moving toward open standards, active engagement with 
local SMEs, and a continued push in radical innovation (Carlsson 1997; Casper and 
Glimstedt 2001). High tax rates, inflexible regulations, bureaucratic government, and a 
large monopolized public sector continued (Carlsson 1997), however the incremental 
shifts in technology policy and firm strategy and effectively reoriented the ICT sector 
toward the symbiotic development of large incumbent firms and SMEs. More recently, 
diffused liberalizing policies including reduced tax rates, increased competition, and a 
culture of entrepreneurship have transformed the incumbent Ericsson into a global 
competitor and incubated a strong startup community. 
Danish ICT policy has always favored technology diffusion over directed 
initiatives like large scale R&D (Edquist and Lundvall 1993). The government provides 
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few supports for the ICT sector and is skeptical of new innovation policies (Ornston 
2012a). Without direct support, the Danish ICT sector benefits from broad-based policies 
to increase competitiveness and organic growth. Through industry and labor cooperation 
instead of state direction, Danish ITP prioritizes lifelong learning and training, 
entrepreneurship, and inter-firm cooperation (Ornston 2012b) which have been conducive 
to ICT sector development but mostly for SMEs and startups. Conversely, liberalizing 
policies have eroded sector supports for large incumbent firms through privatization, 
divestiture, organizational restructuring, and layoffs. 
The limited direct forms of Danish ITP include 22 initiatives to improve ICT 
infrastructure and increased digitization of private and government entities (The Danish 
Government 2013). In a break from past practice, the government recently commissioned 
an ICT growth team tasked with conceiving wider policy recommendations to help 
develop the ICT sector (The Danish Government 2013). Growth team recommendations 
include continued support for existing initiatives but also advocate devising a national 
ICT strategy to include improved ICT education, access to public data for product and 
service development, improved commercialization of public R&D, public procurement 
policies with export potential, and improved digital security (Telecompaper 2014). That 
said, Denmark has yet to develop a national strategy for ICT or move from its historical 
approach in advancing relatively thin, market-oriented, and broad-based ITP. Without a 
lighthouse firm or viable public R&D institutions, however, diffused ITP has led to 
sectoral ambiguities, especially in directing skill formation under high labor mobility 
(Kristen, Lotz, and Rocha 2011), consequently undermining overall sector potential. 
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R&D intensity and focus 
The ICT sector is the most R&D intensive with an industry rate of 13.6 percent 
for the software and internet industry and 7.0 percent for electronics (Jaruzelski and 
Dehoff 2008).23 Measured as a percentage of total GDP, Finland and Sweden outpace 
Denmark, Norway, and the OECD average in R&D in most years by at least a percentage 
point (Figure 2.11). Denmark has made significant progress over the past 15 years by 
improving a full percentage point, now exceeding the OECD average and the Barcelona 
goal of three percent. Norway consistently falls below every other Nordic country, the 
OCED average, and the Barcelona goal although the R&D deficit is attributed to 
differences in industrial development (i.e. oil and gas) and the high incidence of SMEs 
(Grønning, Moen, and Olsen 2008). Figure 2.12 provides support for Norway’s special 
case showing the percentage of non-business R&D from the overall total.24 Unlike the 
other Nordics who trend near the OECD rate ranging between 30 and 33 percent, Norway 
averages 15 percent higher in non-business R&D. In the remaining Nordics, Denmark’s 
progress can be attributed to increasing private investment while Sweden appears to be 
shifting from private to public R&D, as is Finland more recently.  
                                                
23 Healthcare is the second most R&D intensive at 13.4 percent (Jaruzelski and Dehoff 2008), 
24 Non-business R&D includes R&D predominantly from government resources but also higher education, 
private non-profit, and funds from abroad (OECD 2015). 
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Figure 2.11 R&D Expenditure               
(% of GDP) 
Figure 2.12 Non-Business Enterprise 
R&D (% of GDP) 
  
Source: The World Bank Group 2015. Source: OECD 2015. 
 
Using strong ties between the state and industry, Finland pursues science-driven 
policy oriented toward research and high technology development (Asheim 2011a; 
Ornston 2012b). Public R&D investment helped drive the rise of Nokia and the continued 
expansion of the ICT startup community, especially through the efforts of Finland’s 
leading innovation organization Tekes. Following the 2007/8 global recession, Finland 
sought to maintain gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) at a rate of four percent 
as part of the recent “Research and Innovation Policy Guidelines for 2011-2015” (Sinno 
2012). However, Finland’s tepid recovery continues to constrain private sector R&D, 
reducing total R&D below the four percent target. To address the shortfall, Finnish ICT 
firms are now soliciting foreign direct investment (FDI) as in the example of Chinese 
handset manufacturer Huawei investing €70M in a R&D center to develop smartphones 
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Norwegian policy as well seeks to increase private sector R&D though structural 
issues hinder increased contributions (Grønning, Moen, and Olsen 2008) and necessitate 
ongoing dependence on public sector R&D. Norwegian public and private R&D has not 
been favorable to knowledge intensive sectors like ICT, due to priorities on process 
innovations in a resource-based economy (Asheim 2011a) and labor/cost savings 
(Kristensen 2011). Government programs in the ICT center of Oslo have been mostly 
unsuccessful because funding has favored low priority sectors and inconsistent 
innovation objectives (Pålshaugen 2011). Norway’s leading research organization, the 
Research Council of Norway (RCN), and the largest research facility in the Nordics, 
SINTEF, have consistently underfunded ICT, though the former now seeks to redress the 
disparity with a special purpose ICT fund (The Research Council of Norway 2012). More 
positively, ICT firms disproportionately take advantage of the RCN-administered tax 
incentive program for private sector R&D (Norges forskningsråd 2014). 
Norway’s high concentration of public research institutions diverges from 
Sweden’s low concentration with the latter contributing less than five percent as opposed 
to the former’s 20 percent (Edquist 2011). Administered through more than 20 agencies 
pursuing medium-sized interventions from multiple ministries, the OECD rightly 
characterizes Swedish public R&D funding as “fragmented” (2013, 28). Fragmentation 
has not prevented Sweden from defining aggressive objectives with the leading agency 
VINNOVA having a comparable mandate to Finland’s Tekes but with an operating 
budget that is one third the size (OECD 2013). An early internal review by VINNOVA 
acknowledged as much, further noting the lack of support for knowledge-intensive 
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startups and SMEs (Marklund et al. 2004). VINNOVA has since implemented the VINN 
NU program for new R&D based firms though funding remains relatively insignificant at 
SEK 6.0M p.a. (Myrehed 2013). Accordingly, private sector R&D from large TNCs 
contributes the majority of R&D funding (Suorsa 2007) in support of process innovations 
and complex product improvement (Asheim 2011a). 
Similar to the historical pattern of Sweden prior to 2003, Danish private sector 
R&D has improved while public contributions have fallen and now appear stagnate 
(Christensen et al. 2008). Danish R&D agencies are again comparable to Sweden with a 
relatively high number of R&D councils and funds complicating coordination, limiting 
flexibility, and hindering large scale objectives (The Danish Government 2012, 12). 
Thus, Danish firms leverage modest R&D investments with skilled employees and tight 
customer integration to support new product development (Kristensen 2011). More 
broadly, the Danish innovation system favors market based and user-driven incentives 
over core R&D (Asheim 2011a). ICT firms follow the general trend in contributing a 
large share of total private sector R&D but predominantly through product and service 
development, not intensive basic research. 
Funding 
Directed finance can benefit both large, incumbent firms as well as startups and 
SMEs. Technology-based SMEs, however, have more difficulty accessing private 
financing and therefore stand to realize higher growth through public financing options 
from grants, loans, and state funded VC (Revest and Sapio 2010). Europe in particular is 
unable to provide levels of risk-based financing comparable to leading economies like the 
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United States, causing some to advocate for broader funding support as part of the recent 
Europe 2020 initiative (Veugelers 2012). While funds will always remain scarce, the 
more pressing challenge for governments is to develop the competencies required to 
effectively allocate funding to the most promising ventures (Avnimelech, Rosiello, and 
Teubal 2010; Revest and Sapio 2010). As in the example of Norway and Denmark, the 
former has sizeable funds but a limited history in risk-based investments while the latter 
has more experience in risk-based financing but operates with a much smaller pool of 
capital. 
Public investment also differs in funding levels with government more apt to 
support early stage funding and leaving later stage funding to private markets. Finland 
follows this approach with public investors providing effectively all pre-seed and seed 
funding but relatively little in late stage financing (Nordic Innovation 2012). Norwegian 
public investors also provide the overwhelming majority of pre-seed and seed funding but 
far less in absolute terms and as compared with late-stage financing provided by private 
and public resources (Nordic Innovation 2012). Sweden relies more on private funding at 
all levels yet again suffers from a dearth of early stage funding. The government recently 
established two public funds using SEK 5.0B in capital, however the new funds are 
earmarked for the automobile industry and broad-based development in Sweden’s 
underserved northern region (Nordic Innovation 2012). 
Denmark has the lowest overall levels of public funding as evidenced by the 
largest agencies Vækstfonden and Innovationsfonden operating with just DKK 2.0B (Hal 
2013; Vækstfonden 2015). Instead, Denmark receives a higher percentage of foreign 
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private VC funding at 45 percent, well above the non-Danish Nordic average of 28 
percent (Grimsby, Grünfeld, and Espelien 2010). 
Incubation 
To facilitate growth in the number and size of new enterprises, Nordic 
governments sponsor incubators, accelerators, innovation centers, and science parks to 
provide funding, mentoring, networking, operating space, and infrastructure especially 
for highly innovative sectors like ICT.25 Incubation in Denmark and Sweden is more 
organic utilizing grass roots networks, private resources, and to a lesser degree, direct and 
indirect public support. Danish entrepreneurs leverage networking applications like Grip 
while their Swedish counterparts developed the Swedish Innovation Compass app to 
bring together an aspiring technology community with the support of accomplished 
founders and investors. Danish ITP has been most effective in supporting public/private 
collaboration as in the case of Denmark’s leading incubator Pre-Seed Innovation, formed 
from the merger of incubators Symbion and DTU Innovation out of the public Danish 
Technical University with additional funding from the VC firm SEED capital. 
The Swedish startup community is larger, more advanced, and continues to push 
for institutional reforms supportive of venture creation through efforts like the Swedish 
Startup Manifesto. Sweden has more than 40 incubators, 30 science parks, and 12 seed 
capital funds/business angel networks with notable standouts including the university 
                                                
25 As a point of clarification, incubators sponsor long-term initiatives to develop internally conceived ideas 
while accelerators are short-term efforts to advance externally conceived ideas (DesMarais 2012). Science 
parks are more supportive of large, established firms (SISP 2015) though often in conjunction with startups 
and spinoffs. Innovation centers are broadly defined entities usually oriented toward R&D. I use the term 
“incubator” and “incubation” to comprise all venture creation efforts regardless of if they are more 
accurately described as science parks, innovation centers, accelerators, or strictly defined incubators. 
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affiliated Encubator and Uppsala Innovation Centre. Government involvement recently 
improved in 2011 through the Innoationsbron fund providing SEK 56.4M to 46 
incubators (Dahlstrand 2012) and VINNOVA’s funding of the National Open Platform 
project to align innovation and collaboration efforts under a unified national strategy 
(SISP 2015). Still, the most successful entrepreneurs leverage private sector supports 
through established networks VC investors, angel investors, and founders. 
The Finnish government has a long standing in supporting high technology firm 
incubation and most incubators continue to rely on government support. Established in 
the early to mid-1980s, the first science parks in Oulu and Espoo struggled to survive due 
to limited funding and had little impact in firm creation. The recession of the early 1990s 
further weakened the science parks but also compelled the government to establish the 
TE-Center in support of creating 16 incubators in Finland’s technology center in the 
greater Helsinki region (Abetti 2004). The number of incubators has since grown 
substantially with the government providing indirect and direct support through funding 
agencies like Tekes and public universities as in the notable example of Startup Sauna 
supported by Aalto University.26 As an example of private sector incubation support, 
Technopolis is a publicly traded, for profit firm led by a liberal CEO operating 20 
business parks across Finland, Norway, Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia.27 That said, 
Technopolis receives direct funding from Tekes in support of programs like Innovation 
                                                
26 Finland has 54 entities providing work space, business incubation, business plan competitions, training, 
mentoring, and matchmaking events to support venture creation (StartSmart 2015). 
27 In an open letter to the Finnish government, Technopolis’ CEO Keith Silverang famously quoted Ronald 
Regan in declaring: “Government is not the solution to our problems. Government is the problem” (2014). 
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Mill to commercialize new ideas and existing intellectual property rights (IPR) (European 
Commission 2015b). Thus, statist ITP continues even as certain actors advance strategies 
more consistent with liberalization. 
Norwegian incubation also benefits substantially from ITP support, though efforts 
are relatively recent and with mixed results. Given that greater Oslo is the technology 
center in Norway, the government established an ICT research park on the site of the 
former airport in nearby Fornebu. Multiple SEOs including Statoil and Telenor, along 
with technology TNCs relocated to the park to collocate with the state-sponsored 
incubator Simula. Simula continues to produce viable ICT startups, though funding is 
small compared to the total budgets of the RCN, SINTEF, and Innovation Norway. Other 
notable incubators include StartupLab near the University of Oslo and MESH in central 
Oslo, both receiving government support and through a growing founder’s community 
providing private funding.  
Promotion 
Finland leads in the promotion of innovative enterprises and especially ICT. The 
Finnish government formed the collaborative network “Team Finland” in 2011 bringing 
together three ministries, the prime minister’s office, 11 government agencies, and 
several cultural/scientific institutes to promote innovative enterprises at home and abroad 
(Team Finland 2015). Coordination efforts continue across ministries and agencies even 
though the government has cut promotion funding in response to continued low economic 
growth. In the ICT sector, the government actively supports Europe’s largest startup 
conference Slush with either the Prime Minister or President attending and/or opening the 
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event (Miki Kuusi 2015). The conference showcases Finnish ICT abroad and is supported 
by direct funding from the sponsoring Aalto University and contributions from Tekes 
(STVP 2015). Finland’s active promotion has demonstrated positive results as Figure 
2.13 shows exceptional media coverage in technology startups in relation to the other 
Nordics, outpacing rates of funding as well. 
Figure 2.13 Intra-regional distribution of startup media coverage and investment 
 
Source: Murray 2015. 
 
Sweden recently established their own “Team Sweden” in support of the 
government’s objective to maintain the lowest unemployment rate in the EU by 2020 
(Government Office of Sweden 2015). The initiative does not target particular sectors for 
promotion or active support seeking instead broader reforms aimed at simplifying export 
regulations. That said, specifics have yet to be developed pending the release of the 
government’s wider export strategy later in 2015 (Government Office of Sweden 2015). 
Denmark initiated an export and promotion strategy in 2014 with nine general measures 
supported by 40 discrete initiatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, The Trade 
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Council 2014). One of the measures includes funding for collaboration in strategic 
sectors. However, the government has not yet disclosed which sectors are “strategic”. 
While Norway has a ministerial agency for oil and gas and fisheries, it does not have one 
for ICT. Promotion of the ICT sector consequently falls to trade and employer 
associations like Abelia and IKT Norge with support from the RCN and related industry 
trade associations like security. Innovation Norway and Startup Extreme help to promote 
the ICT sector but with limited resources, as reflected in the relatively low media 
coverage depicted in Figure 2.13. 
Nordic ICT sector outcomes 
To summarize the preceding discussion, all of the Nordics continue to maintain 
strong commitments to social democracy though each has pragmatically altered 
institutions and ITP to direct sector outcomes. Finland retains statist social democratic 
institutions limiting labor freedom and private sector funding. Offsetting these 
constraints, the Finnish government actively supports highly innovative enterprises 
through directed funding, tertiary education, and intensive R&D. Sweden has moved 
decidedly toward liberalization with high levels of private sector financing in all forms, 
reduced regulation, and lowered taxation. ITP is fragmented with the private sector 
playing a more active role in funding, R&D, and firm incubation. Denmark has also 
advanced liberalizing reforms with high labor mobility, flexible organization structures, 
limited ICT sector supports, and diffused, underfunded ITP. Similar to Finland, Norway 
follows a state-centric development path in many regards. Most notably, Norway ranks 
relatively low in labor freedom, has limited equity financing with the state as the single 
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largest investor, a high number of SOEs, and ITPs that favor strategic sectors and large 
incumbents. These characteristics then inform the direction and form of ICT sector 
development. 
The intersection of domestic institutions and ITP informs outcomes in Nordic ICT 
sector development, though divergent pathways favor certain firm types over others, 
consequently impacting aggregate levels. Finland and Sweden outperform Denmark and 
Norway in ICT sector development even though the all follow different development 
paths unaligned with sector outcomes. Regardless of the path taken, Finland and Sweden 
lead in ICT because they manage to support lighthouse firms like Nokia and Ericsson 
while also building out competitive SMEs and high growth startups that in total explains 
aggregate levels of sector development. The following profiles the outcomes of large ICT 
firms and SMEs/startups for the four Nordic cases under cursory review. 
Large firms, incumbents, and lighthouses 
Studies on Nordic ICT development focus on Finland and Sweden where the 
global telecommunication equipment manufacturers Nokia and Ericsson dominate and 
are thought to be highly relevant in structuring a set of localized institutions that defy 
national frameworks (Casper and Glimstedt 2001; Ali-Yrkkö and Hermans 2002; Castells 
and Himanen 2002; Richards 2004). Nokia and Ericsson realized rapid growth through 
novel firm strategies and directed policies though in neither case was policy used to 
selectively determine a “national champion” (Richards 2004). In Norway, state 
ownership and directed ITP supported the transition of Telenor from a domestic 
incumbent carrier to a global mobile communications provider that now ranks 12th in 
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overall size and includes substantial holding in other large telecommunications 
companies. Denmark does not have a large, lighthouse ICT firm due to the ongoing 
reduction in sector supports. 
Nokia was the undisputed ICT lighthouse in the Nordics from the mid-1980s 
before peaking in the 2000s, followed by a precipitous decline. Nokia was a longstanding 
conglomerate with by 1967 included five disparate business lines comprised of rubber, 
cable, forestry, electronics and power generation. It was not until 1989 that Nokia began 
to divest all but its telecommunications business, a strategy realized in 1996 (Nokia 
2015). During its peak years, Nokia was as a highly innovative and successful firm, 
becoming the world leader in mobile handset production and other related technologies. 
Nokia’s dominance in handsets eroded under poor management in failing to anticipate the 
rapid adoption of smartphones that utilized faster fourth-generation (4G) networks. 
Following the loss of substantial market share to competitors in China, Korea, 
Taiwan, and the United States, Nokia sold the mainline devices and related services 
business to Microsoft in 2014.28 The residual company immediately refocused on the 
remaining business lines including mapping software HERE, telecommunications 
equipment, and other mobile technologies (e.g. the Nokia N1 handheld device) (Nokia 
2015). More recently, Nokia is repositioning itself as one of the largest 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers through the planned acquisition of 
competitor Alcatel-Lucent for €15.6B while divesting itself of the HERE software 
business for $2.5B to a German auto maker consortia (Boston 2015; Olson 2015). 
                                                
28 Microsoft recently wrote down $7.5B from the Nokia handset acquisition (Kumar 2015). 
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Morgan clarifies the role of Nokia in Finnish ICT development finding that 
coordination between the lighthouse, state, and society enabled dynamic development 
that was neither overly statist or restricted by existing institutions (2006). In effect, the 
Finnish government operated pragmatically in directly supporting Nokia and enabling a 
capable workforce required by the firm. Nokia then advanced its own firm strategy by 
accessing aspects of the traditional statist support structure including directed R&D but 
also market-based institutions like external equity financing and organizational change 
(Castells and Himanen 2002). However, rigid institutions also led to a culture of 
excessive tolerance as Nokia’s executive management continued to fail (The Economist 
2013a) most infamously demonstrated in Stephen Elop’s “Burning Platform” call to 
action memo failing to turn the firm around after losing considerable market share (Elop 
2011). 
Following in the wake of Nokia’s demise, the Finnish government committed to 
never become dependent on a single dominant firm and ensure economic diversification 
through multiple, complementary firms (The Economist 2013b). Nokia received the 
majority of funding from the Finland’s Technology Office of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (later Tekes) in the 1970s and 1980s, peaking at 26.3 percent before falling to 
0.3 percent by 2001 (Ali-Yrkkö and Hermans 2002). Because of Finland’s long-term and 
focused ITP, the fall of Nokia catalyzed a rising startup cluster as former Nokia engineers 
went on to found new companies. Under a supportive institutional environment led by the 
state, redundant workers quickly transitioned into entrepreneurs instead of shifting into 
non-complementary sectors or swelling the roles of the unemployed. 
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The telecommunications equipment manufacturer Ericsson remains one of the 
most influential ICT firms in the Nordics. Beginning in 1876 as a telegraph repair shop, 
Ericsson quickly expanded abroad and embarked on a number of innovative initiatives in 
becoming the first company to develop a digital exchange (AXE), mobile system, GSM 
network, LTE network, and setting the 2010 world record for fastest mobile broadband 
(84mb) over HSPA (Ericsson 2010). Ericsson’s networks carry 40 percent of global 
mobile traffic with over two billion subscribers and expects to support 50 billion devices 
by 2020 (Stojanovic 2015). Ericsson continues to grow and innovate globally with 
118,055 employees, 21.4 percent of which are dedicated to R&D producing in excess of 
35,000 patents (Ericsson 2010). Globalization, however, has increased competition for 
Ericsson leading to more than 15,000 layoffs to maintain profitability (The Economist 
2013a; The Local 2015). 
As Norway’s incumbent telecommunications carrier, Telenor has enjoyed decades 
of support and protection by the state, operating as an effective monopoly until global 
deregulation initiated limited privatization and increased competition. Telenor became a 
public corporation in 1994 but did not begin to privatize until 2000 (Telenor Group 
2015). The Norwegian government maintains controlling interest in Telenor with a 54 
percent stake while resisting acquisition as in the planned merger with Sweden’s Telia in 
1999. Following public listing and limited privatization, Telenor transitioned into a TNC 
through acquisitions in emerging markets. It also relocated to the new Fornebu 
technology center and in the process reorganized to reduce costs and improve operations 
(Telenor Group 2015). 
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Telenor was also a long-term innovator, beginning with the absorption of R&D 
institutions and surplus labor following the collapse of the Norwegian 
telecommunications equipment industry (Sogner 2009). Telenor also spun out innovative 
enterprises like the software company Opera during the 1990s and continues to develop 
partnerships with leading firms like Tandberg. Since then, Telenor has focused more on 
operational efficiencies and international expansion. The firm invests less in core R&D 
by utilizing other equipment manufacturers and relies less on internal human capital, 
favoring increased outsourcing and offshoring instead. 
Denmark does not have a clear ICT lighthouse firm due in part to liberalizing 
reforms that have removed sector supports for large, established firms. The largest ICT 
firm is the incumbent telecommunications provider TDC. The firm fully privatized before 
every other Nordic country leading to acquisition by a private equity consortium before 
relisting on the OMX exchange. Following the change in ownership, TDC underwent 
restructuring and forced layoffs, reducing total employment to just over 10,000 – far 
lower than Ericsson’s 117,000, Nokia’s 50,000, or Telenor’s 33,000. Following 
acquisition, TDC also reduced R&D to 1.5 percent of total revenues (Jaruzelski and 
Dehoff 2008), refocused on domestic markets, increased use of original equipment 
manufacturers OEMs (i.e. external vendors), and continued wider cost containment 
initiatives to increase profitability. The few innovations still made in Danish 
telecommunications have been in product packaging (e.g. service bundling) and process 
improvements, not enhanced services like high-speed broadband or new technologies 
(Falch and Henten 2007). 
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Small firms and startups 
SMEs in the majority of OECD countries have historically provided 60 to 70 
percent of total employment (OECD 1997). Beyond enabling the core of employment, 
Nordic SMEs also demonstrate the potential for high growth. While the Nordics are 
relatively insignificant in terms of European GDP and population at a respective two and 
three percent, the region has produced nearly 10 percent of the world’s billion dollar 
firms over the previous decade, ranking third behind the United States and China, and 
exceeds the combined remainder for Europe (Creandum 2015). Nordic ICT startups in 
particular have performed well but again outcomes vary across countries. Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark have produced the most and highest valued ICT firms while 
Norway has performed significantly lower. 
The index of entrepreneurship tightly correlates with the degree of liberalization 
across the Nordics. The more liberal Sweden and Denmark respectively rank fifth and 
sixth while Finland ranks 14th and Norway 15th (Global Entrepreneurship Development 
Institute 2015). In addition to liberalization, interaction with large incumbent firms can 
spur entrepreneurship as large firms develop new ideas using abundant capital and 
dedicated R&D that entrepreneurs then commercialize through new ventures (Moore and 
Davis 2004). Large firms also have the option to invest directly in new ventures through 
“corporate venturing”, estimated at roughly 11 percent of total VC investments (Lerner 
2013). Sweden and Finland with Ericsson and Nokia are leading examples of active 
incumbent firms sponsoring venture creation, even though the two countries diverge 
significantly in institutions and ITP. Norway then becomes an outlying case, as the 
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presence of the incumbent Telenor has not provided the necessary conditions for 
increased venture creation and more importantly, rapid firm growth. Where Telenor has 
been more successful is in joint ventures with other large firms as in the example of the 
teleconferencing firm Tandberg. 
A caveat to the preceding statement is that economic openness combined with 
large/small firm interaction can lead to increased merger and acquisition rates with mixed 
results for sector development. When Nordic startups are unable to secure funding for 
internal growth, acquisition by a TNC is often a viable and advantageous option at least 
for the firm’s founders and equity holders. Wider benefits from acquisition extend to the 
domestic cluster through increased international exposure that then leads to much needed 
flows of foreign VC (Sawers 2015). Further, TNCs in Denmark stimulate cluster 
competitiveness as firms deepen their interaction within the local innovation system to 
meet TNC short term objectives (Kristensen and Morgan 2007). 
In effect, TNC subsidiaries set independent operational strategies, so long as they 
meet general profitability and productivity expectations. Less favorably, acquisition can 
lead to long-term reductions in sector growth when the TNC appropriates desired talent 
and patents, then restructures to reduce employment, relocates to reduce tax incentives, or 
refocuses on near-term profitability over long-term investment. 
With 263 exits valued at nearly $24B, Sweden leads in the number and scale of 
high growth firms (Davidson 2015). SMEs and startups initially faced an unfavorable 
institutional environment but were able to succeed through selective adaptation and 
recombinations of technology and organization (Glimstedt and Zander 2003). Ericsson 
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and its concentrated group of suppliers overshadowed the development of smaller 
nonmanufacturing firms who remained diffused and largely unorganized (Karlsson and 
Klaesson 2002). As Sweden moved toward increasing liberalization, Ericsson also shifted 
strategies through the unbundling of network elements to increase mutually beneficial 
competition from VC-backed entrepreneurs better equipped at developing new products 
and services within a broad array of wireless technologies (Glimstedt and Zander 2003; 
Richards 2004; Løhre 2015). Large ICT incumbents like Ericsson continued their support 
for SME creation by spinning off new ventures following the collapse of the dot.com era 
(Zaring and Eriksson 2009). More recently it has been reforms including the elimination 
of the wealth tax, the inheritance tax, and most importantly, taxes on capital gains from 
investments in private companies that have led to venture creation in Sweden (Zennstrom 
2015). Robust firm creation coupled with the highest rates of VC and PE have enabled 
Sweden to produce Europe’s most valuable startup firm Spotify with a current valuation 
of $8.5B (Austin, Canipe, and Slobin 2015) 
Finnish ICT large/small firm collaboration began with Nokia and a small number 
of highly dependent core suppliers vertically integrated in mobile handset production 
(Ali-Yrkkö 2001; Richards 2004). While suppliers benefitted from Nokia’s partnership, 
they were unable to develop their own branding, market channels, and external customers 
(Ali-Yrkkö and Hermans 2002), consequently limiting entrepreneurship and startup 
growth (Castells and Himanen 2002). The cluster suffered further setbacks following 
Nokia’s decline even though the firm remained an active supporter of the sector in 
sponsoring more than 1,000 new firms and providing direct assistance to another 14,000 
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former employees (Milne 2013). Outside of direct support, Nokia’s enduring legacy is 
that it became the inspiration to a new generation of highly skilled engineers and 
technologist to forgo employment in traditional sectors and accept the risks of 
entrepreneurship. As Heikki Hämmäinen, Professor of Communications and Networking 
at Aalto University stated, Nokia demonstrated that “…everything is possible in ICT 
innovation” (Millar 2015). Finland is now a major contributor of highly innovative ICT 
startups (The Economist 2013b), leads in portable device gaming with Fingersoft, Rovio, 
and Supercell producing three of the most downloaded games (Reed 2015), and is home 
to Northern Europe’s largest startup conference, Slush. 
Danish entrepreneurship benefits from high labor mobility, organic cluster 
development, low regulatory burdens, and limited but effective risk-based financing. 
Denmark has very low barriers to entry (Christensen et al. 2008) with entrepreneurs now 
able to establish a firm with a single Danish kroner. The potential for firm expansion is 
high in Denmark with five percent of new firms developing into high-growth enterprises 
(Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) 2013). Danish ICT does not have a lighthouse 
firm to direct firm creation though it does have an active community of founders and 
investors providing advice, funding, and general support.29 
Constraining SME and startup growth are the highest capital gains tax rates in the 
OECD at 42 percent over $7,160 (Newton 2015; Pomerleau 2015) contributing to a 67 
percent overall effective tax rate for startups (IT-Branchen 2014). The Danish 
                                                
29 Influential founders include Tommy Ahlers (ZYB), Jesper Buch (Just Eat), Lars Dalgaard (Andreessen 
Horowitz), Janus Friis (Skype), David Heinemeier Hansson (Basecamp), David Helgason (Unity 3D), 
Morten Lund (Skype), and Mikkel Svane (Zendesk). 
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government has proposed tax credits of DKK 650K for new firms, enabling entrepreneurs 
to invest in the firm and draw a reasonable salary without enduring double taxation 
(Lagzdina 2014). Outside of taxation, limited risk-based financing has led to an increase 
in acquisitions by TNCs and high growth firms relocating to capital abundant locations 
abroad.30 That said, acquired firms generally have a high degree of autonomy and 
expatriate founders routinely return to Denmark to sponsor and fund new ventures. 
Analysts at one point dubbed Oslo the “new Palo Alto” for its perceived potential 
in creating high-growth ICT firms (Nairn 2005). At the time, Telenor had recently spun 
off the highly innovative software firm Opera led by the charismatic founder/CEO von 
Tetzchner with its superior web browser utilizing several novel technologies. Since that 
time, growth stagnated until the company restructured and refocused on online 
advertising. Norway also has the Horten electronics cluster which at its peak was home to 
1,900 employees across 25 firms with support from national R&D institutes (Asheim and 
Isaksen 2002) as part of the Norwegian Centres of Expertise (NCE) program31. Like 
Denmark, Norway is known for its high number of SMEs and in venture creation but 
struggles in growing and sustaining firms, with higher closure rates than Sweden 
(Grønning, Moen, and Olsen 2008). Further, employment opportunities at large SOEs 
offer higher compensation and employment stability making new venture creation a risky 
and less lucrative opportunity. 
                                                
30 Basecamp, Just Eat, Skype, Unity 3D, and Zendesk are all such examples. 
31 The NCE is funded in part by funded by the Industrial Development Corporation in Norway (SIVA), the 
Research Council of Norway (RCN) and Innovation Norway. 
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Model specification, case classification, case selection, and method 
In each of the Nordics, ICT sector development benefitted from early and ongoing 
investments in ICT, certain social democratic institutions, and progressive ITP. While 
ICT infrastructure investment remains relatively consistent across the Nordics, each 
country has and continues to diverge in institutional development favoring either 
incremental liberalization or more statist commitments. Further, the Nordic countries 
have utilized ITP for divergent ends, be it broad-based improvements in R&D, education, 
and venture creation or more focused efforts to support specific sectors. In every 
instance, the combination of institutions and ITP have led to disparate outcomes due to 
intra-sectoral dualism in which certain firm types within the same sector benefit 
disproportionately over others. In this final passage, I document the causal model 
between independent, intervening, and dependent variables, the corresponding case 
classifications and justifications for the cases selected, and the method utilized in 
subsequent analysis. 
The basic causal diagram asserts that domestic institutions (independent variable) 
complemented by ITP (intervening variable) direct ICT sector outcomes (dependent 
variable). The elaborated model then disaggregates the dependent variable into outcomes 
for large, incumbent ICT firms (dependent variable I) and SMEs/startups (dependent 
variable II). I further identify structural factors as an antecedent independent variable 
directing institutional and ITP orientations.  The research design addresses structural 
factors through weak claims (i.e. dummy hypotheses) but are neither formally defined nor 
rigorously tested. Figure 2.14 illustrates the high-level causal diagram. 
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I classify Denmark and Sweden as more liberalized social democratic countries 
while Finland and Norway adhere to statist social democracy. In ITP, Denmark and 
Sweden favor more diffused and fragmented programs aimed at reorienting firm 
incentives. Conversely, Finland and Norway utilize statist policies actively supporting 
national and/or sectoral development objectives. In terms of outcomes, Finland, Sweden, 
and Norway all have a large, incumbent firms while Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have 
more developed environments comprised of SMEs and startups. Because Finland and 
Sweden successfully support both large incumbent firms and SMEs/startups, aggregate 
outcomes are higher than in Denmark and Norway where only one firm type has realized 
above average outcomes. A concatenated two-by-two diagram then illustrates 
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The leading cases of Finland and Sweden demonstrate that irrespective of 
institutional forms and ITP objectives, Nordic countries can support both large 
incumbents and SMEs/startups. In these cases, causal connections must rely more on the 
interactive effects between firms (i.e. the lighthouse effect) with institutions and ITP 
operating as supportive or intervening variables. While interactive effects help in 
explaining the leading cases of Finland and Sweden, they are unable to do so for 
Denmark and Norway. Thus, I selected these cases for study because they best illustrate 
intra-sectoral dualism whereby domestic institutions and ITP do direct sector 
development but operate differently, depending on the type of firm. While Denmark and 
Norway have received relatively less coverage in the comparative capitalism literature, 
they are in fact unambiguous cases of causality between institutions, ITP, and knowledge 
economy development. 
As a two-case comparative analysis on domestic institutions and policy in 
directing economic outcomes, my approach follows J. S. Mill’s tenets of causation based 
on necessary and sufficient conditions but also utilizing combinatorial explanatory 
models (Caramani 2009). In the case of Nordic ICT, however, macro-level comparative 
assessments cannot fully explain empirical outcomes due to the observed variation on 
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both the independent and dependent variables. Lundvall instead advocates the study of 
firms as mediated through micro-structures and a wider set of supporting institutions in 
addition to the interactive effects between firms (2007). My study seeks a comparable 
agenda in assessing the effects of institutions and policy on different types of firms, while 
identifying to a lesser degree interactive effects between firm types. 
I first perform a cursory analysis of the institutional forms, policy objectives, and 
sector outcomes for all four Nordic cases to develop a working heuristic. Supporting 
evidence is predominantly in the form of standing research, macro-level statistics, and 
other external resources. The analysis then incorporates findings from 60 interviews of 
subject matter experts in large incumbent firms, SMEs, startups, government agencies, 
trade associations, employer associations, unions, and academic institutions. My 
approach was to engage interviewees through open-ended questions while following 
general guidelines relevant to the research question. Interview guidelines are given in 
Appendix A and deidentified responses in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER THREE: COMPARATIVE CAPITALISM AND SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
Due to the diversity of economic activity in ICT, theoretical arguments attempting 
to explain sector development are inherently problematic (Biagiotti and Burroni 2004; 
Casper and Whitley 2004). While challenges persist, theorists engage the question of ICT 
sector development from a range of perspectives and methodological approaches. 
Institutionalist arguments range from structural accounts and the importance of 
complementarities (Hall and Soskice 2001b) to those that begin with firm agency and the 
recombination of multiple institutional forms befitting specific strategies (Crouch 2005; 
Herrmann 2008). Scholars operating from the systems of innovation perspective place 
innovation at the center of the analysis, generally finding synthetic factor combinations 
through an acausal sociological approach (Lundvall et al. 2002). Finally, institutionalists 
recognize the role of government policy in reforming or augmenting existing institutions 
and directing socioeconomic objectives including sector advancement (Casper 2007). 
I situate my arguments for Danish and Norwegian intra-sectoral dualism within 
the context of the aforementioned body of knowledge. I limit my application to existing 
research focused on domestic institutions, government policy, and innovation as applied 
to the Nordic countries and knowledge economy development. As such, I situate my 
arguments primarily within the comparative capitalism, systems of innovation, and 
Nordic area study literatures. While my research benefits from the insights of all the 
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perspectives detailed herein, my arguments for intra-sectoral dualism assert the primacy 
of institutions and policy in directing firm outcomes. Firms can and do develop their own 
strategies with or against prevailing structures, though doing so is less practical than 
some authors might contend. Even in the rapidly evolving and global reach of ICT, 
domestic institutions and government policy largely determine firm action in Denmark 
and Norway. 
Literature review 
Institutions and firm agency 
Following Whitley, “The logics governing economic decision making and actions 
are inherently structured by dominant institutions…” (1999, 5). Comparative political 
economy (CPE) seeks to identify localized structures with discernable operating logics to 
explain outcomes in production, distribution, and consumption. As durable structures 
directing economic activity, institutions and their various forms, adaptations, and 
interoperability are the focal point of comparative assessments. Comparative institutional 
assessments follow a sequence beginning with the identification of relevant institutions 
accessed by economic actors for specific ends (e.g. access to financial markets to fund 
increased production). Following identification, assessments then categorize economic 
institutional forms and how varying forms address the needs of economic actors. 
Researchers then devise typological classifications with distinct operating logics and 
associated outcomes, be they growth levels, income equality, stability, sector 
composition, etc. 
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Noted by Thelen: “For all the debate in the literature, there are really no serious 
disagreements about which core institutional arenas analysts should be studying” (2012). 
A cursory review of the literature confirms Thelen’s conclusion. As an early researcher in 
institutional CPE, Whitley identified interdependencies and reinforcing dynamics 
between the state, financial system, skill development and control system, and 
trust/authority relations (1999). Hall and Soskice followed a similar path but with a focus 
on the five areas which all firms must address using domestic institutions: industrial 
relations addressing wages and productivity; vocational training and education; corporate 
governance or aspects of finance and ownership; inter-firm relations; and employee 
relations (Hall and Soskice 2001b). 
Amable developed a comparable framework with the addition of social 
protections, the welfare state, and a slight augmentation of inter-firm relations to include 
product-market competition (2003). Other researchers adhere to the general framework 
but focus their analysis on a subset of economic institutions relevant to specific research 
questions. As an example, Pauly and Reich assess continued divergence in multinational 
corporations through a review of internal governance, long-term financing structures, 
approaches to R&D, intra-firm trading strategies, and overseas investment (2003). 
Regardless, the gamut of economic institutions remains largely consistent. 
Thelen’s observations on the relative agreement of institutional arenas then shifts 
the debate to actual institutional forms, combinations, change, and relevance to economic 
outcomes (2012). Following the comparative method, researchers develop typologies 
with distinct operating logics to explain subsequent causality in institutional change and 
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outcomes. Hall and Soskice conceived the parsimonious Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
model by distinguishing the operating logics of liberal market economies (LMEs) from 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) (2001a). Firms in Anglo Saxon countries like the 
United States and United Kingdom utilize market-based institutions while firms in 
Continental European countries, especially Germany, rely on strategic coordination. In 
terms of outcomes, LMEs support radically innovative sectors like ICT while CMEs tend 
toward incrementally innovative sectors like complex manufacturing. VoC remains an 
influential heuristic for framing institutional enquiry, even if the LME/CME dichotomy 
does not fully accommodate the mixed-market, social democratic institutions of the 
Nordic countries without further elaboration. 
Amable extends Hall and Soskice’s binary to five forms of capitalism including 
social democracy (2003). Denmark, Finland, and Sweden diverge from other economies 
due to higher product-market competition, labor flexibility through wage solidarity, 
moderate employee protections, high social protection, and skill retraining. Amable 
classifies Norway as “Continental European” with a more activist state-led economy and 
less developed welfare state. While more encompassing than VoC, the weakness of 
Amable’s typology is that barring the rare case of Norway, he classifies most countries 
by geographic region with historically determined institutional forms. Amable identifies 
differing internal logics in each of the five cases, though given the number of 
permutations, the forms of capitalism are a series of sui generis cases limiting wider 
generalization. 
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Boyer moves away from Amable’s expanded typology and instead identifies a 
more manageable three-form typology in recognizing core institutional domains but also 
expanding on education and learning systems (2004). Boyer distinguishes social 
democratic capitalism from other forms of either deregulated or catching up economies 
due to the distinct characteristics of homogenous education levels, lifelong learning, 
negotiated ends for innovation, and collectively organized labor. Instead of relying 
primarily on geography and historical path dependence to determine operating logics, 
Boyer categorizes economies based on outcomes and the importance of human capital in 
advancing development. The approach also allows for a wider interpretation of 
innovation and sector formation than that of VoC. In so doing, Boyer provides an 
approach more in line with the patterns of institutional and economic development, 
especially for those found in the Nordics. 
 Thelen followed the three-fold typology as well in a return to Hall and Soskice’s 
LME/CME binary but with the addition of “egalitarian capitalism” for social democratic 
countries (2012). Thelen’s project focuses on coalition formation leading to institutional 
development. In the case of the Nordics, Thelen identifies pragmatic institutional 
adjustment supportive of “embedded flexibilization” to maintain social cohesion and 
human development under conditions of increased competition. Thelen’s insights are 
particularly relevant when recognizing the cross-coalition agenda setting of the Nordics 
to advance institutional change, ITP, and wider wellbeing. In every instance, the 
typologies help in guiding research agendas but are ultimately generalizations with limits 
in specifying the actual processes for disparate institutional domains and economic 
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actors, consequently directing outcomes. The concept of the social democratic Nordic 
model itself remains a contested concept with area specialists concluding that economic 
actors have a high degree of agency in leveraging dynamic complementarities across 
institutions (Kristensen and Lilja 2011).32 
The strength of high-level comparative assessments is that they offer a theory- 
driven analytical starting point for classifying economic systems, understanding their 
internal logics, and how they direct outcomes. This is both their strength and their 
weakness. VoC remains a powerful analytical tool because it finds that mutually 
exclusive institutional environments can coexist as optimal economic systems through 
complementarity (Hall and Soskice 2001b). As analytical starting points, they cannot, nor 
do they intend to explain the full range of institutional variation, actor agency, and 
outcomes. 
VoC is a structuralist approach in which  “… strategy follows structure” (2001a, 
15) because “… firms will gravitate toward the mode of coordination for which there is 
institutional support” (Hall and Soskice 2001a, 9). Following the structuralist approach, 
firms are institution takers leveraging path dependent norms, rules, and principles. 
Institutions develop into optimal yet distinct forms not unlike the production and trade 
profiles of economies determined by factor endowments and comparative advantage. 
Under such conditions, the opportunities for institutional change are often limited to the 
introduction of an internal or external shock (e.g. financial crises, conflict, etc.), 
                                                
32 Kristensen and Lilja disagree with the concept of a unified Nordic model, but they do find consistent 
strategic patterns even under conditions of institutional variation (2011). 
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advancement of radical political change, or the actions of economic actors defecting from 
domestic institutions to follow what is in effect a suboptimal strategy. Because the first 
and second explanations rely on altogether different processes, researchers assuming a 
fixed operating environment instead focus on alternative possibilities through firm 
agency. 
Herrmann asserts that when domestic institutions are unable to provide the 
supports required for certain firm strategies, those firms still follow alternative strategies 
by accessing “functional equivalents” (2008). How firms can and do access functional 
equivalents and the relative ease in so doing, however, is less clear. Institutional 
embeddedness limits access to alternatives, be they foreign equity markets or bespoke 
labor contracting arrangements. As an example relevant to the ICT sector, venture capital 
(VC) deal flow is a tightly coordinated activity led by investors, not potential 
entrepreneurs. Expressed by many respondents seeking Silicon Valley VC, accessing 
what is effectively a closed funding network is a challenge for external entrepreneurs. 
Concerning labor contracting, Nordic startups again note the relative difficulty in 
obtaining talented staff willing to forgo stable and higher wages for the uncertainty 
associated with new ventures. Respondents found that only through the support of a 
collaborative community consisting of like-minded entrepreneurs are individuals willing 
to defect and assume the risk associated with joining a startup. 
Herrmann recognizes the role of clusters in supporting defecting firms (2008). 
Other authors then cite the role of a lighthouse firm in directing cluster formations 
operating under a different logic in what is considered an inhospitable environment 
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(Casper and Glimstedt 2001; Casper and Whitley 2004; Casper 2007). Ericsson 
developed an altogether separate operating logic within its cluster through personnel and 
technical initiatives based on open standards (i.e. the Erlang programming language), 
labor portability, and general skill development (Casper and Glimstedt 2001; Casper and 
Soskice 2001). 
That said, the case of Ericsson might not be applicable in every instance. Telenor, 
for example, demonstrates the counterfactual case in which the firm adhered to a strategy 
supported by existing institutions. Because of the collective action dilemma, or first 
mover disadvantage, no single actor has the incentive to initiate a strategy against an 
otherwise supportive institutional environment. As Casper states, the dilemma can then 
be resolved through directed policy: “Technology policy has… promoted institutional 
adaptiveness by providing opportunities for firms to experiment with or reconfigure 
elements of relatively stable national institutional frameworks to create new business 
practices” (Casper 2000, 887). Hermann agrees in highlighting the growth of risk-based 
financing through government VC funds (2008), while others deny the relevance of 
government policy in leading and/or directing cluster formation and instead advocate 
open environments enabling the free association of economic actors (Bresnahan and 
Gambardella 2004).33 
Crouch avoids the dilemma altogether in advancing an agent-centric approach 
through institutional diversity (2005). Stated fully: “… institutional heterogeneity will 
                                                
33 The authors assume a liberal market orientation, consequently limiting the applicability to Nordic social 
democratic economies. 
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facilitate innovation, both by presenting actors with alternative strategies when existing 
paths seem blocked and by making it possible for them to make new combination among 
elements of various paths” (Crouch 2005, 71). Instead of assuming structural rigidity and 
the need for functional equivalents, firm leadership, cluster dynamics, or ITP, Crouch 
finds an open and fluid environment in which firms have access to a range of institutional 
options and the knowledge required to access them. Because national institutions are not 
as confining as others contend, local institutions then become more relevant, enabling 
firms to positively leverage creative incoherencies between institutions (Crouch, 
Schröder, and Voelzkow 2009). These institutional entrepreneurs can then secure 
favorable reinterpretation, reform, or adjustment of existing institutions further 
solidifying the supports required for divergent firm strategies (Boyer 1996; Crouch, 
Schröder, and Voelzkow 2009; Hall and Thelen 2009). 
Lundvall also diverges from structuralist accounts in asserting the importance of 
learning and competence building in directing innovative processes that break from 
preexisting forms (1999). As opposed to Whitley’s “combination of elements” model, 
Lundvall advocates the National Innovation System (NIS) concept (Lundvall et al. 2002) 
governed by “processes where agents interact” (1999, 72) without the necessity of 
institutional complementarity (Lange 2009). The challenge in operating from the NIS 
perspective is that agent processes necessitate a sociological approach on a wider set of 
institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001a). In so doing, the identification of distinct ideal types 
with differentiated operating logics becomes a challenge and can lead to a series of sui 
generis models lacking wider explanatory power. Edquist admits as much stating that the 
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systems of innovation framework is conceptually diffused and not a formal theory 
(Edquist 2006). 
The challenge in applying these models to the Nordics is that every aspect is 
relevant though varies, depending on specific economic actors. Beginning with 
institutional forms, the Nordics are undeniably social democratic economies blending 
social protection, statist policies and firm ownership with deregulated markets and 
privatization. Notwithstanding the important reservations of Nordic scholars like 
Kristensen and Lilja (2011), Nordic social democratic capitalism is a distinct form when 
compared with other advanced forms of capitalist organization. Further, researchers 
investigating hybrid environments and their amenability to high technology sector 
development still assume a binary model between LMEs and CMEs (Casper 2003) 
instead of recognizing a distinct operating logic typified by the Nordic economies. 
A second consideration involves the pragmatism and adaptiveness of the Nordics 
in altering institutions and enacting ITP. The dynamism of the Nordic model complicates 
classification, interpretation, and the determination of outcomes, especially for rapid 
innovation sectors like ICT. Actor agency then becomes increasingly relevant but can 
follow divergent pathways for different firm types. Adhering to traditional institutional 
forms may prove beneficial to established firms though new entrants may exploit new 
opportunities through institutional adjustments and changes in ITP. Therefore, I assess 
both the structural rigidities and emergent pathways that enable ICT sector development, 
as moderated through specific firm types. I conclude that structures and policies direct the 
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strategies of economic actors and that only when these actors realize the limits of 
domestic environments will they then seek alternatives. 
Innovation and technology policy 
Assessments on the effectiveness of ITP are decidedly mixed. However, there is 
widespread agreement on the potential of ITP to adjust existing institutions, advance 
wider socioeconomic objectives, and support specific sectors, firms, or other economic 
actors. Edquist et al. advocate a relatively uncontroversial position in support of ITP 
under conditions of market failure and when the state has the capabilities necessary for 
action (2004). In a review of innovative enterprises, Lazonick suggests a more assertive 
role for government in providing public goods including education and research, as well 
as interventionist economic policies including subsidization, market protection, and 
directed finance (2007). Conversely, Casper finds policy effective in supporting a 
particular sector or group of firms through the reconfiguration of existing institutional 
frameworks, increasing complementarity or opportunities for circumvention (2007). 
Concerning specific interventions, Mowery notes that technology licensing 
policies adopted outside the United States have not been as successful in commercializing 
research discoveries because of differences in education institutions (2011). Several 
interviewees agreed with Mowery citing limited interaction between academics and 
industry due to conflicting incentives and bureaucratic processes. In an assessment of the 
semiconductor industry, Langlois and Steinmuller also find mixed results in the potential 
for positive collaboration between government policy and firm strategy with the United 
States and Japan as positive examples but not Europe (1999). 
 
  93 
The most contentious aspect of ITP involves the efforts of the state to develop 
industry leaders or “national champions”. Cortada concludes that outside of Japan and 
Korea, all ICT national champion programs failed to meet their intended objectives 
(2011, 6). Mowery and Nelson are similarly against government action in sponsoring 
industrial leadership, due to the fact that most projects fail and all are prohibitively 
expensive (1999). Further, sponsoring technology national champions can lead to the 
dual dilemma of failing to launch a leading firm while also neglecting smaller firms with 
high growth potential. In an assessment of French industrial policy, Rhodes concludes 
that technology national champions enjoyed protection and subsidies while innovative 
SMEs faced competitive markets and consequently failed (1988). 
The mixed results of ITP found by other researchers follows the empirical 
evidence for Nordic ICT. Finland adopted national policies supportive of wider 
innovation objectives by improving tertiary education, directed R&D, and funding. 
Finnish ITP may not have sought to build Nokia into a national champion, but the firm 
did benefit disproportionately from ITP, ultimately proving to be a costly mistake 
following Nokia’s near demise and the fallout for the wider ICT sector. Sweden also 
maintained a national focus on ITP with limited supports for the already successful 
technology leader Ericsson. The firm endured its own volatility during the dot.com era 
though quickly restructured on its own and returned to profitability. 
Norway attempted to build out national champions in computing and in 
telecommunications equipment manufacturing failing in both instances with the collapse 
of Norsk Data, STK, and Elektrisk Bureau. However, Norway did maintain supports for 
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Telenor which went on to acquire the technologies, R&D facilities, and displaced 
workers of the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry collapse. 
(Fagerberg, Mowery, and Verspagen 2009). Without a viable leader in computing and an 
innovation system conducive to venture creation, redundant employees from Norsk Data 
were absorbed into large firm IT departments. In Denmark, liberalizing ITP led to the 
early privatization of the leading technology firm TDC with the intention of developing a 
global partnership with a United States-based TNC. The effort was largely unsuccessful 
as TDC restructured into a limited regional telecommunications carrier with substantially 
lower total employment and relative annual turnover. 
In each instance, Nordic ITP has in general followed the contours of existing 
institutions. The Finnish state maintains a strong and central role in directing innovation 
and technology advancement even as it adopts liberal forms of finance through state-
supported VC funds. Norway also adheres to statist ITP through SOEs and directed 
funding. Conversely, Swedish ITP remains fragmented and diffused though still 
supportive of limited liberalization. Danish ITP is less significant in absolute terms, 
however, ITP actively seeks the dismantling of ICT sector supports to compliment liberal 
reforms. 
General arguments 
The existing literature provides important insights into how institutions and ITP 
inform sector development. Much of the debate within the literature focuses on the 
relative importance of structures over agents. Structuralists rightly cite the rigidity of 
dominant institutions in directing outcomes while others recognize the ability of actors to 
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determine their own strategies under less constraining environments. ITP then becomes a 
moderating force but again subject to spatial and temporal limitations in its applicability. 
Policies that accomplish their objectives in one instance can fail in another and the 
Nordics are no different. The Nordics complicate our understanding of institutions and 
ITP due to their inherent pragmatism and willingness to experiment with a range of 
institutional changes and policy instruments. That said, my approach asserts that 
institutions are influential in directing sector outcomes and that ITP more often than not 
complements existing institutional frameworks. The key difference in my analysis is that 
outcomes within sectors can diverge substantially contributing to suboptimal outcomes 
on aggregate. 
The following hypotheses outline the causal associations tested in subsequent 
chapters. Because the Nordics are undeniably social democratic countries yet also engage 
in pragmatic and experimental changes in policy and institutions, I do not claim that 
either Denmark or Norway constitute ideal-typical forms of either liberal or statist 
varieties of Nordic capitalism. Both countries have maintained continuities in some 
institutional and policy areas while diverging in others. I therefore construct hypotheses 
that are most relevant in understanding the apparent shifts in institutions/policy but do not 
exhaustively test every aspect. I review all institutions and policies identified in Chapter 2 
in the empirical Chapters 4 and 5 so that the reader can understand the commonalities and 
differences between cases. I then restate and test the following hypotheses in Chapter 6 to 
qualify my claim of a general tendency toward increasing liberalization in Denmark and 
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retrenchment of statist social democracy in Norway, consequently leading to intra-
sectoral dualism and lower aggregate outcomes in both countries. 
Hypotheses: Denmark 
Danish movements to liberalization are most apparent in the areas of labor 
freedom, risk-based capital financing, and deregulation/privatization. The institutional 
and policy shifts favor SMEs and startups over large, incumbent firms. Accordingly, I 
identify three core hypotheses with corroborative evidence supporting my argument for 
Danish ICT intra-sectoral dualism: 
HD1: Danish labor force liberalization has facilitated the proliferation of SMEs 
and startup firms. Because of the relative ease in firm hiring and firing, ICT 
professionals have the incentive to manage their own careers to the greatest ends. 
Supporting evidence: high labor turnover rates, high number of SMEs and 
startups, high SME and startup revenue/valuations, developed cluster 
communities, high number of firm founders, high labor movement abroad and 
back, increased reskilling, increasing entrepreneurship programs, increase in 
number of entrepreneurs, and limited opportunities for legacy ICT professionals. 
 
HD2: Danish liberalization has increased the quantity and quality of risk-based 
financing providing growth opportunities for SMEs and startups. Denmark has 
increased the number of risk-based funding resources while access to higher 
stage funding remains relatively low. Supporting evidence: high number of SMEs 
and startups, high SME and startup revenue/valuations, number, value, and 
performance of risk-based funds, high number of founders, increase in number of 
entrepreneurs, high rate of acquisition by TNCs, high rate of funding exits 
abroad, and low rates of domestically listed public firms.  
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HD3: Danish liberalization has lowered regulatory burdens for SMEs and startups 
while increasing competitive forces on incumbent firms. Denmark leads in 
privatization, divestiture, and deregulation of ICT firms. Supporting evidence: 
reduced barriers to entry, market deregulation, lowered requirements for firm 
creation, high number of SMEs and startups, high SME and startup 
revenue/valuations, developed cluster communities, high number of firm founders, 
privatization of SOEs, increase in TNC competition, high rates of TNC ownership 
and acquisition, and high rates of firm restructuring/reorganization. 
Hypotheses: Norway 
Norway remains committed to statist social democratic institutions and policy 
predominantly through state involvement in the economy, labor rigidities, market 
protection, and directed funding. In the ICT sector, Norwegian statist social democracy 
tends to benefit large, incumbent firms over SMEs and startups. Thus, there are four core 
hypotheses with corroborative conditions supporting the argument for Norwegian ICT 
intra-sectoral dualism: 
HN1: Norwegian state involvement in the economy continues to support large, 
incumbent firms. The largest enterprises in Norway are all either partially or 
majority owned by the government as part of a strategic plan for long-term 
growth and stability. Consequently, supports for SMEs, startups, and other non-
strategic firms and industries are limited, exacerbated by the limited interaction 
between the two firm types. Supporting evidence: high incidence of SOEs, high 
ownership in financial markets, high concentration of large firms in the ICT 
sector, and high R&D concentration for large firms/strategic sectors. 
HN2: Statist social democracy includes labor incentives favoring large, incumbent 
firms over SMEs and startups. Due in part to Dutch disease, SOEs, government 
wage setting, and informal labor restrictions, SMEs and startups are unable to 
extend the salaries and stability provided by large incumbent firms. Supporting 
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evidence: high concentration of firms in ICT sector, income differentials, low 
labor mobility, low labor mobility between incumbent firms and SMEs/startups, 
competition for scarce professionals, limited entrepreneurship, fewer founders, 
and a less developed startup community. 
HN3: The Norwegian economy maintains market protections limiting competition 
to a small number of large, incumbent firms. Because of the concentration of 
large SOEs, TNCs, and government agencies along with regional biases, 
contracting tends to favor the largest ICT firms and local providers. Supporting 
evidence: high barriers to entry, extensive contracting requirements, high 
incidence of SOEs, high concentration of large firms in the ICT sector, limited 
number of firms winning service contracts, higher domestic market focus, and 
service contracts between firms with shared ownership. 
HN4: The Norwegian government directs innovation funding toward other ends 
but not in support of ICT SMEs and startups. State funding disproportionately 
favors low innovation sectors, established firms, and remote regions where ICT 
firms are less prevalent. Supporting evidence: higher funding for non-ICT 
sectors, higher funding for low innovation sectors, higher funding for incumbent 
firms, and higher funding in remote regions where ICT development is limited. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DANISH ICT SECTOR 
In this chapter I detail the empirical evidence in support of the hypotheses defined 
in Chapter 4. I use a single rubric framing origins of ICT, institutional forms, ITP, sector 
outcomes, and conclusions for each case. I limit the institutional analysis to the aspects 
deemed most relevant in determining sector outcomes: labor markets, skill development, 
employee incentives, finance, firm organization, geography, and inter-firm dynamics. In 
policy, governments implement broad initiatives under the nominal guise of 
“technology/innovation policy”. Therefore, I address the most prominent aspects 
including direct sector supports for ICT, R&D intensity and focus, funding, incubation, 
and promotion. I then move to sector outcomes, decomposing aggregate performance by 
firm type starting with large, incumbent firms then startups and SMEs. 
Origins of Danish ICT 
As with the other Nordics, Denmark developed telecommunications and 
computing relatively early in Europe. The first telephone exchange opened in 
Copenhagen six years after its invention in 1881 (TDC Group 2015). As the industry 
emerged, Danish telecommunications operated as a standard utility for more than a 
century until the watershed movement toward deregulation, liberalization, and 
privatization in the 1990s. Sweden was the first mover in liberalization, but it was 
Denmark that completely reformed the industry in four short years. After consolidating 
multiple state-owned carriers into a single entity, the new firm TDC issued its first shares 
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in 1994 then divested 49 percent of state ownership and deregulated the industry in 1996 
before fully privatizing in 1998 (Svenolof Karlsson 2011). In 2005 five private equity 
funds established Nordic Telephone Company ApS (NTC) to purchase controlling 
interest in TDC (85.9 percent) before divesting to 17.7 percent in 2013 (TDC Group 
2015). TDC remains the largest carrier in Denmark with limited operations in Europe but 
dwarfed by Norway’s Telenor and the Swedish-Finnish carrier TeliaSonera. 
In computing, the United States allocated funds from the Marshall Plan to 
establish the first computing program Regnecentralen (RC) originally for military defense 
but quickly repurposed by the Danes for scientific and government use (Klüver 2005). 
The Danes utilized a modified version of the Swedish Binär Elektronisk 
SekvensKalkylator (BeSK) computer dubbed “Danish BeSK” or DASK and wholly 
operated by RC (Bruhn 2005; Klüver 2005). RC quickly became an innovator in the field 
led by the notable accomplishments of A.M. Turing prize winner Peter Naur in 
programming language and compiler design, the definition of Algol (ALGOrithmic 
Language) 60, and broader contributions to programming (Association for Computing 
Machinery 2012b). 
Following the historical pattern of Danish governmental decentralization, RC 
originally provided services for a variety of departments, educational institutions, and 
local governments or kommunes (Klüver 2005). The creation of the federal computing 
agency Datacentralen in 1959 formalized what had previously been ad hoc organizations 
so it could implement multiple national initiatives including the PAYE (pay-as-you-earn) 
tax system, VAT services, and the Central Persons Register (Jørgensen 2011; Klüver 
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2005). The establishment of Kommunedata later in 1972 formalized local level 
government computing as well, with the added benefit of internal competition inspiring 
innovative computing practices such as online and near real-time computing instead of 
antiquated batch/scheduled services (Jørgensen 2011). 
Operational successes were tempered, however, by the limited successes of 
Danish computer firms. IBM proved a strong partner though not an entirely fair 
competitor. IBM donated a large-scale computer to the Technical University of Denmark 
(DTU) but then actively discouraged local competitors (Andersin 2005). The British 
computing firm ICL acquired a privatized RC in 1988 (Gram et al. 2005) which was then 
acquired by Fujitsu in 2002 (Sabbagh 2001). A/S Chr. Rovsing (CR) enjoyed rapid 
success until it collapsed in 1984 after it began funding development projects with 
unrealized revenues (Gram et al. 2005). Finally, Dansk Data Elektronik (DDE) founded 
by engineers from DTU established a UNIX-based line of computers but could not 
compete with more established manufacturers (Gram et al. 2005). Refocusing on 
software production provided a short-lived lifeline and just long enough for the company 
to sell to CSC where it then underwent reorganization in 2001 (Dansk Datahistorisk 
Forening 2012).  The string of failures were a setback for the sector though it did help to 
develop a strong and competent user community supporting industry computing services, 
and in fostering the establishment of academic computing programs across Denmark 
(Gram et al. 2005). 
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Danish ICT today 
The path dependent effects of diffused sectoral development and failed attempts 
at homegrown industry leadership influenced the current structure and composition of the 
Danish ICT sector. It is overwhelmingly comprised of micro firms, followed by a 
respectable number of SMEs, and a very small number of large enterprises.34  Micro 
firms employ less than 10 employees and produce ≤ €2.0M in annual turnover. Small 
firms range between 10 and 49 employees producing between €2.0M and €10.0M p.a., 
while medium firms start at 50 but do not exceed 250 employees and have turnover of 
more than  €10.0M but less that  €50.0M p.a. (European Commission 2015a). In terms of 
annual turnover and total employment, it is the handful of large enterprises making the 
largest contributions in the Danish ICT sector (Figure 4.1). Owing to scale efficiencies 
and capital intensity, large enterprises are also more efficient than any other class of firm, 
especially micro firms using four percent of total employment but producing just two 
percent of annual turnover. That said, turnover per employee ranges significantly for even 
large enterprises with the broadband and content TDC subsidiary YouSee reporting 
$781K per employee and the hearing instrument firm GN Store Nord reporting a rate 
two-thirds less at $235K per employee.  
                                                
34 The European Commission defines criteria for classifying small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
(2015a). I use the term “enterprise” singularly to refer to any firm larger than those defined as SMEs. 
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Figure 4.1 Danish ICT sector by share of firms, revenues, and employees 
Source: Bureau van Dijk 2015.35 
 
A final consideration involves industrial composition and the varying 
contributions to and relative efficiencies of the current Danish ICT sector. Table 4.1 lists 
the number of firms, annual turnover, and total employees by industry classification as 
reported by the Orbis database for the reporting years from 2010 through 2012 (Bureau 
van Dijk 2015).36 The data indicate that manufacturing is heavily consolidated with the 
fewest number of firms but the least efficient in turnover per employee. Trade services 
are the most efficient in turnover per employee but contribute the smallest share in total 
turnover and employment. Finally, the wide-ranging service firms dominate in total 
number, turnover, and employment but with significant inter-class heterogeneity. The 
most striking difference is between the highly consolidated “Telecommunications” and 
                                                
35 The differences in sample sizes are due to varying degrees of information completeness. 
36 Final figures include an additional 3,154 firms lacking employee counts and annual turnover. 
Computations for the additional firms assumed a 50 percent survival rate on an initial population of 6,359 
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diffused “Computer programming, consultancy and related activities” subsectors, again 
with disparate efficiency levels. Thus, the diversity of the Danish ICT sector necessitates 
an appreciation of firm differences and how institutions and policy influence sector 
outcomes. 
Table 4.1 Danish ICT sector by share of firms, revenues, and employees 
	Industry	Classification	 Firms	 Turnover	($000s)	 Employees	
26	Manufacture	of	computer,	electronic	and	optical	
products	 	166		 3.2%	 	7,983,522		 22.5%	 	32,206		 28.1%	
46	Wholesale	trade	(ICT	only)	 	657		 12.6%	 	6,905,591		 19.4%	 	13,447		 11.7%	
ICT	Services	 	 	 		 		 		 		
58	Publishing	(Software	only)	 	214		 4.1%	 	915,201		 2.6%	 	4,577		 4.0%	
61	Telecommunications	 	192		 3.7%	 	9,944,650		 28.0%	 	22,693		 19.8%	
62	Computer	programming,	consultancy	and	
related	activities	 	3,536		 67.9%	 	9,291,289		 26.1%	 	39,109		 34.1%	
63	Information	service	activities	(ICT	only)	 	402		 7.7%	 	439,222		 1.2%	 	2,057		 1.8%	
95	Repair	of	equipment	(ICT	only)	 	45		 0.9%	 	67,000		 0.2%	 	572		 0.5%	
ICT	Services	total	 	4,388		 84.2%	 	20,657,362		 58.1%	 	69,008		 60.2%	
Total	ICT	 	5,210		 100.0%	 	35,546,475		 100.0%	 	114,660		 100.0%	
Source: Bureau van Dijk 2015. 
 
Institutions 
Labor markets, Skill development, and Employee incentives 
Beginning with labor mobility, Denmark ranks more like the United States than 
the other Nordics with relatively few encumbrances on either employers or employees 
(Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal 2011). Denmark continues to advance labor 
mobility policies with recently prosed legislation further restricting employment clauses 
for non-solicitation, competition, customer acquisition, and combined clauses (Amsinck 
2015). The overall trend in ICT appears to favor employees over employers. Using 
statistics from the business-oriented social networking service LinkedIn, Danes are 
considerably more active in the labor market than their Nordic counterparts with nearly 
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1.7 million members or just under 50 percent of the active labor force using the site for 
employment opportunities (Fawcett 2014). Several ICT firm respondents noted the 
relative ease in hiring and firing, continual firm restructuring, utilization of contractors, 
and offshoring as contributing factors on the demand side but also supply side challenges 
in the competition for scarce talent. As one respondent claimed, there is “extreme” labor 
mobility in the Danish ICT sector but this is not necessarily a good thing. Active labor 
policies under the “flexicurity” model enable Danish labor mobility because the welfare 
state extends substantial transition benefits through unemployment compensation, 
retraining, and placement services (Geishecker, Görg, and Munch 2010; Ornston 2012a). 
Every Nordic country offers generous unemployment benefits, but Denmark’s especially 
strong commitment among the Nordics to active labor market policies prioritizes the 
placement of individuals back into the labor force over benefits entitlement 
(MondayMorning 2012). 
Other researchers note the positive benefits from high labor mobility in enabling 
increased knowledge share and network effects (Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; Hage 
and Hollingsworth 2000; Lundvall 2007). The assumption requires knowledge workers 
such as those in ICT to be integrated tightly into an established community collaborating 
on work-related challenges, rather than atomized individuals concerned with protecting 
intellectual property rights. Indeed, respondents from the Copenhagen ICT cluster 
repeatedly noted the tight interaction of individuals across firms and the relative ease in 
moving from firm to firm as new opportunities emerged. However, moving between 
established firms and startups was more difficult, though doing so is now less of an issue, 
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at least for certain firms like Microsoft. Interviewees also noted that a more significant 
challenge is moving outside of one’s core educational discipline. 
Looking at demand and supply dynamics for Danish ICT labor, mobility 
engenders different challenges and opportunities for both firms and employees depending 
on market conditions, skill sets, and firm commitments. On the demand side, the ongoing 
growth in ICT worldwide has caused a shortage of skilled professionals in most every 
ICT center. Denmark is no different with numerous respondents citing the scarcity of 
qualified labor as the most significant issue limiting sector growth, a sentiment recently 
seconded by the Danish IT Industry Association (IT-Branchen) (2015b). Firm 
respondents found it difficult to locate and retain professionals with current technical 
skills, relevant advanced degrees, and business experience in product development, 
marketing, process (re)engineering, and entrepreneurship. Still other respondents 
perceived a “brain drain” of the most technically skilled and entrepreneurial professionals 
to larger ICT markets, especially Silicon Valley and London. 
While competition for scarce talent exists on the top end, high wages – especially 
for workers with legacy skills – have led to substantial restructuring by incumbents 
internally and through acquisitions in an effort to reduce labor costs. Firm restructuring 
appears more prevalent in Denmark as indicated by several high profile examples. 
Following acquisition by a private equity group, restructuring at the telecommunications 
firm TDC resulted in nearly 7,000 employee redundancies or 44 percent of the full-time-
equivalent (FTE) labor force (TDC Group 2010; TDC Group 2014). Nokia closed its 
research and development centers in Denmark, Finland, and the United Kingdom 
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shedding 4,000 jobs in the process (Sayer 2011). Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) 
eliminated 450 employees and transferred another 300 to the Indian IT firm Tata TCS 
following the acquisition and subsequent restructuring of the Danish Federal Data Center, 
Datacentralen (Pedersen and Jensen 2012).37 Given the severity of the recent financial 
crisis in Denmark – compounded by labor market liberalization and ICT unionization 
rates 20 percentage points lower than in the wider economy – the aforementioned 
redundancies in ICT are unsurprising. 
Thus, the demand for ICT labor is highly dependent on the type of skills required, 
market conditions, and firm commitments. Further, the success of active labor policies 
depends on the type of industry undergoing restructuring and the associated skills in 
demand. High skill sectors like ICT have more difficulty reskilling individuals with 
legacy knowledge and reintegrating them into the labor force. Respondents stated that 
government and trade union reskilling programs such as those offered by the IT 
professional union PROSA have helped in transitioning workers with legacy skills. 
However, the general consensus of respondents is that retraining programs are unable to 
provide the “intangible” skills required by current employers. 
To address the labor shortage, several firms have adopted contracting 
arrangements with local providers, guest workers, and used offshoring. Denmark has 
done more to facilitate bespoke labor contracts than the other Nordics by requiring 
employers to provide a single day’s notice to temporary workers facing termination. As 
for guest workers, the Danish government lowered tax rates to 31.9 percent for foreign 
                                                
37 Reductions were across the CSC Nordic region but borne predominantly in Denmark. 
 
  108 
researchers and key employees, which is a full 23.5 percentage points lower than the top 
end effective tax rate of 55.4 percent (Holsen 2015). More recently, the government 
advanced an initiative to reduce the extensive bureaucracy required to recruit, educate, 
and retain high-skilled international labor (Regeringen 2014). In offshoring, most firm 
respondents regardless of size utilized ICT workers from abroad to fill pressing staffing 
requirements and realize labor cost savings. National statistics support the anecdotal with 
30 percent of ICT firms relying on international sourcing, which is a greater percentage 
than any other sector (StatBank Denmark 2012c).38 Respondents generally prefer Eastern 
European countries to other countries such as India, citing the benefit of higher quality 
technical resources, language capabilities, and proximate time zones. 
More strategic solutions to address labor market demand focus on skill 
development, especially through post-secondary education. Gross tertiary enrolments 
increased significantly by 47.8 percent to 77.0 percent over the 14-year period from 1996 
to 2009 (The World Bank Group 2015). The significant increase in tertiary enrolments 
marks a significant transition for Denmark, given the country’s historical roots in 
secondary education and vocational training (Lundvall 2002). In terms of tertiary 
education completion, Denmark had over one million individuals with various levels of 
higher learning in 2012 of whom nearly 20 percent of the total and 43.4 percent of all 
PhD degrees were in technology and natural sciences as shown in Table 4.2 (StatBank 
Denmark 2012b).  
                                                
38 Statistic is for firms with 50 or more employees. 
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Agriculture	 		 	 	956		 	8,114		 	1,510		 	10,580		
Agriculture	and	fishing	 	4,585		 	669		 	 	 	 	5,254		
Bachelor	 		 	 	70		 	 	 	70		
Candidate,	undefined	 		 	 	 	40		 	 	40		
Communication	and	applied	language	 	15,503		 	16,212		 	 	 	 	31,715		
Food	industry	and	home	economics	 	7,793		 	4,896		 	218		 	1,537		 	 	14,444		
Health	care	 	8,237		 	108,101		 	4,056		 	35,204		 	4,339		 	159,937		
Pedagogy	 	660		 	239,734		 	 	7,030		 	29		 	247,453		
PhD	Degree	 		 	 	 	 	77		 	77		
Public	security	 	18,455		 	1,857		 	 	3,394		 	 	23,706		
Social	science	 	53,855		 	49,529		 	32,440		 	91,863		 	1,811		 	229,498		
The	arts	 	1,056		 	7,238		 	909		 	5,994		 	583		 	15,780		
The	humanities,	theology	 		 	 	26,652		 	51,826		 	1,908		 	80,386		
Transport	etc.	 	2,024		 	13,718		 		 		 		 	15,742		
Total	 	112,168		 	441,954		 	65,301		 	205,002		 	10,257		 	834,682		
Natural	science	 		 	870		 	6,590		 	27,122		 	3,562		 	38,144		
Technical	 	58,842		 	65,106		 	3,462		 	37,762		 	4,316		 	169,488		
Total	 	58,842		 	65,976		 	10,052		 	64,884		 	7,878		 	207,632		
%	Technical	 34.4%	 13.0%	 13.3%	 24.0%	 43.4%	 19.9%	
Source: StatBank Denmark 2012b. 
 
In addressing the shortage of skilled ICT personnel, Denmark’s established 
science and/or business universities all offer studies in computer science, IT, and/or 
engineering with all but one having programs in entrepreneurship and innovation as 
well.39 The advancements in curricula address the need for both depth in technological 
skill and breadth in application. That said, some respondents claim that universities have 
been slow to change and that the number of individuals with these competencies is still 
relatively low in Danish ICT. On a more practical level, IT University of Copenhagen 
recently implemented startup competitions where software teams produce working 
prototypes along with business plans before pitching to established founders, VCs, and 
                                                
39 The list of “established” Danish universities include Aalborg University, Aarhus University, Business 
Academy Aarhus, Copenhagen Business School, IT University of Copenhagen, Roskilde University, 
Technical University of Denmark, University of Copenhagen, and University of Southern Denmark. 
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silent investors. It was clear after I observed several presentations that Danish ICT 
entrepreneurs excel in technical capabilities and product design though are less able to 
demonstrate an understanding of market demand and overall business strategy. 
Moving to employee incentives, the traditional model of salaries and group-level 
bonuses remains the most prevalent form of compensation for Danish ICT workers 
especially at domestically-owned, established firms. Individual-based performance 
compensation schemes are increasing in number even in the public sector, though remain 
balanced with traditional group or firm-based performance targets as well. Where 
individual performance matters the most is in determining compensation for upper level 
managerial and sales roles. Respondents noted the movement toward personalized 
incentives and compensation as a manifestation of the long-standing and significant 
presence of TNCs. The trend is particularly significant for the Danish ICT sector where 
foreign ownership as a percentage of all firms is far higher than in any other sector, 
roughly equivalent to 50 percent (StatBank Denmark 2012a). The government has 
historically responded with tax policies discouraging the use of individual, risk-based 
compensation schemes by treating stock options as earned income. Recent reforms have 
begun to reverse the trend by providing favorable treatment to all-employee stock option 
plans as a compromise between individual and group incentives. 
Beyond compensation, Danish respondents noted other nonmonetary incentives as 
being equally important, if not more so. The ability to “be one’s own boss”, work with 
interesting people, and do interesting work were all noted by respondents as key 
incentives outside of compensation and highlight Danish entrepreneurship. Denmark 
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continues to maintain an abundance of small ICT firms lending support to the 
aforementioned desire for independence. Some respondents cited the need for 
independence as a constraining factor in Danish ICT, as independence has not led to a 
rise in the number of high growth firms. Arguably, the desire to scale up a firm from five 
to 50 to 500 employees with corresponding revenues is less common in Denmark, though 
given the tight network of small firms and the high degree of collaboration, this may not 
be a hindrance to more incremental and sustainable sector growth. One respondent noted 
movements like the “IT Collective” and “Robotnik” as meaningful examples of sector-
enhancing collaboration without a significant profit motive. Conversely, other 
respondents claimed the benefits from a generous welfare system provide the wrong 
incentives, engendering a proliferation of “would-be entrepreneurs” producing little in 
the way of actual value and wasting scarce resources. 
In summary, Denmark’s high labor market mobility contributes to knowledge 
share and positive network externalities within ICT clusters. Competition for scarce talent 
remains a challenge as it does for every productive ICT cluster, so long as demand for 
ICT products and services continues to grow. Denmark has addressed the shortage of 
qualified ICT professionals through liberalizing reforms including unrestricted labor 
contracting, expanding access to foreign workers, and extensive offshoring. More 
strategically, Denmark increased the stock of human capital in tertiary education and 
shifted to more demand-based skill sets. Active labor market policies have and continue 
to transition redundant ICT workers back into the labor force through (re)training 
programs, though the frequent skill changes inherent in ICT limit overall effectiveness. 
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Incentives remain a work in progress with the durable characteristics of independence 
and egalitarian wages, tempered by movements toward more individualistic, risk-based 
compensation schemes advanced by TNCs. 
Finance 
The most common forms of financing available to Danish SMEs and startups 
include retained earnings/savings or bank lending. Small firms and startups repeatedly 
stressed the limited access to uncollateralized bank lending in support of firm growth and 
the reliance on proceeds from mortgage loans, personal loans, savings, or retained 
earnings (e.g. organic growth). Respondents claimed that poor investment decisions 
during the 2000 and 2008 financial crises dampened interest in ICT growth companies 
and that most banks have yet to develop the expertise necessary to vet and value 
promising technology companies. Figure 4.2 shows the overall perception of corporate 
lending closely following Denmark’s relatively anemic recovery but there are more 
recent positive developments (StatBank Denmark 2014). Given the nascent economic 
recovery and renewed interest in growth firms, banks are returning to invest in ICT. As 
an example, the third largest Danish bank in terms of market share, Jyske Bank A/S, 
funds the Copenhagen incubator DARE2mansion. Nonetheless, direct investment 
remains the exception not the norm as banks prefer to catalyze funds like 
Modningsfonden, Vækstfonden, and SEED Capital with fund managers better qualified at 
making investment decisions in small, high-growth technology firms.  
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Figure 4.2 Credit condition survey, corporate lending 
 
Source: StatBank Denmark 2014. 
 
For large firms, the disproportionate number of TNCs makes assessments of local 
subsidiary financing arrangements a challenge. In general, large ICT firms rely on a mix 
of financing instruments including bonds and bank loans but also equity and retained 
earnings. TNCs have access to financial instruments across global markets and can utilize 
intercompany transfers to provide enabling additional internal financing options. The 
leading domestic-headquartered firm TDC for example holds DKK 23.4M in long-term 
loans and DKK 18.6M in retained earnings with a rather minimal equity position of DKK 
0.8M (TDC Group 2014). Simcorp is another example with €44.2M in retained earnings, 
€5.6M in share equity, and a modest €1.5M in long-term liabilities (SimCorp 2014). 
Using a slightly larger sample of seven Danish ICT firms, the holding of retained 
earnings comprises on average of 73.0 percent of annual turnover (Compustat 2012). 
Under such conditions, the opportunities for significant expansion are consequently 
constrained with firms operating as value companies, prioritizing returns to shareholders 
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over growth. It is possible that the recent upswing in credit availability has improved 
lending opportunities for ICT firms at all levels and consequently improving overall 
sector growth. Failing that, ICT firms need to look to either established equity markets, 
VC/PE, or state-sponsored grants and loans. 
Denmark has never had large equity markets though it is actively expanding all 
levels of risk-based financing, some of which finds its way to the ICT sector. Denmark 
fared relatively poorly during the 2008 financial crisis with overall GDP declining by six 
percent in 2009, second only to Finland, and with the slowest recovery among the 
Nordics (The World Bank Group 2015). Still, the Danish economy is recovering and 
financing levels are returning to pre-crisis levels, though not to the peak levels 
experienced during the dot.com era. Compared with the other Nordics, Denmark has the 
least amount of equity and venture capital financing. However, respondents in both 
Denmark and Norway consistently claimed that Denmark has better expertise in high-
growth sector investment like ICT. As an example, the Copenhagen based VC fund 
Northcap has been in operation for more than 16 years and invested in more than 40 IT 
firms. More importantly, Northcap maintains a strong presence in the Copenhagen startup 
cluster by actively engaging aspiring entrepreneurs and sharing information on funding 
options. While commendable, respondents unequivocally cited the lack of financing in 
Denmark as one if not the primary issue constraining ICT sector growth. 
Over the past 20 years for which data is available, market capitalization as a 
percentage of total GDP has grown significantly, rising from 29.2 percent in 1993 to 69.8 
percent in 2012 at a compound rate of 4.4 percent (The World Bank Group 2015). 
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Surprisingly, Danish equities have expanded without the benefit of FDI – which stands at 
less than one percent, ranking below every other Nordic country and the OECD average 
of 2.6 percent (The World Bank Group 2015). The Danish equity portfolio however, 
remains heavily oriented toward traditional industries like industrials, consumer goods, 
and basic materials. The percentage of technology and telecommunications firms listed 
on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE) is a mere 7.7 percent with the majority 
residing on the small cap First North exchange where EU regulatory requirements do not 
apply (NASDAQ OMX Nordic 2015). Along with Danish reforms lowering the required 
startup capital to DKK 500K for public listing, the First North exchange provides a track 
for growing companies like ICT startups. 
Moving to VC and other PE options, Denmark ranks relatively high in 12th place 
on the Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index, in line with the 
other Nordics but far behind the top ranking United States (Groh, Liechtenstein, and 
Lieser 2011). The measure identifies the likelihood of VC flows to highly competitive 
countries, not the actual amount of domestic VC funding. For this measure, the six-year 
annual average for VC investments in Denmark is €177M (EVCA 2015). Using the wider 
measure of total PE as a percentage of GDP, Denmark had the second largest (relative) 
PE industry behind the United Kingdom at 0.6 percent and ranked first in (relative) PE 
markets at 0.7 percent in 2013 (EVCA 2015).40 
                                                
40 Out of the 23 countries listed, just three countries (Denmark, Finland, and Belgium) improved in 2013 
over 2007-2012 average levels in the PE industry measure and four countries (Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
and Austria) in the PE market measure. In both instances, Denmark made the most significant improvement 
over all improving countries. 
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As with listed equities, sector allocation is the more relevant statistic and again 
Danish ICT receives a decent share of overall PE at 15.5 percent but allocated against a 
relatively large number of firms receiving PE at 25.8 percent. The percentages equate to 
an average of €2.9M per firm, considerably lower (65.8 percent) than the €4.8M average 
for all sectors (EVCA 2014). Table 4.3 provides a full accounting with Life sciences 
receiving the lion’s share at 35.6 percent, followed by Consumer goods and retail at 16.5 
percent (EVCA 2014). Given the longstanding presence of biotechnology firms and the 
multinational pharmaceutical giant Novo Nordisk, Denmark’s Life sciences share of is 
VC is expected. 




Agriculture	 		3,008		 	0.7		 		4,512		
Business	&	industrial	products	 		81,814		 	8.8		 		9,262		
Business	&	industrial	services	 		23,861		 	5.5		 		4,338		
Chemicals	&	materials	 		7,288		 	3.7		 		1,988		
Communications	 		34,797		 	11.7		 		2,983		
Computer	&	consumer	electronics	 		64,896		 	22.7		 		2,863		
Construction		 		14,530		 	1.2		 		12,455		
Consumer	goods	&	retail	 		105,750		 	8.0		 		13,219		
Consumer	services	 		8,276		 	1.2		 		7,094		
Energy	&	environment	 		25,797		 	12.2		 		2,120		
Financial	services	 		261		 	0.2		 		1,568		
Life	sciences	 		228,248		 	53.8		 		4,240		
Real	estate	 		201		 	0.2		 		1,209		
Transportation	 		30,129		 	1.2		 		25,825		
Unclassified	 		13,176		 	2.5		 		5,270		
Total	 		642,032		 	133.3		 		4,815		
ICT	 		99,693		 	34.3		 		2,904		
%	ICT	 15.5%	 25.8%	 		
Source: EVCA 2014. 
 
Researchers cite the privatization of Danish pension funds in contributing to the 
recent increase in equity and VC/PE financing (Christensen et al. 2008; Ornston 2012b). 
Danish pension funds do contribute the largest share of total PE at 29.5 percent p.a. but 
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when compared against total assets under management, this equates to just 0.06 percent 
(EVCA 2014; Towers Watson 2014). Moreover, Nordic pension funds invest a 
comparatively modest amount in PE at 27.4 percent, well below Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland at 49.5 percent, the UK and Ireland at 40.3 percent, and closer to 
Central/Eastern Europe at 28.3 percent (EVCA 2015). 
Regardless, investments from all forms of equity financing are insufficient in 
supporting the overall Danish ICT industry. Danish pension funds were early movers into 
risk-based financing during the dot.com era but now appear to favor more stable 
investments. As one VC partner described the current situation: “Danish pension funds 
are less relevant and guided by market indices, not picking good VCs.” As such, Danish 
pension funds invest globally using a risk-weighted portfolio reflective of an aging 
demographic that expects predictable returns, not risky growth opportunities or 
necessarily funding Danish industry. 
For these reasons, ICT firms generally and late-stage startups especially have had 
to seek alternative resources for growth capital. The first route has been through sale to a 
larger firm, usually a TNC. The benefits and consequences for a firm undergoing 
acquisition are debatable, often depending on the terms of the agreement and degree of 
complementarity between the acquirer and acquired. In general, Danish respondents 
perceived acquisition to be a constraining factor for the ICT sector, referring to the act as 
“selling out” due to subsequent cost savings initiatives and reprioritizing business 
strategy. 
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Two of the more notable Danish ICT firms followed the acquisition route with 
Microsoft acquiring both firms. Navision (rebranded Dynamics) provides financial 
management software to the wider European market by addressing specific domestic and 
EU regulatory requirements. Microsoft acquired the firm in 2002 and continues to 
maintain a development center in Denmark. Former CEO Steve Balmer, however, 
discounted Denmark’s long-term relevance in application development. Loss of tax 
revenue from relocating IPR and limiting innovations to maintain corporate release 
cycles are additional examples of the challenges of Microsoft operating in Denmark. A 
Dane (Janus Friis) and Swede (Niklas Zennström) founded Skype using technical 
resources from Estonia. EBay acquired the firm for $2.6B in 2005 then sold a controlling 
stake to a private equity consortium before Microsoft purchased the firm six years later 
for $8.5B. The founders profited substantially and continue as serial investors in the 
Nordics and elsewhere. The bulk of operations continue to reside in Estonia and the 
headquarters are now in Luxembourg, ostensibly due to favorable tax policies concerning 
IPR and other factors. 
More recently, Danish ICT firms have instead relocated to areas with larger risk-
based capital markets to enable accelerated growth. Founded in Copenhagen in 2004, the 
gaming software company Unity 3D moved to San Francisco following a $5.5M 
investment led by Bay Area PE firm Sequoia Capital. Unity 3D has since grown to more 
than 500 employees with a 45 percent market share and a valuation between one and two 
billion USD (Takahashi 2014; Unity 3D 2015). The customer service software firm 
Zendesk also relocated to San Francisco by way of Boston seeking a more conducive 
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growth environment. Following a series of investments from US-based venture funds, 
Zendesk listed on the New York Stock Exchange in May 2014 with a current market 
capitalization of $1.79B as of September 2015. Several smaller ICT firms followed suit 
in relocating to San Francisco including the software firm Tradeshift who secured $129M 
in venture funding and Podio who sold to Citrix for $53M. Outside of Silicon Valley, the 
Internet firm Just Eat relocated to London in 2006 to access £10.5M in venture funding 
before listing on the London Stock Exchange. Just Eat has a current market capitalization 
of £2.59B as of September 2015. 
As opposed to the shortage of talented ICT professionals globally, the dearth of 
financing required for ICT sector growth appears to be a local phenomenon 
unambiguously constraining sector growth. Whereas skill development is traditionally the 
purview of the state, financing Danish ICT appears to exhibit symptoms of market 
failure. The fact that multiple billion-dollar ICT firm exits have not engendered a 
refocusing on domestic financial markets and instead established a de facto route to 
international alternatives via acquisition or relocation lends credence to the argument. 
Given that other sectors including biotechnology and consumer products appear to have 
little difficulty in securing local financing and growing domestically, path dependent or 
policy favoritism may explain the relative success of those sectors in accessing capital at 
the expense of ICT. Regardless, market liberalization without the concomitant 
mobilization of late-stage risk-based financing enables the growth of viable startup firms 
but limits the development of large domestic firms. 
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Firm organization 
Owing to egalitarian ideals and a work culture known as arbejdsglæde or 
“happiness at work”, the general characteristics of Danish firms include flat organization, 
limited hierarchy, and employee autonomy. Confirmed in an extensive study, 62 percent 
of large firms stated they support managerial delegation, functional flexibility, 
firm/employee strategic alignment, and cross-disciplinary work groups (Lundvall 2002). 
Respondents stated that “happiness at work” enables Danish ICT workers to be critical 
and free to volunteer ideas but also consensus seeking though peer-to-peer decision-
making. Further, Danish ICT professionals take the initiative and are self-starters, though 
respondents also noted that relative autonomy could lead to intra-group impasses 
impeding critical decision-making and strategy advancement. 
Flat organizational structure extends to executives. Several respondents viewed 
executive management as open, transparent, and accessible. In one example following the 
acquisition of a Danish software firm by a U.S. TNC, the American contingent amused 
their Danish counterparts when they implemented “brown bag sessions” with upper 
management to increase employee/employer trust. While somewhat novel in American 
firms, the Danish respondent stated that “Brown bags are not new here; we already all eat 
in the canteen.” Ironically, innovative technology firms in Silicon Valley adopted 
management practices consistent with the Danish commitment to employee-centered 
organization (Saxenian 1994) but at least to some Danes, current U.S. ICT firms with 
Danish subsidiaries operate more hierarchically using top-down management practices. 
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Conversely, the significant presence of TNCs in Danish ICT has influenced firm 
organization. As with employee incentives, changes to firm organization depend on the 
acquirer and their specific strategy. More than not, respondents from acquired firms 
claimed that organizational changes were relatively modest with significant autonomy 
post acquisition. The general trend is toward portfolio management in which the parent 
company imposes core expectations while permitting limited organizational autonomy 
and flexibility. According to one respondent, the central office sets overall EBITDA41 
(i.e. earnings) targets and then each office determines their own strategic agenda to meet 
said targets. At another respondent’s office, the integration of portfolio management with 
shared competencies organized through “Centers of Excellence” meeting monthly to 
leverage knowledge from various projects ensures a balance between corporate and 
subsidiary objectives. The firm subsequently developed an in-house collaboration and 
archive system for knowledge management ensuring that the best ideas were available for 
all organizational units. 
Geography and inter-firm dynamics 
The center of Danish ICT is located in the capital city of Copenhagen followed by 
the “Mobilecom Valley” in Northern Jutland (Figure 4.3). The concentration of firms in 
the capital follows the general tendency of European software firms to cluster around 
metropolitan areas with abundant skilled labor and developed industry (Biagiotti and 
Burroni 2004). The Copenhagen cluster extends to the affluent northern city of Hillerød 
                                                
41 Earnings Before Income Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization. EBITDA is the generally accepted 
measure of profitability, excluding tax considerations. 
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and Roskilde in the west with the majority of firms based in Copenhagen and immediate 
suburbs. The cluster benefits from cross-border interaction with the high innovation 
Swedish cities of Malmö, Lund, and Helsingborg across the Øresund strait. Taken 
together, the wider Øresund region includes more than 3.8 million inhabitants making it 
the largest metropolitan area in the Nordics.42 Outside the Copenhagen cluster, the two 
universities in Århus and Ålborg establish the foundation for Mobilecom Valley where a 
number of domestic firms and TNCs reside, predominantly developing 
telecommunications and acoustic equipment (Asheim and Coenen 2005). 
Figure 4.3 Danish ICT clusters 
 
Source: List-of-companies.org 201243 
                                                
42 The Danes recently announced the desire to rebrand the Øresund region as “Greater Copenhagen” in 
recognition of the ties between the two countries and shared identities but also as a promotional move to 
establish a Nordic metropolis with international recognition (D. Crouch 2015). 
43 Results are from a random sample of roughly 300 ICT firms. 
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Given Denmark’s long tradition of SME-based, cooperative production, inter-firm 
collaboration should carry forward to ICT clusters. One respondent asserted otherwise 
and that cluster dynamics have and continue to lack coherence. If so, small-scale 
production largely in support of existing industries would ensure firm atomization 
consequently limiting knowledge share, network effects, and opportunities for mutually 
beneficial collaboration. At least in the Copenhagen cluster, grass-root efforts at 
increasing inter-firm collaboration amongst startups is increasing and reaching critical 
mass. 
The most notable example involves the establishment of #CPHFTW, a nonprofit 
community connecting aspiring and established entrepreneurs, investors, academics, and 
government representatives. The community does not limit sector focus, though it is 
overwhelmingly comprised of ICT startups. The most significant impact by the 
community is in engaging successful founders to share their experiences with aspiring 
entrepreneurs and in some case invest directly in new ventures or connect entrepreneurs 
with other investors. Given the high number of Danish founders abroad, the fact that so 
many continue to return periodically and invest in the Copenhagen ICT cluster is 
compelling and could be catalytic in accelerating sector growth. Jesper Busch of Just Eat, 
David Helgason of Unity 3D, Mikkel Svane of Zendesk, and Tommy Ahlers of Podio are 
all examples of founders making routine trips to Copenhagen and engaging future ICT 
entrepreneurs. 
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Beyond the improvements through #CPHFTW, challenges remain in inter-firm 
collaboration. First, in terms of overall employment, Danish ICT is largely comprised of 
sole proprietorships and a small number of large incumbent firms. For the average ICT 
firm providing basic technology services outside (or within) Copenhagen, there is little to 
be gained from participating in a startup community. Small ICT firms seek a living wage 
and the work they do differs greatly from the development of disruptive technology, 
products, and services. Second, large incumbent firms at least thus far have little interest 
in participating for two reasons. Not unlike the smaller services firms, large firms provide 
standard ICT services to larger customers so the potential benefits in collaboration is 
again limited. Product development firms, however, stand to benefit by extending their 
existing portfolio or improving current products with innovations produced by startups. 
Lastly, government involvement has up until recently been limited and remains focused 
primarily on promotion over collaboration. As noted in the following passage, 
government procurement tends to favor large, established firms over the small firm, let 
alone the innovative but deeply uncertain startup. 
Innovation/technology policy 
Sector supports 
Asheim finds that similar to Norway but unlike Finland and Sweden, Danish 
policy provides specific, sector-focused supports as opposed to supporting national and 
regional innovation system (2011a). Denmark has well established sector supports for 
mainline sectors but not ICT. In the fall of 2012, Denmark renewed their commitment to 
favored industries by establishing seven strategic growth teams: Blue Denmark 
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(Maritime); Creative Industries and Design; Water, Bio and Environmental Solutions; 
Health and Care Solutions; Energy and Climate; Food Sector; and Tourism and 
Experience Economy (OECD 2014). The government belatedly established a growth plan 
for ICT and Digital Growth with a team comprised of business and government leaders. 
The team has yet to formalize recommendations though it is expected that the team 
continue existing initiatives to expand ICT infrastructure, especially broadband access 
and speeds (The Danish Government 2013). Doing so will arguably increase ICT use and 
possibly foster demand-pull for wider digitization efforts. Doing so would be 
commensurate with diffused policy providing public goods with market mechanisms and 
institutions providing all other supports. 
Through increasing liberalization, direct involvement of the Danish government 
in the ICT sector has led to the dismantling of sector supports. The government 
dismantled the ICT and Digital Growth Department into four existing departments 
comprised of Business Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs, and Finance. The effort reflects 
the government’s general tendency to view ICT as a general-purpose technology, though 
not necessarily an industry in itself and worthy of a dedicated department. The 
government continues to provide support services especially to small firms, usually in 
legal and financial matters. Some respondents found the services helpful though several 
did not, citing the use of outdated business plans more amenable to ICT as it existed in a 
previous generation. As for the industry itself, privatization remains the priority of the 
Danish government. The government limits direct support for broadband initiatives, 
favoring private sector efforts aimed at increasing competition through expanded 
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deregulation. The government has also divested its holding in ICT through the 
privatization of the incumbent telecommunications carrier TDC and federal and local 
government ICT data centers. 
Where Denmark has made the most impact is in more broad-based, liberalizing 
reforms. Denmark has lowered corporate tax rates to 25 percent and plans to decrease 
rates further to 22 percent by 2016 lower than the liberal UK economy.44 Denmark has 
lowered the barriers to entry in firm creation with the elimination of the “entrepreneur 
tax” and in 2014 reduced capital requirements for certain firms to DKK 1.0. Establishing 
a firm is now easier as well requiring minimal time and effort due to technology 
improvements and streamlined processes. Once a firm is a going concern it faces minimal 
regulatory requirements up to 50 employees consequently benefiting the majority of 
Danish ICT firms. Equally relevant for some respondents is the time, effort, and costs 
required to close a failed business through bankruptcy proceedings. The process itself is 
relatively straightforward, but the dissolution or restructuring of liabilities is more 
difficult. Owing to enduring characteristics of Nordic capitalism, a firm owner is 
responsible for one’s debts – a noble characteristic reducing moral hazard but also 
constraining risk-taking in high innovation sectors like ICT. 
The reforms indicate a substantive policy shift though may represent the limits of 
liberalization for a center-left government heavily criticized by its leftist partners. While 
reforms like improving active labor policies by raising the retirement age and cutting the 
                                                
44 One respondent noted that the reduction in corporate tax rates does not apply to banks or petroleum 
firms. 
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maximum duration for unemployment benefits in half from four to two years (Gørtz 
2013) have been adopted, more recent proposals have been met with resistance. The 
public and unions in particular disapproved further reforms including reductions in 
student benefits, the elimination of certain long-term benefits, and a proposed extension 
in the number of annual workdays. Most recently, Denmark elected the liberal party 
Venstre with a mixed mandate to increase public sector consumption, limit immigration, 
and adopt additional job reform (Christian 2015a). 
Macro level reforms affecting the supply side of ICT accompany demand-side 
policies through continued government spending on ICT. Driven by efforts to reduce 
overall labor cost, increase efficiency, and improve service, the Danish government 
continues to automate services through digitization efforts focused on self-service, 
limiting face-to-face contact. Implementations have followed a rolling wave schedule 
prioritized by departmental readiness. Respondents viewed the competition for federal 
services as fair and transparent but favored established TNCs like Deloitte, IBM, and 
Accenture who can provide solutions for large, complex projects. Government ICT 
contracts remain focused on the aforementioned priorities, though private/public 
collaboration has led to broader innovations especially in establishing uniform standards 
subsequently adopted in the private sector. eProcurement, the creation of a standard 
citizen identification (NEM ID), electronic signature, and document management have 
engendered positive externalities for the ICT sector and the wider economy. 
Given lock-in effects from proprietary systems and data owned by the former 
government data center KMD, competition is less robust at the regional level where the 
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government provides healthcare and other social services. At the local level, kommunes 
are advancing their own agenda for increasing competition and improving services 
through the establishment of the independent entity KOMBIT using windfall taxes on the 
sale of grid services. The initiative is still a work in process with an effective duopoly in 
place. However, the kommunes are driving vendor competition by requiring data 
standardization and best practices. The overall verdict on government services is mostly 
positive reflecting increased competition, improved service levels, and limited though 
substantive innovations leading to positive network externalities. Regrettably, 
respondents noted that government procurement at all levels offers limited opportunities 
for small ICT firms outside of niche applications. 
In summary, sector supports for ICT are limited and moving toward diffused, 
liberalizing policies. In rank-order relevance, respondents identified demand-side factors 
through government ICT procurement as most supportive. However, respondents 
qualified their answer by noting that government procurement favors established TNCs 
over small firms. Next, macro-level liberalizing reforms have invariably improved 
operating conditions for all ICT firms. Finally, respondents found the limited, direct 
efforts of the Danish government for the ICT sector to be the least significant. Denmark 
already has some of the highest levels in ICT adoption and access to high-speed 
broadband. The establishment of an ICT growth team could redress the issues cited by 
respondents, though most respondents remain skeptical given the historical prioritization 
of other sectors over ICT. 
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R&D intensity and focus 
Closely aligned with sector supports are the efforts to increase absolute levels and 
wider impact of R&D. As depicted in Figure 4.4, Denmark made significant progress 
over the last 17 years for which data is available, reaching the three percent Barcelona 
goal in 2012 but stalling in the number of individuals employed in R&D (The World 
Bank Group 2015).45 In terms of R&D sources, Denmark consistently relies on the 
private sector at nearly 60 percent of total spending with a CAGR 2.9 percentage points 
higher than every other source (Figure 4.5) (OECD 2015).46 The disproportionate 
contribution from the private sector may be due in part to favorable tax concessions. 
R&D expenditures can be paid out as negative tax expenditure up to DKK 5.0M, soon to 
increase up to DKK 25.0M. 
Figure 4.4 R&D expenditure and 
employment 
Figure 4.5 Total R&D by source 
   
Source: The World Bank Group 2015. Source: OECD 2015. 
                                                
45 Values are interpolated for both measures in year 2000 and for “R&D researchers per 1,000” in 1998. 
46 Includes extrapolated values using year-on-year averages and/or previous year results where actual 
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While Denmark has improved overall levels of R&D, the perception of most 
respondents is that research remains directed toward academic advancement as opposed 
to private ventures. 1991 the Danish Parliament established The Danish National 
Research Foundation (Danmarks Grundforskningsfund) as the preeminent funding 
mechanism for basic research through the creation of “Centers of Excellence” (Danmarks 
Grundforskningsfond 2015). To date, the Foundation has provided DKK 6.0B in funding 
for 88 Centers of Excellence, though their stated strategy precludes interaction with 
private enterprise or the commercialization of discoveries (Danmarks 
Grundforskningsfond 2010; Danmarks Grundforskningsfond 2015). 
To address the issue of limited commercialization from R&D, Denmark has 
adopted reforms similar to those of the U.S. that enable public researchers to license and 
profit from inventions at public institutions. In practice, however, technology transfer 
remains limited. Respondents again cited the persistent divide between academics and the 
private sector as the most constraining factor along with an extensive bureaucracy 
stymieing the process. Consequently, the government embarked on a new strategy in 
2012 to consolidate three of the nine national laboratories established in 1985 for product 
development, ostensibly to develop critical mass in advancing marketable discoveries and 
improving the administrative process required to bring a product to market. 
Because of the conflicting and limited efforts in government sponsored R&D, the 
private sector continues to make the most significant contribution and is thus a more 
relevant measure in understanding the sectors receiving R&D spending. Using slightly 
more encompassing ISIC classification codes, Table 4.4 shows the Danish ICT sector 
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receiving a respectable 16.6 percent average of the total Business Expenditure R&D 
(BERD) (OECD 2015). Given a roughly eight percent share of total valued from the ICT 
sector, this implies that Danish ICT firms spend twice as much on R&D as the industry 
average before including contributions to R&D from government and other sources. 
Based on the data, Danish ICT firms lead the push in R&D with government contributing 
a modest share and limited commercial impact. Reforms aimed at improving the 
interconnections between public research institutions and private ventures appear 
promising, though respondents remain skeptical due to longstanding and persistent 
divisions. 
Table 4.4 Business enterprise R&D expenditure by industry (ISIC 4) in DKK M 
	
Industry	
2009	 2010	 2011	 Average	
ICT	 		 	 	 		
261:	Manufacture	of	electronic	components	and	boards	 	59.0		 	82.9		 	91.8		 	77.9		
262:	Manufacture	of	computers	and	peripheral	equipment	 	58.0		 	127.2		 	135.9		 	107.0		
263:	Manufacture	of	communication	equipment	 	243.0		 	224.4		 	242.7		 	236.7		
264:	Manufacture	of	consumer	electronics	 		 	 	31.1		 	31.1		
268:	Manufacture	of	magnetic	and	optical	media
47
	 		 	 	 		
582:	Software	publishing	 	849.0		 	754.5		 	539.7		 	714.4		
61:	Telecommunications	 	327.0		 	241.7		 	389.4		 	319.4		
62:	Computer	programming,	consultancy	and	related	activities	 	4,159.0		 	4,697.6		 	4,419.1		 	4,425.2		
63:	Information	service	activities	 	33.0		 	34.7		 	91.1		 	52.9		
951:	Repair	of	computers	and	communication	equipment	 			 	0.5		 	0.4		 	0.3		





	1,293.0		 	1,335.9		 	1,539.9		 	1,389.6		
Other	industries	 	23,965.3		 	21,749.7		 	21,711.5		 	22,475.5		
Total	 	36,714.3		 	35,412.6		 	35,133.8		 	35,753.6		
ICT	%	 15.6%	 17.4%	 16.9%	 16.6%	
Source: OECD 2015. 
                                                
47 Listed as “Confidential”. No values given. 
48 Excluded from ICT percentage calculations. 
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Funding 
To augment the limited sources of risk-based financing, the Danish government 
supports three funds aimed at increasing entrepreneurship and innovative firm growth, 
each directed at defined stages of firm development. The Market Development Fund 
(Markedsmodningsfonden) provides grants to firms at the pre-seed development level 
when firms are in the prototyping phase prior to revenue generation. Once a prototype 
becomes a viable product with prospective customers, the fund then provides guarantees 
to protect buyers from product failure. The goal of the fund is to enable growth in 
innovative SMEs, especially those in green technology, health and welfare solutions, 
design and other creative professions (Markeds Modningsfonden 2015). That said, the 
inherent riskiness of such ventures limits the overall pool of grants to DKK 135M p.a., 
roughly a quarter of the later-stage Danish Growth Fund’s (Vækstfonden) annualized 
investment pool of DKK 521.7M (Markeds Modningsfonden 2015; Vækstfonden 2015). 
The state investment fund Vækstfonden provides support to SMEs through equity 
stakes, loans, and guarantees. Because Vækstfonden operates as an investor with an 
expected rate of return, the Danish government provides a larger pool of capital so long 
as losses from write-offs/write-downs remain within expectations. Through partnerships 
with private investors, it has extended more than DKK 12.0B to more than 5,000 Danish 
companies since 1992 (Vækstfonden 2015). The amount dwarfs other government 
investment programs but equates to a relatively modest amount on an annual basis and 
fluctuates with the priorities and capabilities of government. Respondents noted that 
Vækstfonden does not target particular industries and has a broader mandate including 
 
  133 
aspects of social justice. In short, they loan to those who would otherwise not receive 
funding for whatever reason, including aspects of market failure. Consequently, ICT has 
historically received relatively little financing. On a positive note, recent partnerships 
with local venture capital funds experienced in risk-based financing have increased the 
number of ICT firms receiving funds to between four and six per year. 
The final government-sponsored fund is Innovation Fund Denmark 
(Innovationsfonden) with a total budget of DKK 1.5B for strategic research (Hal 2013). 
The fund emerged following consolidation of The Danish Council for Strategic Research, 
The Danish National Advanced Technology Foundation, and The Danish Council for 
Technology and Innovation (Hal 2013). Launched in 2014, the government has yet to 
state the criteria for funding (e.g. determination of strategic research initiatives and 
firms/sectors targeted) or what the forms of funding will be (e.g. grants, guarantees, or 
loans). Assuming the fund adheres to the policies of existing government investment 
schemes, it will target the leading industries with dedicated growth teams. 
As a member of the European Union, Denmark also benefits from structural funds 
earmarked for SME support and expanding entrepreneurship. During the previous 2007-
2013 period, Denmark received DKK 451M to support entrepreneurial skill development, 
enhance entrepreneurial culture, increase consultative services, and finance entrepreneurs 
(Hoffmann et al. 2012). Of the total, 41 percent went to direct funding projects including 
the Central Denmark Entrepreneurship Fund (DKK 50M), CAT Invest Zealand 
foundation (DKK 30M), Regional Loan Fund (DKK 30M), South Denmark Loan Fund 
for Outlying Areas (DKK 20M), and Copenhagen Spinouts (DKK 20M) (Hoffmann et al. 
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2012). The report does not provide funding allocations by sector, though the proxy 
measure of new firm registrations indicates that the construction industry experienced 
disproportionately higher growth than all other sectors from 2003 before collapsing in 
2008 (Figure 4.6). Knowledge services including ICT maintained moderate growth 
during the 11-year period with the strongest sector growth occurring most recently. 
Figure 4.6 Number of new enterprise registrations in four major sectors 
 
Source: Hoffmann et al. 2012. 
 
Denmark has since moved forward with its 2014-2020 program for innovation 
and sustainable growth in business with a total operating budget of €399.2M of which the 
EC will contribute €206.6M or 51.8 percent (European Commission 2014b). The total 
amount is 22 percent lower than the previous 2007-2013 period though still maintains 
aggressive targets including investing in 6,800 SMEs, establishing 700 new growth firms, 
and creating 2,700 jobs (European Commission 2014b; Regional Udvikling 2014). As 
with the 2007-2013 report, the 2014-2020 report does not specifically address the ICT 
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sector and instead focuses on increasing broader firm cooperation with knowledge 
institutions and innovation projects. In summary, both domestic and European public 
sector funding for ICT SME and startups firms remains limited. 
Incubation 
Tightly coupled with the broader mandates to support innovation and 
entrepreneurship are the government and private-sponsored programs to incubate or 
accelerate the development of new, high growth firms. Incubators provide a shared space 
for emerging firms to collaborate with other startups, share facilities and infrastructure, 
access various funds, and receive guidance from experienced entrepreneurs. Denmark has 
multiple incubators with variable mandates, partnerships, and levels of significance 
though private/public supported incubators and entrepreneurship programs have become 
the largest and most effective. 
One of the most prominent Nordic incubators in the Nordics is DTU Symbion 
Innovation (UBI 2014) now known as Pre-Seed Innovation. The incubator began in 1986 
with six scientists interested in connecting research and business, soon obtaining status as 
an “innovation environment” by the Danish government (Symbion 2015). It then 
established its own venture capital fund in 2001 later renamed SEED Capital Denmark 
(Symbion 2015). Symbion then merged with DTU Innovation in 2009 and is now the 
largest and most successful pre-seed venture capital investor (Pre-Seed Innovation 2015). 
The incubator itself relies on government capital from the Danish Agency for Science, 
Technology and Innovation (Pre-Seed Innovation 2015). Conversely, the dedicated 
venture capital fund SEED Capital has a more expansive portfolio operating two 
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additional later-stage funds worth €162M (SEED Capital Denmark 2015). Fund investors 
include the public agencies Væksfonden, along with pension funds like ATP and AP 
Pension. Further, several established private firms like Carlsberg, Danske Bank, Nordea 
Bank, and Danfoss have also invested in the fund (SEED Capital Denmark 2015). 
The next most prominent incubator is the Copenhagen Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship Lab (CIEL) established in 2011 with the intention of fostering 
collaboration between the schools of Copenhagen Business School, DTU, University of 
Copenhagen, and the private sector. Aligning with Denmark’s broad focus on dominant 
industries, CIEL operates seven initiatives covering Digital Services, Bio-Business, 
Sustainability, Food, Health, Maritime Logistics, and Climate supported by a DKK 18M 
grant from the EC’s European Social Fund (ESF) (CIEL 2015; Hoffmann et al. 2012). 
Given CIEL’s academic background, student development and core research factor 
heavily with business interactions focusing on graduate recruitment and venture 
collaboration (CIEL 2015). The project has advanced research initiatives, improved 
curriculum in entrepreneurship and innovation, and increased student engagement 
through networking with other entrepreneurs and the startup community. A cursory 
review of the 2012 annual report, however, did not provide unambiguous examples of 
successful high growth firm creation (CIEL 2013). 
A third example of private/public collaboration is the program “We Love 
Startups” bringing together Microsoft, the unemployment fund for the self-employed 
(DANA), and the aforementioned incubator Pre-Seed Innovation. The initiative does not 
provide facilities or infrastructure but does extend seed grants ranging from DKK 25K to 
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DKK 75K, mentor counseling, access to the information repository Trends Online, and 
subsidized webhosting from UnoEro (WeLoveStartups 2015). The remaining incubators 
are mostly small, grass roots, not-for-profit collectives ranging in purpose, scope, and 
relative impact. Thinkubator is one example combining a 10-week program, €2.0K grant, 
office space and facilities, and networking opportunities with research institutions and 
established firms (Munk 2015). The incubator operates out of the eclectic 
DARE2mansion collective, housing a range of enterprises from high technology to 
graphic design and art to performance artists, all of whom are focused on 
entrepreneurship in varying form (DARE2mansion 2014, 2). 
Promotion 
Without a globally recognized ICT firm, the sector lacks the universal recognition 
of other notable countries like the United States, Korea, Finland, or Sweden. Danish ICT 
has grown quietly over the years producing several small firms of consequence, 
predominantly in niche market like business-to-business (B2B) applications including 
enterprise resource planning (ERP), database design and access, and gaming engines. 
Relocation abroad further hinders promotional efforts as Danish firms assume a global 
identity to extend their market reach. The government agency Copenhagen Capacity 
actively promotes inward investment and a range of advisory services assisting foreign 
firms in establishing a presence in the capital with dedicated support for ICT. Trade 
associations comprised of the Confederation of Danish Industry’s (DI) ITEK and The 
Danish IT Industry Association (IT-Branchen) provide promotional support in addition to 
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wider advisory services for domestic firms. All three promote the ICT sector to potential 
foreign investors, though none maintains a presence outside of Denmark. 
The Danish government provides the most extensive outreach effort through the 
agency Innovation Centre Denmark. The agency operates multiple offices in Munich, 
New Delhi, São Paulo, Seoul, Shanghai, Silicon Valley, and Tokyo with a broad mandate 
to support increased opportunities for Danish knowledge-based firms operating abroad, 
predominantly through business case development, networking, introductions to potential 
investors, and access to knowledge and research centers (Innovation Centre Denmark 
2015). Efforts in support of ICT focus on complementarities between established 
knowledge sectors like clean technology (i.e. renewable energy) and life sciences, 
although three of the seven centers have dedicated ICT resources (Innovation Centre 
Denmark 2015). The approach appears consistent with the government’s domestic 
growth initiatives in supporting and promoting dominant sectors first with ICT enabling 
increased innovation within said sectors. 
Outcomes 
Large firms, incumbents, and lighthouses 
There are relatively few large, incumbent ICT firms in Denmark and most are 
TNCs performing general ICT consulting services, referred to by one respondent as 
“somewhat stagnant”. For reasons that date back to at least the mid-1980s, Denmark has 
been unable to establish a lighthouse firm conducive to wider sector growth and global 
recognition. In absolute terms, TDC is the only Danish firm with more than 10,000 
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employees and turnover in excess of $5.0B p.a.49 Just 11 firms have an annual turnover in 
excess of $500M and the majority are foreign TNCs as depicted in Figure 4.7. That said, 
size is but one part in defining a lighthouse and can be less relevant than positive inter-
firm dynamics between suppliers, customers, research centers, and learning institutions. 
Respondents noted the presence of IBM, TDC, and Microsoft as possible lighthouses for 
varying reasons, although all have undergone restructuring and consequent layoffs. 
Understanding the role of Danish large firms in catalyzing the domestic ICT sector then 
becomes subjective and dependent on other factors besides size. 
Figure 4.7 2011/12 Largest Danish ICT firms as measured in annual turnover 
. 
Source: Bureau van Dijk 2015. 
 
                                                
49 The Orbis dataset identified Danfoss as an ICT manufacturer making it the largest firm in terms of 
turnover and employment. The firm is included in all analytics, though as a producer of components for 
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IBM is a technology and professional services firm with a focus in Denmark on 
logistics following the acquisition of Maersk Data from A.P. Møller-Maersk Group in 
2004 (Sherriff 2004). Annual turnover for IBM stood at $1.2B in 2011, third overall 
behind Danfoss and TDC, though little improved since combining Maersk Data’s €467M 
with a comparable sized existing operation in 2004 (Bureau van Dijk 2015; Sherriff 
2004). Because of IBM’s enduring presence in Denmark and the commitment to 
maintaining high-skilled employment and development activities, one respondent 
referred to the firm as one of the “positive partners”. Still, restructuring has drastically 
reduced the total labor force from nearly 7,000 following acquisition to roughly half that 
just seven years later (Bureau van Dijk 2015; Sherriff 2004). IBM has realized significant 
efficiencies and improved shareholder value, though it is unknown whether efficiencies 
stem from laborsaving innovation that might still enhance the domestic ICT ecosystem 
through knowledge externalities or by shifting to lower-cost labor centers elsewhere, 
which would not. 
TDC is four times the size of IBM in annual turnover with three times as many 
employees but no respondent referred to it as Denmark’s ICT lighthouse. Since 
acquisition by a private equity consortium in 2005, TDC has focused on domestic 
markets, cost containment through layoffs, reductions in R&D, and increased use of 
original equipment manufacturers OEMs (i.e. external vendors) for equipment. Falch and 
Henten confirm as much noting that most of the innovations in Danish 
telecommunications have been in product packaging (e.g. service bundling) and process 
improvements, not improving services like high-speed broadband or in equipment 
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manufacturing (2007). TDC follows the more general trend in telecommunications with 
low R&D averaging 1.5 percent or half the GDP-wide figure of 3.0 percent (Jaruzelski 
and Dehoff 2008). Thus, TDC is not unlike IBM in maintaining profitability through 
labor force reductions but because of its focus on markets, process, and external 
equipment acquisition it appears less supportive of innovative activities and/or inter-firm 
collaboration enabling cluster development. 
Microsoft greatly enhanced its presence in Denmark following the 2002 
acquisition of Navision for DKK 10.9B to expand its reach in the European ERP market 
and access DKK 1.5B in annual turnover (Compustat 2012; Microsoft 2002). Since then, 
annual turnover declined to $148M with 412 employees ten years later in 2012 (Bureau 
van Dijk 2015). Microsoft’s continued presence in Denmark is a telling example in which 
the gains from additional local investment are contrasted against wider corporate 
objectives not always beneficial to the Danish economy and especially the ITC sector. 
Microsoft continues to maintain a strategic development center in Copenhagen 
supporting business applications like ERP. It also implemented an innovative recruitment 
and retention program where high skilled, entrepreneurial employees are encouraged to 
start independent ventures with an open door policy to return to Microsoft. Still, 
Microsoft reduced overall application development, relocated their corporate 
headquarters to Ireland to take advantage of lower corporate tax rates, and relegated local 
innovations to corporate release cycles to extend the life of legacy products. That said, 
most respondents regard Microsoft’s presence as an asset to the Danish ICT sector even 
with its relatively small presence within the ecosystem. 
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The examples in the private sector follow developments in the public sector where 
liberal reforms have led to the privatization of KMD at the local level and the divestiture 
of federal services to U.S.-based TNC Computer Science Corporation (CSC). Results 
from privatization and divestiture are mixed, with KMD leading competitive processes 
through close interaction with the kommunes and CSC enduring a necessary managerial 
overhaul and crosscutting restructuring. The overall synopsis for large ICT firms is that 
continued competition through liberalization has undermined domestic sector supports 
while benefiting the profitability of foreign TNCs. TNCs recognize the pool of talent, 
market opportunity, and favorable regulatory environment in Denmark and will continue 
to increase investment in subsidiaries and acquisitions. 
Micro/small firms and startups 
Noted earlier in the chapter, micro firms and SMEs with limited, linear growth 
dominate the Danish ICT sector in absolute numbers. The majority of small firms provide 
standard IT services like local computer sales and support, limited (often-bespoke) 
application development, and some product development focused predominantly on 
domestic markets. Exemplifying the standard Danish ICT SME, one firm interviewed is a 
Microsoft partner offering a range of business application solutions, website/content 
hosting, and voice over IP (VOIP) telephony. The firm acquired a handful of smaller 
firms before expanding into two continental European countries and growing in excess of 
300 employees. The firm is a classic example of a Danish ICT SME providing standard 
services using OEM products, growing organically, and collaborating with partners but 
not engaged in radical product development with the potential for exceptional growth. 
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Consequently, the firm representative did not have a favorable view of the Copenhagen 
cluster or the ongoing efforts to stimulate one.  
Another example follows a similar narrative but demonstrates that by leveraging 
traditional Danish institutions, outcomes in firm incubation are improved. The firm began 
by providing general IT services, web design, and search engine optimization (SEO) 
before developing a cloud-based application with a current global user base of 275,000. 
The firm has always relied on internal funds and like others cited the scarcity of financing 
options and limited government support. How the firm differs is that it operates out of a 
repurposed dairy farm, now collective, housing multiple growth companies sharing 
facilities and collaborating on ideas and work projects. Unlike the more structured 
incubators in the U.S. and even Denmark, the collective is an extension of long-standing 
Danish practices but adapted to support knowledge industries. 
The collective tradition continues in other examples like the self-taught developer 
who started at an IT TNC before founding a series of ventures and becoming a 
multimillionaire. The respondent continues to operate an ICT SME providing support for 
Oracle software products while trying to break away with their own product offerings. 
Employees are actively involved in the local startup community, work in an experimental 
non-revenue generating lab/incubator while remaining a fully paid employee, and are 
encouraged to take positions in established ICT firms or create new startups before 
returning to the firm. Consistent with other SMEs, this particular respondent cited the 
lack of financing and government assistance as persistent factors limiting sector growth. 
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Instead, the firm succeeded through the support of a strong community of likeminded 
entrepreneurs facing similar challenges. 
Notwithstanding the perspectives of some respondents, the Danish startup 
community has evolved significantly, beginning as a grassroots effort that has now 
garnered the attention of government and private investors. Obtaining positive 
collaboration with government has been a persistent challenge, as noted in one 
respondent’s example of a government-sponsored presentation on entrepreneurship 
comprised of accomplished founders, none of whom received government assistance. The 
landscape has improved, especially through public-private investment schemes like 
SEED Capital and Vækstfonden, along with a new program offering residency to non-EU 
entrepreneurs (Danish Business Authority 2015). As well, the often cited cultural stigma 
of becoming entrepreneur appears to be improving with continued new firm registrations 
in knowledge services even through the 2008 financial crisis (Hoffmann et al. 2012). 
The persistent challenge for Danish startups is how grow beyond SME status and 
do so domestically. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 document the trend of Danish ICT firms seeking 
late stage funding and higher market valuations from international markets. Danish 
startups secure private equity funding domestically, though relatively few then list 
domestically for later stage equity financing. Of those that have, just two have grown to 
billion dollar valuations: Netop Solutions and Simcorp, and only after 44 and 34 years of 
growth, respectively. Further, Netop has since delisted along with Trifork leaving just 10 
former ICT startups on the Danish OMX exchange for a total market capitalization of 
$1.6B; roughly 11 percent of total international valuation/funding. 
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Table 4.5 Startup firms by status and 
location – International 
Table 4.6 Startup firms by status and 
location – Domestic 
Relocated	Internationally	or	Acquired	by	TNC	 	 Denmark	
Status	 Name	 	Valuation/	Funding	in	$M		 	 Status	 Name	
	Valuation/	
Funding	in	$M		
Acquired	 Skype	 	8,560.0		 Acquired	 11	Other	Firms*	 	33.6		
Acquired	 Navision	 	1,450.0		 Listed	Domestically	 SimCorp	A/S	 	1,346.5		
Acquired	 Thrane	&	Thrane	A/S	 	428.2		 Listed	Domestically	 Rtx	A/S	 	120.7		
Acquired	 Area9	 	178.0		 Listed	Domestically	 Columbus	A/S	 	94.1		
Acquired	 Maconomy	A/S	 	73.0		 Listed	Domestically	 cBrain	A/S	 	69.4		
Acquired	 Podio	 	53.0		 Listed	Domestically	 6	Other	Firms	 	53.3		
Acquired	 14	Other	Firms*	 	126.4		 Total	Listed	Domestically	 	1,683.8		
Total	Acquired	 	10,868.6		 Listed	Abroad	 Vopium	 	23.1		
Listed	Abroad	 JustEat	 	2,915.4		 Private	 Netop	Solutions	A/S	 	5,566.8		
Listed	Abroad	 Zendesk	 	1,730.0		 Private	 Trifork	A/S	 	45.2		
		 	 	4,645.4		 Private	 Sitecore	 	Undisclosed		
Private	Equity	 Unity	Technologies	 	1,500.0		 Total	Privatized	 	5,612.1		
Private	Equity	 Tradeshift*	 	129.0		 Private	Equity	 83	Other	Firms*	 	199.0		
Private	Equity	 9	Other	Firms*	 	59.9		 		 Total	Domestic	 	7,551.6		
Total	Private	Equity	 	1,688.9		 		 	 		
		 Total	International	 	17,202.9		 Closed	 21	Other	Firms*	 	51.5		
Total	Startup	Value	Intl.	and	Domestic	 	24,754.5		 Domestic	Percent	of	Total	Startup	Value	 30.5%	
Source: CrunchBase 2015 and related data.50 
 
Single case conclusion 
My general argument explaining ICT sector outcomes in the cases of Denmark 
and Norway is that domestic institutions and innovation/technology policy are oriented 
toward certain actors over others within the same sector. In the case of Denmark, the 
preceding discussion shows that overall ICT sector size and growth remains muted in 
relation to the leading Nordic countries of Finland and Sweden due to enabling factors 
favoring small firms and startups while constraining factors work against large, 
established firms. The incontrovertible movement toward liberalization through labor 
market mobility, deregulation, and increased risk-based financing has generally 
                                                
50 The asterisk (*) denotes total funding received to date. All other values are total market capitalization for 
listed firms or the firm valuation at the time of acquisition. 
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benefitted small firms and an organic startup community. Denmark, however, has 
stopped short of continued reforms especially in expanding later stage financing options 
for ICT firms. Without access to larger pools of capital, many promising firms opt for 
acquisition by a TNC or relocate to larger, liberal markets. 
Consequently, there are few large ICT firms in Denmark and none has become a 
successful lighthouse firm with the potential to bring global recognition to the sector and 
formalize what has thus far been an organic and somewhat diffused cluster. Further, the 
effect of Danish liberalization varies depending on the sector. Danish policy favors 
dominant sectors like maritime and health care/pharmaceuticals over ICT where the state 
actively dismantled supports even though ICT contributes more than eight percent of total 
GDP. 
The ICT sector would contribute a considerably greater share if high growth firms 
remained in Denmark and/or favorable supports for incumbent firms remained or 
improved. Denmark has instead done what no other Nordic country has done in fully 
privatizing the once state-owned telecommunications provider TDC, benefiting 
international investors while shedding thousands of domestic positions. Denmark then 
privatized government ICT services leading to the acquisition of the federal data center 
by a TNC and the divestiture of Kommunedata into KMD. The trend extends into the 
private sector with large firms in other industries divesting their internal ICT services as 
in the notable examples of IBMs acquisition of Maersk Data and the spinout of NNIT by 
Novo Nordisk. 
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Thus, Denmark’s limited liberalization, dismantling of sector supports, and 
diffused ITP has led to suboptimal aggregate outcomes in ICT sector development. 
Denmark has directly supported comparable sectors like biotechnology and renewables 
using both concerted liberalization and active state support. Liberalization enabled the 
development of a strong biotechnology sector by making risk-based capital available and 
creating a track to listing on the domestic stock exchange. The strategy complemented 
established health care and pharmaceutical industries in engendering localized positive 
externalities for the overall sector. Denmark also engaged in active industrial policy to 
build Vestas – the market leader in wind turbines – through subsidies and a direct tax on 
nonrenewable energy sources. The outstanding question for Denmark then is why 
movements toward liberalization and diffused ITP have not been more extensive, 
assuming active state involvement is an undesirable option. Tax reform, expanding 
access to all stages of risk-based capital, improving the commercializing of R&D, and 
improving incentives for entrepreneurship are all favorable adjustments that would 
complement an already established liberal path to ICT sector development.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE NORWEGIAN ICT SECTOR 
Origins of Norwegian ICT 
Norway was in near lockstep with Denmark in the early adoption of 
telecommunications and computing. Beginning with telecommunications, Norway 
opened its first telephone exchange in 1880 (Telenor Group 2015). During most of its 
history, Norwegian telecommunications operated as a traditional state-run monopoly. 
This changed in 1994 when the main telecommunications company became a public 
corporation. Privatization, however, did not begin until 2000 and the Norwegian 
government still holds a majority and controlling interest in the large telecommunications 
company Telenor (Telenor Group 2015). Norwegian telecommunications would have 
likely remained a fully state-controlled monopoly had it not been for the competitive 
pressure from the other Nordics and elsewhere advocating deregulation, liberalization, 
and privatization in an effort to improve and expand new services. 
When Denmark fully liberalized and privatized telecommunications in 1998, the 
remaining Nordics began to rethink the traditional state- controlled telecommunications 
model. Denmark’s primary operator TDC sold 42 percent of outstanding stock to the 
United States’ Ameritech under a new strategic partnership to extend data and telephony 
access throughout Europe (TDC Group 2015). The action prompted Norway’s incumbent 
carrier, now renamed Telenor, and Sweden’s Telia to enter into merger negotiations to 
offset what was perceived as a powerful new entrant in the Nordic telecommunications 
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market (Svenolof Karlsson 2011). Negotiations, however, proved intractable and 
ultimately collapsed in 1999 (Edwardsson 2015). At issue was the Norwegian 
government and Telenor’s insistence that mobile services be located in Fornebu while the 
consolidated central headquarters would be located in Stockholm (Svenolof Karlsson 
2011). The fate of the proposed merger was ultimately sealed when a frustrated Minister 
of Swedish Industry, Employment and Communications, Björn Rosengren, unwittingly 
referred to Norway as the “last Soviet state” on broadcast television, due to stalled 
negotiations and the persistent involvement of the Norwegian government (Edwardsson 
2015). Telia and Finland’s Sonera then agreed to a merger a year later under comparable 
terms to those sought by Telenor and the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian 
government remains an active agent in Telenor through a controlling ownership stake of 
54 percent, in contrast to against Denmark’s full privatization and the Finnish and 
Swedish governments’ combined ownership of 49 percent in TeliaSonera. 
Norwegian computing has had a long though less enduring than 
telecommunications. Fredrik Rosing Bull was an early pioneer in advanced punch card 
technology receiving multiple patents in the early 1920s before relocating to France to 
found the firm now operating as Groupe Bull. In electronic computing, Norway first 
appropriated technology from abroad using machines manufactured by IBM and 
UNIVAC then augmented the systems locally to meet specific needs (Berntsen 2005). It 
was not until 1954 that Norway developed its own electronic computer called NUSSE 
(Berntsen 2005; Bruhn 2005), later administered by the Council for Government 
Electronic Data Processing or DB-rådet established in 1961 (Elgsaas and Hegna 2009). 
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The computing ecosystem made a major advance following the work of Kristen 
Nygaard and the development of the world’s first object-oriented programming 
languages: Simula I and Simula 67. The importance of Nygaard’s contribution continues 
to resonate, as object-oriented programming became a global standard underpinning the 
development of current programming languages including C++, Java, and C#.51 For his 
groundbreaking work in computing, Nygaard earned the A.M. Turing award in 2001 
(Association for Computing Machinery 2012a) and in 2001 Norway named its national 
computing research laboratory SIMULA in honor of the contribution. Notwithstanding 
the accomplishments of Nygaard and others, Norwegian educational institutions 
prioritized over the subsequent 20 year period the development of the computer science 
discipline as opposed to core research, consequently hindering innovation within the 
sector (Nordal 2009). 
By the mid-1970s, Nordic computing grew to include Norsk Data, Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk, Tandberg, and Mycron (Elgsaas and Hegna 2009). As computing became 
a defining characteristic of economic competitiveness, vendor ambivalence gave way to 
defensive positions favoring the local minicomputer firm Norsk Data over the U.S. rival 
Digital (Gram et al. 2005). Active industrial policy enhanced Norsk Data’s presence 
through directed procurement by the newly established Norwegian Regional Colleges 
from 1965 to 1975 (Ofstad 2005). At the behest of governing political parties and trade 
unions, DB-rådet extended industrial policy though more subtly by stalling purchase 
requisitions for rival computing systems from foreign competitors, especially the United 
                                                
51 Danes Bjarne Stroustrup and Anders Hejlsberg respectively developed C++ in 1978 C# in 2000. 
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States (Elgsaas and Hegna 2009). Fissures widened between Norsk Data and foreign 
commercial computing suppliers like IBM with effectively no interaction between the 
two user and development communities (Gram et al. 2005). In so doing, wider 
collaboration and growth within the sector stalled. 
Industrial policy and directed procurement programs ultimately failed to protect 
the Norwegian computer sector. Along with most other minicomputer manufacturers in 
the 1970s, Norsk Data did not anticipate nor effectively respond to the rapid adoption of 
the then emerging microcomputer systems. Norsk Data founder Lars Monrad Krohn led 
efforts to reposition Norsk Data as a producer of microcomputers through the 
establishment of Mycron but failed under intense competition from IBM with the 
advanced and widely adopted personal computer (PC) system. With the fall of Norsk 
Data and its microcomputer offshoot Mycron in 1990/2, Norwegian industrial policy in 
support of the computing industry effectively ended (Elgsaas and Hegna 2009). The end 
of Norsk Data/Mycron did not contribute to the creation of new enterprises in computing 
as in the case of the United States’ Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory in 1957, 
Sweden’s Ericsson later during the 2000s and 2010s, or Finland’s Nokia most recently. 
Instead, IT departments at other incumbent firms and government departments absorbed 
the majority of redundant employees because a path to entrepreneurship with a cohesive 
startup community was effectively nonexistent.  
Norwegian ICT today 
The current state of Norwegian ICT reflects long-standing commitments to 
incumbent firms and limited efforts to support small firms, entrepreneurs, and startups. 
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Micro firms dominate the sector in absolute terms by more than seven to one (IKT-Norge 
2009) providing a significant percentage of total employment but a modest contribution 
to total annual turnover (Figure 5.1).52 Conversely, a handful of very large enterprises 
contributes the overwhelming share of annual turnover and a considerable portion of total 
employment, which  stems from the high degree of concentration of three firms: the 
telecommunications giant Telenor and the ICT services firms Atea and Evry. SME firms 
comprise the remaining share of total firms, turnover, and employment. Not unlike micro 
firms, SMEs employ a disproportionately large percentage of the total but contribute a 
lower percentage of total turnover. 
Figure 5.1 Norwegian ICT sector by share of firms, revenues, and employees 
Source: Bureau van Dijk 2015.53 
 
                                                
52 The European Commission defines criteria for classifying small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
(2015a). Micro firms employ less than 10 employees and produce ≤ €2.0M in annual turnover. Small firms 
range between 10 and 49 employees producing between €2.0M and €10.0M p.a., while medium firms start 
at 50 but do not exceed 250 employees and have turnover of more than €10.0M but less than €50.0M p.a. 
(European Commission 2015a). I use the term “enterprise” singularly to refer to any firm larger than those 
defined as SMEs. 
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Table 5.1 lists the number of firms, annual turnover, and total employees by 
industry classification, highlighting the contribution of the big three firms of Telenor, 
Evry, and Atea (Bureau van Dijk 2015). One caveat to the analysis is that unlike the 
Danish dataset, the Norwegian dataset listed more firms in total but the completion and 
accuracy of the data was less reliable, necessitating corrections and estimations by the 
author. That said, the breakouts are consistent with expectations. Telecommunications 
provides nearly two-thirds of total turnover and more than 40 percent of total 
employment from just 552 firms. Together with Computer programming, consultancy 
and related activities, the two industries contribute more than 80 percent of total sector 
turnover and employment. The most striking difference between the two industries is the 
total number of firms. Notwithstanding the contributions of Atea and Evry, 4,143 micro 
and SME firms comprise the remainder of industry turnover and employment. The next 
most relevant industry is Wholesale trade, following a similar trend with the next highest 
contribution in turnover and employment spread out amongst more than 1,000 SME and 
micro firms. A small, concentrated group of very large enterprises coexisting with 
thousands of SME and micro firms comprises the total Norwegian ICT sector. 
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Table 5.1 Norwegian ICT sector by share of firms, revenues, and employees 
Industry	Classification	 Firms	 Turnover	($000s)	 Employees	
26	Manufacture	of	computer,	electronic	and	
optical	products	 	112		 1.6%	 	1,652,018		 2.3%	 	3,450		 2.9%	
46	Wholesale	trade	(ICT	only)	 	1,026		 14.5%	 	5,185,011		 7.3%	 	6,817		 5.8%	
ICT	Services	 		 	 	 	 		 	
58	Publishing	(Software	only)	 	651		 9.2%	 	2,466,839		 3.5%	 	7,665		 6.5%	
61	Telecommunications	 	552		 7.8%	 	44,424,288		 62.6%	 	47,339		 40.2%	
62	Computer	programming,	consultancy	and	
related	activities	 	4,145		 58.5%	 	15,941,865		 22.5%	 	47,549		 40.4%	
63	Information	service	activities	(ICT	only)	 	543		 7.7%	 	1,232,600		 1.7%	 	3,926		 3.3%	
95	Repair	of	equipment	(ICT	only)	 	59		 0.8%	 	60,960		 0.1%	 	911		 0.8%	
ICT	Services	total	 	5,950		 83.9%	 	64,126,553		 90.4%	 	107,390		 91.3%	
Total	ICT	 	7,088		 100.0%	 	70,963,582		 100.0%	 	117,657		 100.0%	
Source: Bureau van Dijk 2015. 
 
Institutions 
Labor markets, Skill development, and Employee incentives 
According to the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, the Norwegian 
labor market is classified as “repressive”, ranking below every other Nordic country and 
tied with Ukraine (2011). Respondents agreed with the rankings when applied to the 
overall Norwegian economy though noted less restrictive labor market conditions in ICT 
and in comparison with the other Nordic ICT sectors. Periodic layoffs, organizational 
restructuring, contract labor, and offshoring are all features of Norwegian ICT, though to 
a lesser degree than in other Nordic countries and with other constraints hindering wider 
labor mobility continuing to persist. 
The immediate factor in labor mobility is the significant role of large, sate-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in setting wages and recruiting and retaining the best talent. Norway is 
a de facto petro-state with the government owning two-thirds of the largest oil and gas 
producer Statoil and the sector constituting 23 percent of total value added (Norwegian 
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Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2007). Norway has largely resolved the Dutch disease 
by reinvesting oil and gas revenues abroad through a sovereign wealth fund. The effects 
from oil and gas, however, still permeate in other ways with Statoil offering wages 15.1 
percent above the ICT sector average and employment stability to acquire the most 
sought after technologists (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Statoil is not 
alone as other large SOEs like DNB, Norsk Hydro, Statkraft, and Telenor increase the 
competition for qualified talent. 
The influence of SOEs extends into the private ICT sector through the 
procurement of professional services from large established ICT consultancies. As with 
their SOE customers, ICT consultancies promote higher wages and employment stability, 
although their competitive advantage stems more from aggressive college recruitment 
programs than favorable compensation schemes (Gjendem 2015). In every case, the ICT 
labor market is relatively tight: large, established firms have a significant advantage in 
securing the best ICT professionals over SMEs and startups. 
A second countervailing factor concerns the role of unions in both enabling and 
constraining labor market liberalization. Norway has the lowest unionization rates 
amongst the Nordics standing at just over 50 percent roughly 20 percent lower than the 
Nordic average (European Trade Union Institute 2015). Two unions represent the 
majority of ICT workers: the private sector employee association Negotia with 21,800 
members and Tekna with 68,000 members for those holding advanced degrees in science 
and technology. Nergaard notes that unionization levels in private sector services are the 
lowest in Norway at just 34 percent (2014). Neither Negotia nor Tekna provide 
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membership breakouts by sector making it difficult to ascertain the total number of 
unionized ICT employees. Regardless, the combined membership of both unions is 
roughly 7.3 percent of an already relatively low total union membership indicating an 
insignificant role for unions in the ICT sector (European Trade Union Institute 2015). 
Ostensibly, low unionization rates should enhance labor competition by allowing the 
market rather than collective bargaining to set wages. While the private sector is less 
unionized, public sector employees are highly unionized at 81 percent (Nergaard 2014). 
Further, the unionized government sets labor utilization requirements internally that then 
influences border sectors, especially firms engaged in government procurement like ICT. 
A third consideration underpinning wider aspects of Norwegian governance, 
institutions, and policy beyond aspects of labor freedom pertains to Norway’s distinct 
geography and the subsequent balkanization of its labor markets. Unlike the other 
Nordics, Norwegian local governments have always had a relatively high degree of 
autonomy due to the remoteness of settlements. Local government autonomy has led to 
initiatives seeking additional investment while also protecting local employment. In so 
doing, Norway has fragmented clusters and made labor markets less accessible, both of 
which constrain wider ICT sector development. Labor market protectionism is mostly 
informal with Norwegian labor market laws asserting free and fair treatment. Instead, the 
barriers to entry are more subtle, relying on cultural cues and informal, personal relations. 
While anecdotal, two respondents provided telling examples of labor market 
protectionism. The first involved a respondent who was unable to secure promotion at 
Kongsberg (Norway’s largest defense contracting firm) because he was not born in the 
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town bearing the firm’s name. The other respondent commented that it is impossible to 
conduct business with Statoil without speaking the local Stavanger dialect, Stavangersk, 
with the firm’s headquarters in Stavanger. 
Even with the balkanization of regional labor markets, respondents universally 
noted the scarcity of ICT professionals across disciplines, levels, and geography. Tight 
labor markets are a general condition in Norway with very low unemployment at around 
3.5 percent (The World Bank Group 2015).54 A final consideration concerns the limited 
divestiture and privatization of ICT departments in other industries and the government. 
Industry labor protection insulates ICT professionals from organizational restructuring, 
layoffs, and the need for reskilling. For this reason, no respondent cited employment 
difficulties for ICT workers with legacy skills. Employees keep a job for life at the major 
firms or in government where skill redevelopment is less of an issue. Should workers 
with legacy skills become redundant, tight labor markets ensure that as one respondent 
claimed, they “move on to some bank to do standard Java programming”.55 
Not unlike the other Nordic countries, rising offshoring, increasing competition 
from TNCs, and additional guest workers challenge the aforementioned labor protections. 
The effects would be more significant if Norway loosened informal and formal barriers to 
labor competitiveness. As an example, one respondent noted language requirements and 
knowledge of local markets as being more relevant than marketable skills and wage 
                                                
54 Norway’s relatively low unemployment is somewhat tempered by the fact that 10 percent of the 
population is on long-term nonretirement welfare benefits (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). 
55 Java is a 20-year-old general-purpose programming language. In this context, the respondent used it as a 
pejorative to indicate commoditized, low-level ICT skills. 
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competitiveness. Concerning immigration, Norway eliminated a program allowing 5,000 
in demand workers per annum citing misuse by applicants. A more recent indicator of the 
current conservative government’s stance on immigration is the newly allocated NOK 
183M in the 2015 budget to facilitate increased and expedited deportations of illegal 
residents (The Local 2014). For those guest workers and/or TNCs able to access the 
Norwegian market, they still face higher tax rates for both the individual and firm than in 
other Nordic countries. 
Norway’s preferred solution to tight labor markets is to increase internally the 
pool of qualified individuals. Respondents generally gave an unfavorable opinion of 
government efforts to do so noting the abundance of employment opportunities in less 
exacting fields compounded by the perceived low status of engineers. Norway’s inherent 
regionalism is also an issue with educational development concentrated at the main 
technology campus NTNU at Trondheim and business management at the private BI 
Norwegian Business School in Oslo. Under these conditions, the opportunities for 
collaboration toward ICT commercialization are somewhat limited. 
Macro statistics corroborate the anecdotal evidence. Norway has improved overall 
tertiary enrolment levels from 58.1 percent in 1996 to 74.0 percent in 2012 (The World 
Bank Group 2015). The prima facie results appear promising until one considers that 
Norway started with the second highest enrolment levels in the Nordics, peaking just 
eight years later at nearly 80 percent before falling another six percentage points to 
present levels (The World Bank Group 2015). In tertiary education completion as of 
2012, Norway has 1,170,409 individuals with various levels of higher learning in a 
 
  159 
number of fields (Statistics Norway 2015). Of the total nearly 20 percent are in natural 
sciences, vocational and technical subjects increasing to 33 percent at levels beyond four 
years Table 5.2 (Statistics Norway 2015). 
Table 5.2 2012 Highest attained education of the population 15-69 years 
Field	 	Short		 	Long		 	All	levels		
Business	and	administration	 	146,723		 	29,478		 	176,201		
Education	 	202,532		 	13,118		 	215,650		
General	programmes	 	816		 	69		 	885		
Health,	welfare	and	sport	 	208,434		 	51,815		 	260,249		
Humanities	and	arts	 	82,259		 	36,261		 	118,520		
Primary	industries	 	3,993		 	7,796		 	11,789		
Social	sciences	and	law	 	49,473		 	54,383		 	103,856		
Transport	and	communications,	safety	and	security	and	other	services	 	25,654		 	6,261		 	31,915		
Unspecified	field	of	study	 	14,908		 	4,609		 	19,517		
Total	 	734,792		 	203,790		 	938,582		
Natural	sciences,	vocational	and	technical	subjects	 	131,556		 	100,271		 	231,827		
%	Technical	 15.2%	 33.0%	 19.8%	
Source: Statistics Norway 2015.56 
 
The statistics, however, mask the fact that in ICT the number of bachelor and 
masters graduates fell by 50 percent from 2004 to 2010 (Norwegian Ministry of 
Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). Norway has a history of 
misjudging ICT labor demand, developing ICT skill plans in the 1980s which overshot 
demand by the mid-1990s, and then became outdated by the late 1990s (Ekeland and 
Tomlinson 2001). The trend appears to persist with the government unable to explain or 
offer a solution to the deficit in the latest ICT policy proposal (Norwegian Ministry of 
Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). 
                                                
56 “Tertiary education short” comprises higher education up to four years in duration while “Tertiary 
education long” is more than four years. 
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The Norwegian government has instead opted to improve quality in all levels of 
skill enhancement, prioritizing advancements at the tertiary level. In a movement to 
reduce educational balkanization, the government enacted reforms in 1994 consolidating 
nearly 100 colleges into 26 universities though with mixed results. The reforms were a 
positive move in consolidating 13 schools into the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (NTNU) where the majority of engineers matriculate and are now able to 
take advantage of advanced research labs, local and international business engagement, 
and a school of entrepreneurship. The University of Oslo has a long history in computing 
beginning with the efforts of famed computer scientist Ole-Johan Dahl. The school has 
since developed an informatics program, complemented by the school of 
entrepreneurship. Taken together, the two schools produce roughly 80 percent of total 
computer science masters graduates (Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, 
Reform and Church Affairs 2013). 
In addition to improving the core institutes providing technology education, 
Norway is actively adjusting business education programs to address current 
requirements. The establishment of BI Norwegian Business School dates back to 1943 
with five campuses across Norway and the main campus in Oslo now operating out of a 
state-of-the-art facility. Each campus offers programs in entrepreneurship, maintains 
close ties to businesses, and is strategically located in one of Norway’s economic centers: 
Bergen, Kristiansand, Oslo, Stavanger, and Trondheim. Respondents generally held a 
positive view of the innovative business curriculum at BI and the integration with local 
firms. That said, the majority of students and graduates from BI have assume roles in 
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professions other than technology. In a sample of nearly 57,000 BI students and alumni 
listed on LinkedIn, less than eight percent currently work in the fields of information 
technology or media and communication (LinkedIn 2015). 
Concerning compensation and employment incentives, Norwegian ICT firms 
generally adhere to the broader Nordic model offering salaries and group-based 
incentives. Exceptions include personal incentives and bonuses, though both are used 
more often by TNCs than domestic firms. One managerial respondent noted the ongoing 
challenge in adopting personal incentives stating that employees prefer stability to 
competitive personal incentives, which are deemed little more than “beauty contests”. 
The same respondent stated that employees can either “get with it or leave”, indicating 
that at least at some firms, operational coherence matters more than the retention of 
talent. In the main, respondents noted the balancing of traditional, egalitarian norms and 
incentives alongside more competitive models stressing individual performance. It seems 
to be the TNCs which are driving changes in incentive structures, but constrained by 
existing norms in relatively tight labor markets. 
In sum, one could argue that labor institutions in Norway limit the freedom of 
employers in setting wages, hiring/firing employees, and in setting personalized 
incentives. The real situation in the ICT sector, however, is less clear-cut given the 
presence of factors that both constrain and enable labor freedoms. Constraining factors 
begin with the fact that large SOEs in both ICT and other industries with large ICT 
departments offer higher salaries through negotiated wage setting, employment stability, 
and work/life balance desired by most Norwegians. Unions play a variable role in that 
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private sector unionization is low, but public sector unionization is high. The public 
sector then influences broader wage negotiations leading to wage increases in the private 
sector, especially for large, incumbent firms. Enabling factors include the desire of 
Norwegians to be their own ‘boss’ and maintain a high degree of autonomy as is evident 
from the high number of micro ICT firms. Micro ICT firms are distinct from startups 
because they focus on local markets and bespoke services, consequently limiting overall 
growth potential. While Norwegian ICT professionals are willing to assume the risks 
associated with a sole proprietorship offering standard services, relatively few choosing 
to accept the high risks entailed in developing business ventures with radically innovative 
products and services. 
Other aspects that factor in labor markets include the omnipresent pressures of 
external competition further heightened by recent declines in oil and gas prices. 
Respondents stated that employee layoffs usually stem from overall restructuring 
initiatives but that most firms would opt for hiring freezes first. There are notable 
examples of extensive layoffs following the closure of Norsk Data and more recently the 
restructuring of Opera software, though unlike the other Nordic countries, tight labor 
markets and risk aversion leads most displaced professionals to seek employment with 
another incumbent firm instead of establishing a high growth enterprise. Thus, tight labor 
markets are the rule in Norway with a shortage of qualified candidates driving wages 
across the sector. It is the large, established firms and their ability to extend the incentives 
desired most by average Norwegian ICT professional that garner the best talent, limiting 
development opportunities for high growth startups. 
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Finance 
Norwegian firms have access to all standard financial instruments varying on the 
firm’s size, growth requirements, and risk acceptance. As with other Nordic countries, 
large firms tend toward bank lending and limited equity financing while micro firms, 
SMEs, and startups utilize savings, personal loans, government grants, VC/PE, and 
occasionally formal equity markets. What differentiates the Norwegian financial markets 
from the other Nordics is the inward focus on domestic firms, high degree of state 
ownership, and limited experience in risk-based financing. Norway is further 
distinguished from the other Nordics by an exceptionally large pool of available capital, 
which amplifies a financial system benefitting a limited number of very large incumbent 
firms over micro firms, SMEs, and startups. 
Various forms of lending are the traditional funding options for Norwegian firms 
in every industry regardless of size. Micro firms and SMEs rely on personal bank loans 
and mortgage lending while large established firms have access to proportionally larger 
tranches of collateralized and uncollateralized lending, as well as bond issuances. In the 
ICT sector, micro firms and SMEs consistently noted the lack of bank-based financing 
without assuming personal liability through either collateralized savings or other assets, 
namely their home. Conversely, no large ICT firm found it difficult to obtain and sustain 
debt-based financing. In terms of total bank lending, recent trends are generally stable 
averaging NOK 3.45T after recently peaking at NOK 4.14T (Statistics Norway 2015). 
Looking at composition, Figure 5.2 shows breakouts for the most recent period ending 
January 2015. Non-financial corporations received a relatively modest share at 25.7 
 
  164 
percent compared with households and employees receiving the majority at 58.5 percent 
(Statistics Norway 2015). Sector breakouts of non-financial lending are not available and 
a review of 12 month new bond issues shows Telenor as the only ICT firm accessing 
bond markets at just 0.7 percent of the NOK 276.7M total pool (Oslo Børs 2015). 
Figure 5.2 Banks loans (NOK million) by borrower sector and period 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 2015. 
 
In equity financing, market capitalization as a percentage of total GDP has 
oscillated over the past 20 years, rising from a low of 23.2 percent in 1993 to a peak of 
90.8 percent in 2007 before falling to current levels at just over 50 percent in 2012 (The 
World Bank Group 2015). Norway’s market capitalization ratio remains the lowest in the 
Nordic region due in part to total GDP levels that exceed comparably sized Denmark and 
Finland by a wide margin, approaching Sweden’s with slightly more than half the 
population. Further, market capitalization in Norway is comparable to overall debt levels, 
reflecting relatively modest financing requirements for all firms and households, at least 
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Following the consolidation of the Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, and Swedish 
exchanges into the Nasdaq OMX, the Oslo Børs became the only independent stock 
exchange in the Nordics. In absolute terms, total market capitalization at all levels on the 
Oslo Børs stands at $242.9B compared with $688.4B for the four-country Nasdaq OMX 
(NASDAQ OMX Nordic 2015; Oslo Børs 2015). Led by Statoil, 25 firms make up more 
than 80 percent of total market capitalization; all of which are based in Norway (Oslo 
Børs 2015). Foreign ownership is relatively low at 32.6 percent, primarily due to the 
significant share holdings of the Norwegian government (Oslo Børs 2015). 
There are 20 ICT firms listed on the Oslo Børs with a total market capitalization 
of $37.0B or 15.0 percent of the total (Oslo Børs 2015). Telenor constitutes an 
overwhelming share of the ICT total at 82.1 percent with the remaining valuations shown 
in Figure 5.3 (Oslo Børs 2015). The majority of ICT firms are valued below $100M but 
unlike other markets, just two of the under $100M firms are listed on the Oslo Axess 
market where EU regulatory requirements do not apply. Still yet, Thin Film and IDEX 
exceed $100M in market capitalization yet remain on the Oslo Axess.  
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Figure 5.3 ICT firms listed on the Oslo Børs (excluding Telenor) in $M 
 
Source: Oslo Børs 2015. 
 
Because macro level data provides limited sector specifics regarding types of 
financing and ownership, I reviewed available financial statements for every publically 
listed ICT firm. The sample of 20 firms excludes one firm recently listed that has yet to 
produce audited year-end statements and another which is a foreign-owned subsidiary 
that does not produce financial statements at the subsidiary or country level. All firms in 
the sample utilize a mix of financing options grouped by equities, non-current (i.e. long-
term) liabilities, and short-term liabilities. Listed shares, private shares, and retained 
earning comprise total equity. Long-term borrowing, bonds payable, and extended lease 
obligations constitute non-current liabilities while short-term debt, accounts payable, 
accrued liabilities and other debts make up current liabilities (Investopedia 2015). Figure 
5.4 shows the variation on a per firm basis with larger firms tending more toward 
liabilities and especially long-term liabilities. Smaller firms utilize a greater share of 
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of equity and liabilities for listed ICT firms 
 
Sources: Listed in footnotes.57 
 
Like the other Nordics, Norway is improving the size and quality of non-listed 
equity markets, specifically VC/PE. Respondents noted Norway’s considerable pool of 
risk-based capital but that local fund managers lack the experience held by managers at 
other Nordic funds. Another respondent noted that high growth startups often sell equity 
stakes at a discount, due to a lack of expertise on the part of entrepreneurs as well. The 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index ranks Norway 
comparable to the other Nordic countries in 13th place (Groh, Liechtenstein, and Lieser 
2011), confirming the strengths noted by respondents in overall size but also the 
weaknesses due to lack of maturity. Further corroborating the immaturity of Norwegian 
VC is that the majority of funding is sourced domestically. In 2014 Norway obtained 
                                                
57 Sources: (Asetek, Inc. 2014; Atea 2015b; Birdstep Technology ASA 2014; Blom 2014; Bouvet 2014; 
Cxense 2015; Data Respons 2015; Evry 2014; Funcom 2015; IDEX ASA 2014; Itera 2014; Napatech 2014; 
Nio Inc. 2014; Nordic Semiconductor 2015; Opera Software 2014; PSI Group ASA 2015; Q-Free 2013; 
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fully 85.7 percent of VC internally with the remaining portion originating from the UK 
alone (Jensen and Murray 2015). Conversely, every other Nordic country sourced VC 
from at least eight other countries and in no country was the majority of VC sourced 
domestically (Jensen and Murray 2015). 58 The domestic orientation of Norwegian VC 
underscores the lack of external visibility for emerging firms but also the abundance of 
capital. 
Using the wider measure of total PE as a percentage of GDP, Norway’s PE 
industry ranks below the European average at 0.23 percent and has declined slightly from 
previous levels (EVCA 2015). As with the relative measure of market capitalization, 
Norway’s outsized GDP dampens its private equity ranking. More positively, the PE 
market statistic has improved to 0.43 percent of GDP, behind a declining UK and rapidly 
rising Denmark (EVCA 2015). In terms of sector allocation, Norwegian ICT receives the 
greatest share at nearly 30 percent of the total pool, exceeding the established Energy and 
environment sector (EVCA 2014). Further, the average amount per firm is greater than 
the overall average even with the outsized contributions to Consumer goods and retail. 
Table 5.3 lists amounts, firm, counts, and amounts per firm using six-year averages.  
                                                
58 Excludes Iceland. 
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Table 5.3 Norwegian annualized private equity investments 
Six	Year	Annual	Averages	 Amt	in	€	1,000	 Firms	 Amt	Per	Firm	
Agriculture	 	7,423.78		 	6.3		 	1,172.18		
Business	&	industrial	products	 	58,912.78		 	13.8		 	4,258.76		
Business	&	industrial	services	 	39,299.85		 	5.0		 	7,859.97		
Chemicals	&	materials	 	2,952.45		 	2.3		 	1,265.33		
Communications	 	145,741.22		 	17.2		 	8,489.78		
Computer	&	consumer	electronics	 	191,694.19		 	29.2		 	6,572.37		
Construction		 	6,089.09		 	1.5		 	4,059.39		
Consumer	goods	&	retail	 	149,437.57		 	5.7		 	26,371.34		
Consumer	services	 	44,843.91		 	3.0		 	14,947.97		
Energy	&	environment	 	301,335.58		 	43.3		 	6,953.90		
Financial	services	 	11,762.09		 	2.8		 	4,151.33		
Life	sciences	 	128,490.18		 	21.0		 	6,118.58		
Real	estate	 	2,557.37		 	1.0		 	2,557.37		
Transportation	 	29,998.93		 	2.7		 	11,249.60		
Unclassified	 	6,898.06		 	6.5		 	1,061.24		
Total	 	1,127,437.04		 	161.3		 	6,988.25		
ICT	 	337,435.41		 	46.33		 	7,282.78		
%	ICT	 29.9%	 28.7%	 		
Source: EVCA 2014. 
 
While Norway is prohibited from using its sovereign wealth fund to invest in 
domestic ventures (Caner and Grennes 2010), the Norwegian government maintains a 
significant role in domestic finance through multiple means. The government holds direct 
ownership in 70 companies, utilizes state-owned enterprises to hold shareholdings in 
additional firms, and operates multiple state-owned investment funds. In total, public 
sector ownership of all shareholdings stands at 35 percent, far exceeding other OECD 
countries including the next highest countries of France, Italy, and Sweden with 10, 10, 
and 8 percent, respectively (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015). 
Ownership is through direct investments that are considered strategic and vital to the 
state’s interests, and indirect investments in which the state acts as a portfolio investor. In 
the latter case, the government seeks sustainable returns to fund ongoing payments to 
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retirees, primarily through the Government Pension Fund Norway. 59 Taken together, 
direct and indirect investments account for over NOK 1.7T ($200B) in listed and unlisted 
capital (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015). 
Concerning ICT, the government holds a 54 percent stake in Telenor and owns 
100 percent of SMEs Ambita AS and Electronic Chart Centre AS (Norwegian Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015). The government also holds a majority stake in 
Evry through state-owned Posten Norge’s 40 percent share and Telenor’s 30.2 percent 
share (Evry 2014). The Government Pension Fund Norway indirectly invests in six ICT 
firms including Telenor, Evry, and Atea though in every instance holds minority shares 
under 10 percent (Folketrygdfondet 2014).60 Finally, the government maintains limited 
indirect investments in other ICT firms through a 34 percent stake in the largest financial 
services firm DNB (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015). With 
NOK 1.4T ($600B) in customer loans, DNB has considerable clout over the wider 
Norwegian economy, although investments in ICT constitute a relatively small portion of 
the overall portfolio (DNB ASA 2015). More relevant to ICT is the government’s 37 
percent stake in Norwegian VC leader Verdane (Verdane Capital 2015). 
                                                
59 For clarification, the Government Pension Fund Norway totals NOK 186B as of December 2014 and 
invests using existing funds and only in the Nordics (primarily Norway) through the government agency 
Folketrygdfondet (Folketrygdfondet 2015). As part of the Norwegian central bank, Norges Bank manages 
the significantly larger Government Pension Fund Global through the recycling of oil and gas revenues 
abroad and totaling NOK 5.1T as of March 2014 (Folketrygdfondet 2015; Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Fisheries 2015). 
60 Folketrygdfondet lists 45 firms where fund representatives attended shareholder meetings. From this list, 
I identified the six ICT firms. It is highly likely that the fund holds additional investments in other ICT 
firms in which it did not send representatives to shareholder meetings. 
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Outside of direct and indirect ownership, the Norwegian government utilizes 
other state-owned entities (mostly funds) for additional investments. Investinor AS is a 
state-owned investment fund focused on growth and later-stage firms with stakes in eight 
ICT firms including poLight and Soundrop (Investinor 2015; Norwegian Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015). Argentum Fondsinvesteringer A/S is a state-owned 
asset manager with NOK 10B under management including €168M invested in ICT-
focused venture funds based predominantly in Norway (Argentum 2015; Norwegian 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2015). Lastly, the state-owned Innovation 
Norway, Simula Research Lab AS, and Siva provide grants, loans, and other concessions 
to technology firms and research organizations. Given the heterogeneity of contributions 
extended by these organizations, they are subsequently assessed as part of ITP under the 
topic of “Funding”. 
The Norwegian government continues to reassess the appropriateness of state 
ownership due to competitive pressures and political action advocating a less pronounced 
role for the state in finance. It is a relatively recent development, as the state maintained a 
strong commitment to firm ownership as late as 2006/7. In 2010/11 the Norwegian 
government began discussions on a differentiated strategy in which it would divest out of 
other areas as a “dynamic owner” should but also strengthen state ownership and 
administration in “key” economic areas (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Fisheries 2011). The government defined companies with exclusive “commercial 
objectives” for possible and partial divestiture while ownership in every other instance 
would remain unchanged barring “extraordinary circumstances” (Norwegian Ministry of 
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Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2011). The result was a relatively modest recommendation 
to reevaluate the ownership of three firms: the airline subsidiary SAS AB; maritime 
contractor Secora AS; and the property holding company Entra Eiendom AS (Norwegian 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 2011). 
The current conservative, pro-business government has now advanced more 
aggressive recommendations through the full divestiture of eight firms including SAS AB 
and Entra Eidendom along with reducing ownership in Kongsberg Gruppen ASA and 
Telenor ASA to 34 percent (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 
2015).61 The state would sell a 20 percent stake in Telenor giving up a controlling interest 
in the process and enabling market actors to set Telenor’s strategy for the first time in the 
firm’s history. Kongsberg is not an ICT firm but is a significant producer of software 
systems and associated hardware supporting their mainline defense business. Under 
partial divestiture and again loss of controlling interest, the firm could spinoff ICT 
divisions as it has done in other areas. Finally, the full divestiture of the property 
management systems firm Ambita would have an insignificant impact on the wider ICT 
sector but would provide a demonstrated path for the divesture of other former state-
administered system operators. 
Norway remains focused on long-term investment and the sectors most amenable 
to that strategy. Outside of 160-year-old Telenor, the strategy largely benefits industries 
that generate proven and/or recurring revenues like maritime, fishing, agriculture, and 
raw materials. Newer and riskier industries like ICT factor less prominently in Norway’s 
                                                
61 The government fully privatized Secora AS in 2012. 
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investment strategy, at least since the period following the demise of Norsk Data and 
other state assisted ICT firms during the late 1980s. The fact that Norway does invest a 
sizeable share of capital in the ICT sector reflects its outsized pool of capital, not a 
directed focus on the sector itself. Norwegians do however, recognize that capital 
abundance will not last indefinitely with oil production peaking in 2001 and gas declining 
slightly in 2013 (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2014). Norway will 
continue to carve out specific, deep niches through state sponsorship though the historical 
evidence does not indicate that ICT will be a part of that portfolio.  
Firm organization 
Norwegian firms share the organizational characteristics of Danish firms but 
differ in important ways. Nearly every respondent noted flat, open, and egalitarian 
organizational structures not unlike the Danes. However, respondents claimed that 
Norwegian firms were less transparent and more insular than Danish firms, consequently 
limiting opportunities for collaboration. The differences were particularly striking for 
startup firms seeking foreign investment that tend to withhold specific details concerning 
their venture due to fears of appropriation. The insular focus further manifests through 
aspects of Norway’s longstanding balkanization with larger firms limiting flat 
organizational structures to the department level. As one respondent noted, “small kings” 
lead geographically dispersed departments within large enterprises, protecting and 
insulating themselves from other department heads and again hindering organizational 
coordination. The latter tendency is a long-standing practice in more hierarchical 
environments like the United States but is relatively rate in most technology companies in 
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Denmark. Lundvall systemically confirmed as much observing that just 20 percent of 
large firms in Norway exercised managerial delegation and functional flexibility (2002). 
In the years since Lundvall’s study, aspects of firm organization have evolved as 
Norwegian ICT firms experiment with novel practices to increase collaboration, 
productivity, and innovation. A positive example involves the changes adopted at the 
incumbent carrier Telenor following the establishment of a new headquarters in the 
technology park in Fornebu in 2002. Realizing that several departments exhibited 
entrenched, insular thinking and organizational balkanization, Telenor restructured 
central operations to include open areas, eliminate desks, and co-locate management 
(Telenor Group 2015). Staff and management resisted the changes at first but ultimately 
Telenor benefitted from the changes by increases overall problem solving and reducing 
costs by NOK 270M p.a. (Telenor Group 2015). The experiment proved so successful 
that Telenor exported the model to 10 other global operations sites. 
The software company Opera offers an altogether different scenario according to 
one former insider. The firm began as a research project within Telenor before it spun out 
as an independent firm. In its infancy the firm championed organizational freedom to 
spur idea formation through competitive innovation races, independent development, and 
unencumbered experimentation. The independence paid off with Opera developing 
several novel technologies in web browsing including current standards such as tabbed 
browsing and formatted webpage printing using a fast internal engine. As the firm grew, 
it became apparent that independence had devolved into incoherence with developers 
building subcomponents in isolation, product managers defining release schedules 
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without appreciating the realities of established development cycles, and management 
promising both rapid innovation and defined release cycles to appeal to investors. 
Without a clear direction and firm performance falling, Opera’s board fired the founder 
and CEO von Tetzchner, instituted restructuring, and installed new management more 
focused on advertising revenue than innovative software.62 The software that Opera does 
produce continues to lack coherence with functionality varying between product lines and 
dependent on different operating system (Lardinois 2015). 
Telenor and Opera are critical cases in Norwegian ICT firm organization 
highlighting both the greenfield opportunities under non-hierarchical environments and 
the need for clear structure to support stable, long-term growth. As pure domestic cases, 
their significance is particularly compelling but so too are the dynamics of TNCs 
operating in Norway. The Norwegian ICT sector like those in the other Nordics includes 
a large number of TNCs operating as local subsidiaries and/or as the result of 
acquisitions. As with the domestic cases of Telenor and Opera, respondents again noted 
the challenge in balancing autonomy and hierarchy to enable strategic execution. The 
majority of respondents held a favorable opinion of TNC acquisitions and the 
compromises brokered although as in Denmark, outcomes varied on a case-by-case basis. 
Examples include the acquisition of the startup Vinmed by GE Healthcare who 
already had a standing presence in Norway. Subsequent to the acquisition, GE 
implemented a major cultural change by encouraging movement within the firm to 
                                                
62 More than 63 percent of Opera’s most recent revenues were earned from advertising (Opera Software 
2015). 
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“debalkanize” departments and develop cross-functional employees, especially in critical 
areas like project and general management. The acquisition of Tandberg by Cisco proved 
an altogether different experience with one respondent noting the “shock” of employees 
after observing the organizational and managerial practices of Cisco during a visit to the 
Silicon Valley headquarters. Since that time, the former Tandberg operation has become 
a center of excellence with increasing autonomy. Outside of TNC acquisitions there have 
been a number of domestic acquisitions within the Norwegian ICT sector as well. One 
respondent from a domestic firm acquired by one of the large domestic systems integrator 
cited complete autonomy from the parent firm to the degree that the two entities at times 
act as direct competitors. The parent firm views intra-firm rivalry favorably as it 
invigorates competition instead of cannibalizing scarce market share. 
Geography and inter-firm dynamics 
As with the other Nordics and elsewhere in Europe, the majority of ICT firms are 
located in the capital city of Oslo, endowed with a highly educated population, deep 
financial resources, educational institutions, and extensive markets (Figure 5.5). The 
software sector emerged in Oslo primarily because of the close interaction between 
consulting firms, customers, and other software firms supporting robust demand (Isaksen 
2004). Outside of Oslo, the Trondheim cluster continues to thrive while legacy centers in 
Arendal, Halden, Horten, Jæren, Kongsberg, and Raufoss, are all declining (Isaksen 
2004). Geographic distance, disparate sectoral foci, and political balkanization have led 
to fragmentation of the ICT sector and the decline of ICT clusters outside of Oslo and 
Trondheim. Further, fragmentation of Norway’s ICT clusters across the country 
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constrains opportunities for collaboration, hinders growth of the startup community, and 
limits international recognition. Conversely, the relative autonomy of each cluster 
strengthens existing incumbents where markets are less competitive. 
Figure 5.5 Norwegian ICT clusters 
  
Source: List-of-companies.org 2012.63 
 
The greater Oslo cluster is comprised of two main centers with the majority of 
firms located in Oslo proper and a second group in nearby Fornebu. The Norwegian 
government developed the Fornebu cluster as a high technology industrial park on the 
site of the former international airport. Both state and privately-owned firms including 
Telenor, Statoil, Aker Solutions, and Evry, along with the state-owned computing 
research center Simula relocated to Fornebu. The government expected the cluster to 
                                                
63 Results are from a random sample of roughly 300 ICT firms. 
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incubate a startup community but beyond those sponsored by Simula and large firm 
spinoffs, a strong startup community has not emerged. Instead, startups and supporting 
incubators/accelerators favor Oslo in close proximity to the major universities of BI 
Norwegian Business School and University of Oslo allowing better access to talent, 
financial capital, and quality of life. 
Trondheim is the next most significant cluster benefiting from the notable science 
and technology university NTNU, the research institute SINTEF, and support from local 
institutions. The cluster is known for creating high technology inventions, though some 
of the most productive ventures such as FAST relocate to Oslo seeking deeper financial 
markets and international prominence. As one respondent noted, Trondheim also 
competes with the aggressive recruitment programs of Oslo’s large ICT firms offering 
better incentives to entice the best talent from NTNU. Unlike the remaining clusters 
operating under relative autonomy, the dynamic between Trondheim and Oslo is 
somewhat rivalrous. More recently, Trondheim moved to incubate its own cluster, albeit 
with a smaller community, less funding, and less international recognition than Oslo. 
The next significant center is co-located with the dominant oil and gas industry in 
Stavanger. The oil and gas sector cultivates sector-specific ICT firms through preferred 
procurement, spinouts and/or spinoffs of internal R&D initiatives, and through dedicated 
incubation and funding programs. Statoil is the most relevant actor in the region through 
longstanding directed procurement and the Statoil Technology Invest (STI) initiative 
providing seed funding, VC, and firm incubation through its LOOP program (Statoil 
2015). Stavanger has begun to diversify into other industry-independent ventures through 
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initiatives like the shared workspace Mess & Order sponsored by DNB and the 
innovation park Ipark. The latter offers wider incubation support across industries 
including energy, ICT, fisheries, construction, and others. 
Following Stavanger, Bergen is a more diversified center consisting of 
aquaculture, oil and gas, healthcare, and an emerging technology sector. One of two 
incubators, Impact Hub Bergen is an extension office of the global network “The Hub” 
offering collaborative workspaces, networking opportunities, and education sessions 
under the wider purview of innovation and entrepreneurship. The second, 
Nyskapningsparken, is a prototypical state-sponsored technology park with support from 
local communes Bergen and Hordaland, education institutions Bergen University College 
and Norwegian School of Economics, the technology transfer office of Bergen 
Teknologioverføring (BTO), and a subsidiary of state-owned Siva; Siva Incubator. Siva 
has an extensive mandate in overseeing the construction of industrial and technology 
parks, sponsoring incubators/accelerators, and co-owning innovation companies across 
Norway. 
The once notable electronics cluster in Horten south of Oslo shows only two firms 
in the sample and does not have a dedicated incubation program per se. Nearby Tønsberg 
now overshadows the Horten cluster with the maritime giant Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA and 
multiple incubation efforts from Gründerhuset, Start, Innovation Norway, and the 
nonprofit CONNECT Norway. The remaining centers are scattered throughout Norway 
serving local markets with limited interaction across clusters. Outside of the limited firm 
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interaction, the smaller centers do benefit from national promotional programs seeking to 
highlight technology development across Norway. 
In every instance, the clusters compete against each other using political 
patronage to secure funding, enhance learning institutions, sponsor firm creation and 
growth, and increase the size and competitiveness of established industries. Norway 
consistently asserts a balanced policy regime seeking to develop prosperity equally across 
a geographically dispersed country with widely ranging economic standing. Egalitarian 
idealism complemented by the pragmatic leveraging of local assets and capabilities is 
conducive to inter-firm collaboration within individual clusters but not across them. With 
fragmentation and cluster competition the rule, Norway has not been able to develop the 
critical mass required for international recognition as in other Nordic technology clusters, 
consequently limiting ICT sector development. 
Innovation/technology policy 
Sector support 
As Asheim asserts, Norway follows a comparable approach to that of Denmark in 
providing sector supports (2011a). My research finds supports extending primarily to 
mainline industries and incumbent ICT firm like Telenor and the IT consultancies. The 
Norwegian government has traditionally focused on core sectors including oil & gas, 
fishing, food, and tourism with, as one respondent noted, policies that have not changed 
much since the 1950s. What differentiates Norway from the other Nordic countries is that 
respondents perceive government as more “risk adverse” in advancing policy to support 
radically innovative areas like ICT startups. The proposals that do advance progress 
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slowly and are subject to the demands of local constituencies due to the particulars of a 
geographically dispersed country. Local administrations have a high degree of autonomy 
and there are limits on what the central government can impose on the country as a 
whole. As in labor and finance markets, it is balkanization within a strong state system 
that hinders the advancement of an aggressive national policy for ICT sector 
development. 
Unlike Denmark, Norway has not established a public/private ICT growth team 
despite persistent lobbying by the ICT interest group IKT Norge and the movement of 
Paul Chaffey from CEO of the technology trade association Abelia to Secretary of State 
within the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation. Instead, the Norwegian 
government continues to advance a broad set of ICT initiatives through existing programs 
that in principle align with those of the European Union’s Digital Agenda for Europe. 
Efforts at forming a national ICT policy began in 2000 through the stipulation of 
guidelines advocating an “an information society of all” (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Fisheries 2000). The guidelines prioritized initiatives to increase student 
access and use of ICT, decrease costs of internet access through local loop competition, 
and accelerate e-commerce by mandating electronic procurement and communication. 
More notably, the government advocated the establishment of state-sponsored seed funds 
to augment existing public and private funding resources. 
The guidelines gained momentum in 2006 with the advancement of a formal ICT 
proposal for consideration by the legislature (Norwegian Ministry of Government 
Administration and Reform 2007). The purpose in doing so was to advance a cohesive 
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policy ensuring optimal conditions for the access, use, and development of ICT for all 
Norwegians. Beyond the broad measures of ICT inclusion, the proposal recommends ICT 
industry support through continued application of the two-pronged approach involving 
innovation programs and increasing ICT uptake in firms and society. The government 
extended several of the 2006 goals through the Digital Agenda for Norway (DAN) in 
2013 but with a more aggressive stance in seeking to bring every Norwegian online, 
foster a “digital revolution” in the public and private sector, and establish a basis for long 
term growth (Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church 
Affairs 2013). Irrespective of the intentions within the proposal, it has since stalled under 
the current conservative government pending revision.64 
As aggressive as the latest proposal sounds, the recommendations are in fact 
consistent with those developed 13 years prior but with the added challenge of 
diminishing returns. As it was in 2000 and 2006, the first priority of the DAN is to enable 
“digital participation by everyone”, even though Norway already has the highest internet 
usage rates in the world (Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform 
and Church Affairs 2013, 15). The government identified an estimated 270,000 citizens 
between the ages of 16 and 79 currently not online and seeks to reduce that number by 
half within five years (Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and 
Church Affairs 2013). The initiative is emblematic of Norway’s continued egalitarianism 
but is increasingly impractical, as it will become exceedingly expensive to build out ICT 
                                                
64 One respondent referred to the recommendations as a “pipe dream” representing more than 30 years of 
grand schemes that consistently fail to materialize. 
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infrastructure in remote and geographically challenging locations. As an example, the 
remote arctic archipelago Svalbard home to roughly 2,600 inhabitants received high-
speed broadband from state owned Telenor in 2011 that was 10 to 20 times faster than 
that of the mainland Norway (Zander 2014). 
Throughout the multiple guidelines and proposals, the consistent theme most 
relevant for the ICT sector is the drive to increase ICT use in the public and private 
(especially commercial) sector. To this end, the Norwegian government remains a 
significant consumer of ICT to support its efforts in increasing automation and expanding 
electronic services. Moving from compliance to convenience, government priorities are 
now focused on general administration and welfare provision but also emergent spaces 
such as e-voting.65 Beyond stimulating ICT demand, the objective is to lower costs more 
generally for government and business while increasing overall productivity (Norwegian 
Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs 2013). Further, the 
government seeks to enable positive externalities through government technology 
mandates applicable to all firms, organizations, and individuals interacting with the 
government. Examples include electronic invoicing, payments, signature, documentation, 
regulatory reporting, identification (e.g. the Altinn initiative), and cross border 
transactions (Norwegian Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church 
Affairs 2013). 
                                                
65 The Norwegian government piloted e-voting in 2011 and 2013 but has since abandoned future efforts 
citing the lack of political will (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2014). 
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Some respondents remain skeptical of ongoing government ICT initiatives citing 
few spillover effects for the rest of the ICT sector. Respondents perceive government ICT 
priorities as more oriented toward internal cost containment and contractual fulfillment, 
not broader objectives supportive of sector growth. Respondents noted that mandates 
have increased ICT use, though firms have been and continue to automate processes 
primarily to maintain their own competiveness and lower internal operational costs. 
Respondents instead stated they would prefer that the government sponsor broader 
initiatives by directing innovation, licensing product development, and rewarding risk 
taking when conceiving novel solutions. Other respondents questioned aspects of 
inclusion claiming that government procurement favors the large, established firms like 
domestic leaders Evry, Atea, and Bouvet along with TNCs Accenture, Cap Gemini, and 
IBM. Smaller firms lack the capabilities to service large, complex contracts, however, 
they can provide more innovative solutions at a lower price point while also accelerating 
wider SME growth across the sector. 
Responding to criticisms from the business community and recognizing the 
diminishing returns from existing ICT policy, the new conservative government 
suspended advancement of a unified ICT proposal pending revisions. It is now 
anticipated that the DAN will be (re)released to parliament in mid-2016 (Haaramo 2015). 
Respondents speculated that under the new government ICT policy would move from the 
legacy egalitarian focus on universal ICT access to prioritizing liberal policies 
comparable to those of Denmark. With responsibility for advancing the DAN, department 
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chief Paul Chaffey conveyed a liberal agenda in recent comments to parliament, 
including improved access to risk-based capital (Chaffey 2014). 
That said, ICT policy has moved through multiple ministries under four different 
governments since 2000. Originally residing within the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Fisheries, it then moved to the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and 
Church Affairs before being absorbed by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Modernisation. The current ministry is responsible for advancement of the DAN within a 
wider ICT policy and Public Sector Reform program with a host of other unrelated 
obligations (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2015).66 Even 
with the transition to a conservative government, it is difficult to envision Norway 
implementing a nationwide ICT policy supportive of wider ICT sector growth. Given the 
historical commitment to large state-owned enterprises, egalitarian commitments to ICT 
access, and the diffusion of power to local and regional governments, advancements in 
ICT policy will invariably favor the large, incumbent firms over SMEs and high growth 
startups. 
Respondents consistently agreed noting the lack of direct support for the ICT 
sector and the perception that government has and always will view ICT as an enabler but 
not a defensible sector. Barring limited liberal reforms, respondents did not expect 
substantive change in ICT policy under the current conservative government. Unlike 
Denmark, Norwegian respondents stated that implementing reforms such as the 
                                                
66 Other duties include housing policy, the Planning and Building Act, local government finances and local 
administration, rural and regional policy, the conduct of elections, government employer policy, Sami and 
minority affairs and national mapping and geodetic policy. 
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privatization of government ICT or the reduction of regulatory requirements for SMEs is 
unlikely. Notwithstanding the comments of respondents and the stalled progress on the 
DAN, Norway has advanced limited reforms conducive to sector development including 
deregulation of telephony local loop access, proposed divestiture of SOEs including 
Telenor, and an initiative for broad-based tax reform. The latter involves revisions to 
value-added, personal income, and corporate tax schemes including a reduction of 
corporate tax rates from 27 to 20 percent (Ernst & Young 2015). Whether these proposals 
advance in the current legislature or have a positive effect on the ICT sector, however, 
remains debatable. 
R&D intensity and focus 
As depicted in Figure 5.6, Norway has effectively stagnated in R&D contribution 
as a percentage of GDP while making improvements in the number of researchers per 
1000 (The World Bank Group 2015).67 Researchers attribute the R&D deficit to 
differences in industrial development, especially from oil & gas, and the high number of 
SMEs (Grønning, Moen, and Olsen 2008). That said, Norway falls considerably short of 
the three percent Barcelona goal for R&D due in part to limited public investment 
(Christensen et al. 2008; Grønning, Moen, and Olsen 2008). Recent data; however, 
indicate that public sector R&D total expenditure is comparable to that of Denmark but 
that private sector R&D is considerably lower as depicted in Figure 5.7 (OECD 2015)68 
                                                
67 R&D as a percentage of GDP includes interpolated values for 1996, 1998, and 2000. R&D researchers 
per 1,000 includes interpolated values for 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
68 Includes extrapolated values using year-on-year averages and/or previous year results where actual 
values were unavailable. 
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and as noted by the Norwegian government (The Research Council of Norway 2012). As 
in other measures related to GDP, Norway’s exceptional GDP growth exacerbates the 
perceived shortfall in R&D. Conversely, the number of researchers per 1,000 shows 
upward growth due to Norway’s relatively slow population growth and limited 
immigration. 
Figure 5.6 R&D expenditure and 
employment 
Figure 5.7 Total R&D by source 
 
Source: The World Bank Group 2015.  Source: OECD 2015.  
 
Respondents noted the lack of targeted programs with limited commercial 
viability in public sector R&D especially for ICT. Macro budgetary figures support 
claims by respondents showing a consistent pattern favoring investments in the “general 
advancement of knowledge” averaging 45.3 percent, contrasted with “industrial 
production and technology” receiving just 8.3 percent (Table 5.4) (OECD 2015). The 
leading state R&D institution, the Research Council of Norway (RCN), evaluated public 
sector R&D for ICT finding multiple challenges including: limited funding for basic 
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and that most research does not lead to commercial innovations (The Research Council of 
Norway 2012). The RCN advocated a series of measures to address these challenges 
beginning with a national strategy for ICT research. 
Table 5.4 Government budget appropriations/outlays for R&D in NOK M 
Socioeconomic	objective	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 Avg	
General	advancement	of	knowledge	 45.7%	 45.4%	 45.2%	 45.0%	 45.1%	 45.3%	
Health	 15.0%	 15.1%	 15.3%	 15.7%	 15.7%	 15.4%	
Industrial	Production	and	technology	 8.1%	 7.9%	 8.7%	 8.6%	 8.3%	 8.3%	
Agriculture	 7.4%	 7.0%	 7.1%	 7.0%	 7.4%	 7.2%	
Political	and	social	systems,	structures	and	processes	 5.6%	 5.8%	 5.8%	 6.1%	 6.1%	 5.9%	
Defence	 4.4%	 4.3%	 4.3%	 4.4%	 4.3%	 4.4%	
Energy	 3.3%	 4.2%	 3.2%	 3.1%	 3.0%	 3.3%	
Exploration	and	exploitation	of	space	 2.4%	 2.7%	 2.6%	 2.4%	 2.2%	 2.5%	
Environment	 2.7%	 2.4%	 2.7%	 2.7%	 2.6%	 2.6%	
Transport,	telecommunication	and	other	infrastructures	 2.1%	 2.1%	 1.8%	 1.8%	 1.8%	 1.9%	
Exploration	and	exploitation	of	the	Earth	 1.8%	 1.7%	 1.5%	 1.6%	 1.6%	 1.6%	
Culture,	recreation	religion	and	mass	media	 0.8%	 0.8%	 0.8%	 0.8%	 0.9%	 0.8%	
Education	 0.7%	 0.8%	 0.9%	 0.9%	 1.0%	 0.9%	
Total	 20,629	 21,784	 22,471	 23,172	 24,213	 22,454	
Source: OECD 2015. 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges identified by the RCN internally, respondents 
overall held a positive view of the organization. The government’s lack of focus and 
direction has led to the proliferation of state-of-the-art research but with limited positive 
externalities due to a small, underdeveloped startup community. Since the release of its 
internal evaluation on ICT R&D support, the RCN began to address what it views as an 
“extremely under-funded area” (The Research Council of Norway 2013, 2). In 2015 the 
RCN launched IKT PLUSS or the “new large-scale initiative on information technology 
and digital innovation” replacing the previous ICT-focused research initiative VERDIKT 
(Totland and Lie 2014). The initiative calls for a more integrated approach to ICT R&D 
funding across complementary research areas to increase linkages between R&D and 
innovation. The initiative seeks to increase ICT R&D expenditure by 25 percent or NOK 
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30M p.a.; a laudable improvement though relatively insignificant in relation to the RCN’s 
overall budget of NOK 7.6B (The Research Council of Norway 2013; Totland and Lie 
2014). 
Outside of direct funding for R&D the RCN partners with the wider public sector 
and private investors to support SINTEF, the largest independent research organization in 
Scandinavia with an annual operating income of nearly NOK 2.94B (SINTEF 2015). 
Headquartered in Trondheim in tight partnership with NTNU, SINTEF conducts 
dedicated R&D complemented by technology transfer programs providing funding and 
incubation for startups to commercialize discoveries. As with sector supports, SINTEF 
prioritizes mainline areas like oil & gas, renewable energy, and health & welfare with 
ICT subsumed under “enabling technologies” garnering roughly 14 percent of total staff 
working on 29 out of 403 active projects (SINTEF 2015). 
A third organization, Simula, is a collaborative research lab and incubator focused 
solely on ICT. Established by the government in 2001 as an anchor for the new Fornebu 
technology park, Simula receives NOK 50M p.a. in public funding, catalyzing another 
NOK 100M in private funding and internal service revenue. With a substantially smaller 
budget than that of the RCN or SINTEF, Simula maintains a staff of 140 working with 29 
active PhD candidates. Similar to SINTEF’s incubation program though inspired more by 
Silicon Valley, “Simula garage” provides free housing to entrepreneurs and business 
development opportunities through internal and external equity stakes with industry 
partnerships. By completing state-of-the-art research and direct efforts to stimulate firm 
creation, Simula remains the highest ranked research institution in ICT (Simula 2014). 
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That said, the dominance of oil & gas extends to Simula as well through the largest single 
industry collaboration valued at NOK 125M (Simula 2014). 
In terms of business R&D, Table 5.5 shows the Norwegian ICT sector 
contributing a significant average share of the total, exceeding 23 percent (OECD 2015). 
Private sector contributions to total ICT R&D in 2009 were roughly 80 percent with the 
majority of private sector contributions (90 percent) in development, not core research. 
Respondents noted that most ICT projects are one-off or bespoke development efforts 
and classified as such. Moreover, firms receive a tax deduction of up to 20 percent on 
approved R&D projects through the RCN administered SkatteFUNN scheme (The 
Research Council of Norway 2015). In fact, the ICT sector in 2011 was the largest 
participant in the program with 683 projects worth approximately NOK 480M in tax 
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Table 5.5 Business enterprise R&D expenditure by industry (ISIC 4) in NOK M 
Industry	 2009	 2010	 2011	 Average	
ICT	 	 	 		 		
261:	Manufacture	of	electronic	components	and	boards	 	123.7		 	159.0		 	160.9		 	147.9		
262:	Manufacture	of	computers	and	peripheral	equipment*	 	 	8.0		 		 	8.0		
263:	Manufacture	of	communication	equipment	 	908.1		 	543.1		 	547.5		 	666.2		
264:	Manufacture	of	consumer	electronics*	 	 	26.9		 		 	26.9		
268:	Manufacture	of	magnetic	and	optical	media	 	 	 		 		
582:	Software	publishing	 	1,273.6		 	1,334.4		 	1,318.9		 	1,309.0		
61:	Telecommunications	 	759.5		 	807.5		 	709.2		 	758.7		
62:	Computer	programming,	consultancy	and	related	activities	 	1,976.6		 	2,310.6		 	2,709.6		 	2,332.3		
63:	Information	service	activities	 	104.0		 	119.9		 	133.0		 	119.0		
951:	Repair	of	computers	and	communication	equipment	 	 	 		 		
ICT	Total	 	5,145.5		 	5,309.4		 	5,227.5		 	5,227.5		
45T47:	Wholesale	and	retail	trade;	repair	of	motor	vehicles	and	
motorcycles	 	607.0		 	447.1		 	568.4		 	540.8		
Other	industries	 	15,849.2		 	16,153.7		 	17,913.7		 	16,638.9		
Total	 	21,601.7		 	21,910.2		 	23,709.5		 	22,407.1		
ICT	%	 23.8%	 24.2%	 22.0%	 23.3%	
Source: OECD 2015.69 
Several firm respondents noted their participation in the SkatteFUNN scheme 
while others criticized the bureaucratic challenges in gaining RCN approval. Such 
respondents further asserted that large firms with established R&D departments have an 
advantage over SMEs in navigating the approval process. It is difficult to substantiate 
these claims given that 60 percent of the firms with approved R&D projects had 10 or 
less employees (Norges forskningsråd 2014). Still, Norway has well over 7,000 small and 
micro ICT firms so overall participation amounts to at best less than five percent. The 
latest SkatteFUNN report discloses project counts by firm class and total deductions for 
the sector but not which firm class received the majority of deductions (Norges 
forskningsråd 2014). Thus, it is possible that the five large firms with approved projects 
received the lion’s share in tax deductions. 
                                                
69 Missing values for ISIC codes 262 and 263 are “classified”. Code 268 did not include values. 
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In summary, business R&D intensity is relatively high for the ICT sector but this 
is due to significant development of bespoke programming services, not investment in 
core research to create radically new products. In government R&D, Norway lags every 
other Nordic country and most of the OECD, falling short of EU targets and prioritizing 
other areas over the ICT sector. The dearth of government R&D along with limited 
institutional supports in partially explains the modest development of an ICT startup 
community in technology and specifically ICT. The data, however, do not indicate a clear 
preference for large incumbents, barring the complaints of some respondents in accessing 
funding and R&D tax credits. 
Funding 
Where large incumbent firms have access to formal financial markets, smaller 
firms can access funding through government programs. The primary organization 
providing funding for innovative firms is Innovation Norway. Jointly owned by federal 
and local governments, Innovation Norway administers NOK 6.1B ($710M) in directed 
funding though grants and loans to support entrepreneurs, SMEs, and cluster 
development (Innovation Norway 2014). With a short history of just over 10 years, 
Innovation Norway is the result of merging four disparate entities: The Norwegian 
Industrial and Regional Development Fund; the Norwegian Tourist Board; the 
Norwegian Trade Council; and the Government Consultative Office for Inventors 
(Innovation Norway 2014). 
Because Innovation Norway is a composite of diverse organizations, it has a 
broad and complex mandate extending well beyond its stated mission to include other 
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initiatives such as enabling economic development in disadvantaged regions. The lack of 
coherence and perceived limited focus on innovation has consequently led to ongoing 
debate and criticism with calls for reorganization and reform. Innovation Norway 
historically funded sectors and regions less known for innovation while innovative 
sectors and clusters like ICT in Oslo received disproportionately less funding and 
support. Thus, while large ICT incumbents can access established financial markets and 
bank lending, small ICT firms and startups lack access to state-sponsored funds required 
for growth. 
Firm respondents provided a range of opinions on Innovation Norway with most 
holding a generally unfavorable view of Innovation Norway’s support for ICT sector 
development. Detractors asserted that ICT firms receive relatively little funding, that 
remote areas receive the majority of funding, and that Innovation Norway’s operating 
practices are ineffective for the organization itself and the firms it supports. Further, 
detractors reasoned that political interests direct funding more than efforts to address 
market failure as the organization claims. Critics also view Innovation Norway’s 
operating model as “misguided” because it encourages complacency in firms as they 
increasingly depend on rolling grants instead of focusing on profitability. More 
positively, multiple ICT firm respondents utilized grants and loans from Innovation 
Norway and noted that their venture would not have survived without funding. 
Supportive respondents also cited Innovation Norway’s advisory services in business 
development planning that led to additional private sector financing. 
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A review of the macro data confirms many of the arguments by critics. Innovation 
Norway disperses funding to geographically remote areas with small populations and 
limited industry while the ICT sector receives a relatively small share of the overall total. 
Regions with less than 10 percent of the population garnered nearly a third of total 
funding while the Oslo region with 12 percent of the population and home to the majority 
of ICT firms received just over two percent of the total (Table 5.6) (Innovation Norway 
2014; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Statistics Norway 2014). The results 
confirm Innovation Norway’s more egalitarian mandate to allocate funding 
disproportionally toward remote areas with limited access to formal financial markets. 
Comparing GDP per employed person to allocated funding yields an expected negative 
correlation, although the correlation is relatively weak and statistically not significant.70 
  
                                                
70 Regression tests comparing the index “GDP per employed persons, 2012” and a computed measure of 
funding per capita show a coefficient of -0.04276 and a statistically insignificant adjusted R2 equal to 
0.0759 (p-level = 0.13386) (Author’s calculation using data from Innovation Norway 2014; Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Statistics Norway 2014). 
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Finnmark	Finnmárku	 1.5%	 7.4%	 	49.0		 	322.0		 	371.0		 	83		
Sogn	og	Fjordane	 2.1%	 7.4%	 	72.0		 	301.0		 	373.0		 	89		
Møre	og	Romsdal	 5.1%	 17.1%	 	188.0		 	672.0		 	860.0		 	100		
Troms	Romsa	 3.2%	 6.3%	 	110.0		 	206.0		 	316.0		 	87		
Nord-Trøndelag	 2.6%	 4.9%	 	49.0		 	200.0		 	249.0		 	82		
Nordland	 4.7%	 7.7%	 	95.0		 	294.0		 	389.0		 	87		
Hedmark	 3.8%	 5.7%	 	25.0		 	264.0		 	289.0		 	84		
Sør-Trøndelag	 6.0%	 6.5%	 	50.0		 	278.0		 	328.0		 	97		
Oppland	 3.7%	 3.3%	 	25.0		 	142.0		 	167.0		 	81		
Telemark	 3.4%	 3.0%	 	60.0		 	91.0		 	151.0		 	90		
Vest-Agder	 3.5%	 2.9%	 	68.0		 	79.0		 	147.0		 	102		
Hordaland	 9.9%	 7.6%	 	71.0		 	312.0		 	383.0		 	105		
Rogaland	 9.0%	 6.6%	 	61.0		 	271.0		 	332.0		 	106		
Aust-Agder	 2.2%	 1.4%	 	23.0		 	49.0		 	72.0		 	87		
Buskerud	 5.3%	 2.3%	 	22.0		 	96.0		 	118.0		 	92		
Vestfold	 4.7%	 1.9%	 	19.0		 	79.0		 	98.0		 	90		
Østfold	 5.6%	 2.1%	 	14.0		 	93.0		 	107.0		 	86		
Akershus	 11.3%	 3.4%	 	31.0		 	142.0		 	173.0		 	103		
Oslo	 12.4%	 2.2%	 	48.0		 	64.0		 	112.0		 	122		
Sources: Innovation Norway 2014; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; 
Statistics Norway 2014. 
 
Therefore, it is fitting that Nord-Trøndelag with a GDP per employed person rate 
18 points below average received an allocation of NOK 249M but not that Østfold with a 
comparable GDP per employed person rate and more than double the population received 
just NOK 107M. The full picture indicates that Innovation Norway’s funding priorities 
reflect its stated mandate of assisting relatively poorer regions but also the presence of 
other factors. Whether political patronage plays a role as critics contend remains 
uncertain though it is apparent that some of the least innovative areas in Norway receive 
the majority of funding. 
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Concerning sector allocations, Innovation Norway subsumes annual figures for 
ICT within the catchall category of “Other sectors” receiving a total of NOK 1,097M or 
18.0 percent of the total (Innovation Norway 2014). Even if ICT comprised the entirety 
of funding within this category, which it does not, it would still rank third behind Marine 
and Agriculture at 29.9 and 24.9 percent, respectively (Figure 5.8) (Innovation Norway 
2014). More conclusively, an external review of the combined 10-year history of 
Innovation Norway’s funding allocations showed that the ICT sector received just NOK 
995.5M in grants and loans amounting to 5.4 percent of the NOK 18.5T total (Bengler.no 
2015).71 
Figure 5.8 2014 Funding by sector 
 
Source: Innovation Norway 2014. 
As well, Innovation Norway’s funding allocations do not go to the industries 
generally recognized as most innovative. The OECD ranked the top 20 most innovative 
industries using the combined scores from Eurostat’s Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) (2011). Four ICT division-level industries ranked in the top twenty and three in the 
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top 10 (OECD 2011). When compared with Innovation Norway’s funding allocations, 
just two industries outside of ICT ranked in the top twenty (Figure 5.9) (OECD 2011).72 
More recent funding efforts appear to redress the shortfall through the establishment of a 
NOK 500M seed fund exclusively for IT startups (Øyvann 2013). That said, Innovation 
Norway continues to provide support to less innovative but politically powerful sectors 
like oil and gas, which also received a seed fund of equal size to that of ICT (Øyvann 
2013). 
Figure 5.9 Highly innovative sectors 
 
Source: OECD 2011. 
 
A final consideration is Innovation Norway’s allocation of four times as much 
funding to existing enterprises as opposed to entrepreneurs and startups (Innovation 
Norway 2014). Legacy enterprises can be just as innovative as entrepreneurs and startups, 
but, the general consensus maintains that entrepreneurs and startups are more innovative 
(Baron and Tang 2011). The total evidence then indicates a preference by Innovation 
                                                
72 CIS scores were based on the now outdated ISIC Rev. 3 classification scheme and do not align directly 
with current classifications for the overall ICT sector. 
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Norway to provide funding to regions, sectors, and firms that are in general the least 
innovative. The issue is particularly challenging for ICT given the disparity between 
funding levels and the overall contribution to value added. 
An extensive exposé by the business publication E24 Næringsliv found 
widespread mismanagement by Innovation Norway contributing to a disproportionate 
percentage of failed ventures and subsequent misreporting by the organization (Midtsjø et 
al. 2013). The agency cannot account for more than NOK 1B in funding since 2005 and 
bankruptcy rates in some years were 15 percentage points higher than reported (Midtsjø 
et al. 2013). Innovation Norway responded with a new management team and 
reorientation of the organization to innovation and lending prudence. Following the 
organizational change, the conservative government then cut Innovation Norway’s annual 
operating budget by NOK 107M, prompting the new CEO Anita Traaseth to reduce staff 
and operational costs by 10 percent (Lygre 2015; Traaseth 2015b). 
The reduced and reoriented budget prioritizes an increased focus on ICT, 
investments in skill development, and clarification of Innovation Norway’s mission 
(Traaseth 2015b). The new CEO is a veteran of the ICT sector and heavily promotes the 
potential of high technology Norwegian startups. Still, Innovation Norway and its new 
CEO have stopped short of delivering a clear and concise strategy for any given sector 
including ICT (Traaseth 2015a). Innovation Norway instead released a set of broad goals 
as part of its “Dream Commitment” report, prioritizing long standing commitments to 
enhancing industries with a competitive standing, developing new enterprises, innovating 
the public sector, and improving existing operations and management (Innovation 
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Norway 2015). The evolving reforms should benefit the ICT sector in the years to come, 
but historically Innovation Norway’s efforts have not been a significant factor in 
developing the Norwegian ICT sector, especially for the small firms and innovative 
startups requiring the most assistance. 
Beyond Innovation Norway, the other state-owned funding organization is Siva 
who builds, owns, and manages factories, offices, and innovation centers, as well as 
provides funding to innovative companies (Siva 2015a). Siva invests directly in over 100 
small and large innovation companies through an annual operating budget of NOK 
53.9M in grants and NOK 165.0M in subsidized loans (Siva 2015a; Nærings- og 
Fiskeridepartementet 2014). Of the total, just three funded entities are located in Oslo 
though they are all incubators including the ICT-oriented Oslotech and StartupLab (Siva 
2015b). The remainder are scattered throughout Norway and not unlike Innovation 
Norway, there is little overlap between funded entities and existing technology 
clusters/business centers (Figure 5.10) (Siva 2015b). Siva discloses the geographic 
locations and names of firms/organizations receiving funding but does not disclose the 
amount per location, sector, or firm/organization. Regardless, Siva remains a relatively 
insignificant actor with an operating budget of just NOK 218.9M p.a.  
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Figure 5.10 Current locations of firms/organizations funded by Siva 
 
Source: Siva 2015b. 
Incubation 
Norwegian ICT firm incubation lags behind that of Denmark and the other Nordic 
countries largely due to a relatively late start and an incentive structure that continues to 
favor employment in established firms. While quickly growing in number over the past 
four years, current incubators suffer from additional limitations including a lack of 
international recognition, dependence in some instances on state support, and a dearth of 
competent founders providing funding and guidance. As with the other Nordics, the 
majority of incubators are located in the capital region including 657 Oslo, 
betaFACTORY, Bitraf, Evolve, House of Nerds, Gründernes Hus, MashUP Norway, 
Oslotech, MESH, StartupLab, and Y3o. Also similar to the other Nordics, Norway’s 
incubators vary significantly in the services they provide, their sectoral focus, and in 
actual outcomes, be they venture creation, market access, and firm growth. 
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The first efforts at technology incubation in Oslo date back to 1984 with the 
establishment of Osltech by a consortia of public entities including the University of 
Oslo, Oslo Kommune, and SIVA along with industry leaders Norwegian Hydro, Pareto, 
Dyno and others (Oslotech 2015). In 1989, Oslotech built a traditional research and 
industry park that would later become Oslo Science Park or Forskningsparken with 
dedicated support for ICT (Oslotech 2015). Sector advancement subsequently benefited 
from the 2010 transfer of Fornebu’s IT incubation initiative Vision Business and the 
establishment of Norway’s largest and most notable incubator StartupLab in 2012 
(Oslotech 2010; Oslotech 2015). 
StartupLab currently supports around 70 technology firms providing workspaces, 
courses on entrepreneurship, mentoring, and a founder-led fund investing between $100K 
and $300K per firm for a five to 15 percent equity stake (StartupLab 2015). The 
incubator is selective in the firms it chooses to participate with just 20 percent of 
applicants accepted, all of whom must have a business plan and a technology focus 
(Bonilauri 2015; Solli 2012). The involvement of founders like Jon von Tetzchner from 
Opera Software and Gunnar Evensen of GET AS has greatly enhanced ICT firm 
incubation by raising the international profile of Norwegian startups and providing a 
definable path to firm creation for aspiring entrepreneurs (StartupLab 2015). Those who 
do succeed in establishing a going concern with a viable product or service can generally 
expect to receive permanent placement within Oslo Science Park (Solli 2012). Funding 
remains a persistent challenge as the Founder Fund began with just NOK 30M in initial 
investment (Aldridge 2013). 
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In the three years since StartupLab launched, several other incubators have 
emerged in Oslo seeking to capitalize on the rapidly growing interest in entrepreneurship. 
Given the association with the University of Oslo, StartupLab’s new ventures tend 
toward high-end technology development while MESH located in central Oslo caters 
more toward software, especially rapid mobile application development (Solli 2012). 
MESH is comparable in size to StartupLab but offers lower rents of just NOK 1,190 per 
month in a less structured environment (Savage 2013). Beyond facilities and informal 
networking, MESH does not offer other additional services such as training, mentoring, 
and funding. 
The remaining incubators are comparatively smaller, newer, and in most instances 
lack a focus on ICT. 657 Oslo provides standard workspace services to entrepreneurs 
with an interest in “communications and creativity” for a fee that is two to three times 
that of MESH (657 Oslo 2015). Part of 657 Oslo, MashUP Norway caters to “music and 
technology” entrepreneurs by providing free office space and general guidance to 
selected participants (MashUP Norway 2015). House of Nerds and Bitraf are oriented 
toward gaming and hacking respectively, offering office space and topical meetings more 
for coding, game development, hackathons, and application development than firm 
creation. Conversely, betaFACTORY provides access to capital, mentors, entrepreneurial 
education, and other services with a limited physical presence and a single lead organizer. 
Evolve appears to be a serviced office operator and not an incubator while Gründernes 
Hus and Y3o are currently inactive. 
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Outside of Norway, Innovation Norway’s San Francisco office provides support 
to technology startups seeking to scale up in Silicon Valley. The office provides 
workspaces, networking opportunities, advisory services, and promotion but not funding. 
Innovation Norway also operates an intensive 30-day incubation program named TINC to 
acclimate potential entrepreneurs to the Silicon Valley startup ecosystem. Innovation 
Norway requires applicants to complete a 20-question application, demonstrate a working 
prototype, have current revenues, and an established team. The goal of the program is to 
help entrepreneurs identify the missing or weak aspects of their venture, especially in 
defining market opportunities and product specifics. Longer-term efforts place 
Norwegian entrepreneurs at the University of California, Berkeley where they learn 
entrepreneurship, value proposition, and financing while serving internships at 
established technology firms. Results of the program yield limited success with roughly 
10 percent of each program’s class of 40 participants securing permanent employment in 
the area. 
In conclusion, ICT firm incubation in Norway is growing but from a relatively 
small base with programs ranging from hype to substance (Løhre 2015). Qualified ICT 
professionals continue to prefer the stability provided by established firms to the risks 
associated with entrepreneurship, especially in an ecosystem that is far from established. 
That said, the startup community continues to grow and the view of entrepreneurship held 
by Norwegians is improving. Efforts by the state have helped to establish a physical 
presence for firm incubation though the most promising ventures receive assistance from 
the few experienced founders providing needed investment and operational guidance. 
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The challenge for Norwegian ICT startups is that the number of successful entrepreneurs 
is small, the startup community is relatively unknown internationally, and access to larger 
tranches of financial capital remains difficult. 
Promotion 
The Norwegian government, trade associations, and private actors lead efforts to 
promote the ICT sector in Norway and abroad. Having absorbed the Norwegian Trade 
Council, Innovation Norway is the primary government organization responsible for 
promoting Norwegian industry. Efforts focus on leading sectors like oil and gas, 
fisheries, and tourism while support for ICT is largely through a dedicated in-house group 
in Oslo and regional offices including the notable branch in San Francisco. For ICT 
startups, Innovation Norway extends funding to the promotional and informational 
organization Startup Norway (Startup Norway 2015). Trade associations include the 
Confederation of Norwegian Business Industry with the aligned group Abelia dedicated 
to ICT, R&D, education, and consultancy (abelia 2015). Lastly, IKT Norge is an 
independent interest group for the Norwegian ICT industry promoting the sector in 
Norway and abroad (IKT-Norge 2015). 
For both small and large firms, respondents noted external and internal issues 
limiting promotion of the ICT sector. Externally, Norwegian ICT firms are relatively 
unrecognized even when the firm or product has a presence in international markets. 
Telenor has an extensive global presence as the 12th largest carrier but the firm prioritizes 
promotion of its brand and services, not its Norwegian origins. Opera as well seeks brand 
recognition and market penetration for its online advertising and suite of software 
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browsers with little acknowledgement of the firm’s base in Oslo. Startups also have 
difficulty in establishing Norway as a global hub for ICT as evidenced by Apple’s voice 
recognition software Siri. Norwegian Dag Kittlaus led the development of Siri but few 
consumers associate the application with the developer’s country of origin. Recording 
artist Jay Z’s purchase of the streaming music service Tidal garnered international 
headlines for its exclusive contracts with leading music artists but not because Tidal 
originated and remains headquartered in Oslo.73 
Firm respondents explained that Norwegians have difficulty orienting firm 
development toward international markets because of longstanding isolationist 
tendencies. Norwegians often cite the perception of a “big blue ocean” separating 
Norway from the rest of the world. More practically, firms generally do not promote 
themselves beyond the home market because that is where they derive the majority of 
revenues. Large systems integrators Evry and Atea limit promotion to Norway, the 
Nordics, and a handful of European countries where they operate. The trend again applies 
to startups even though by their nature they should be focused on international markets to 
secure rapid growth. betaFACTORY CEO Brian Wiseberg provided supporting evidence 
when he found that a full third of Norwegian startups do not have a website in English 
(Weisberg 2014). As well, the organizations representing ICT including Innovation 
Norway, Abelia, and IKT provide the majority of their content on associated websites 
and social channels in Norwegian with a lesser amount in English and nothing in other 
                                                
73 Following acquisition, Tidal held a press conference in New York with recording artists Madonna, 
Beyoncé, Jay-Z, Nora Jones, Deadmau5, and several others in attendance. 
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languages. Because of the modest promotional efforts by Norwegian ICT firms and 
representative organizations, it is unsurprising that Norwegian startups garner 
substantially less media coverage than every other Nordic country (Murray 2015). 
In reviewing intra-sectoral patterns of promotion, the preceding indicates that 
both large incumbents and startup firms are relatively unsuccessful in establishing 
Norwegian ICT as a viable brand within Europe and the rest of the world. Cultural 
aspects are tempered by the fact that other Norwegian industries, especially offshore oil 
and gas, fisheries, and tourism, are well known internationally due in part to sustained 
promotional efforts by the state and SOEs. Notwithstanding Telenor, market orientation 
is a clearer indicator of the level of promotional activity given that the majority of ICT 
production is for domestic markets. Telenor as an SOE, however, could do more to 
promote Norwegian ICT abroad either through new joint ventures with Norwegian 
startups or by leveraging the lengthy history of Nordic excellence in mobile 
communications. Alternatively, it will take the breakout of a startup firm to enable 
international recognition for Norwegian ICT. Historical evidence indicates that even 
when Norwegian startups obtain modest success there is, however, little association of 
the firm to Norway. 
Outcomes 
Large firms, incumbents, and lighthouses 
Stated by one respondent, Norway has consistently “taken care of their own” in 
sponsoring national champions. Led by Telenor, the five largest firms comprise more 
than 91 percent of total revenues and employment within Norway’s top 12 ICT firms. As 
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detailed in Figure 5.11, the top five Norwegian ICT firms garnered just over $26.4B in 
revenues with nearly 54.3K employees. With the exception of TeliaSonera Norge AS, the 
top five ICT firms are all headquartered in Norway and the top three are either state- 
owned enterprises, partially state-owned enterprises, and/or have significant service 
contracts with the Norwegian government. The top four firms are also either incumbent 
telecommunications providers or legacy IT consultancies. Given the Norwegian 
government’s continued presence in ICT, it is unsurprising that the sector exhibits a high 
degree of concentration in the top end with few relatively few TNCs or breakout startups 
able to generate comparable revenues and employment. 
Figure 5.11 2011/12 Largest Norwegian ICT firms measured in annual turnover 
 
Source: Bureau van Dijk 2015. 
 
As the leading firm in Norwegian ICT, Telenor dwarfs all other firms in market 
capitalization, turnover, and employment. Because Telenor is an incumbent 
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Telenor as a qualified and debatable lighthouse firm for the Norwegian ICT sector. 
Telenor historically operated as the dominant carrier in Norway with little external 
presence or internal pressure to innovate. Norway progressed more cautiously in partially 
privatizing Telenor and opening up competitive local loop access as the global industry 
pursued more aggressive liberalization. With a largely protected domestic market, 
Telenor viewed increasing deregulation as an opportunity to expand abroad. It is now one 
of the largest mobile telecommunications providers in the world operating throughout the 
Nordics, Eastern Europe, and South Asia. Through dedicated R&D, spinoffs, 
partnerships, and investments, Telenor has a lengthy history supporting wider growth in 
the Norwegian ICT sector. However, respondents did note Telenor’s limited involvement 
in the startup community, recent reductions in R&D investment, and increasing reliance 
on acquiring new technologies over developing them. 
Telenor’s largest and most relevant R&D effort leading to venture creation was 
the founding of Opera software in 1995. In the early part of the 21st century, Opera was 
regarded as a high innovation and growth firm through the development of web browsing 
technology. The firm listed on the Oslo Børs and currently has revenues in excess of 
$480M for the most recent reporting period (Opera Software 2015). Since Opera’s 
founding it has moved away from software development to online advertising where it 
now garners more than 60 percent of total revenues (Opera Software 2015). In 
applications, Opera continues to update their mainline web browsing software and 
increase their user base in absolute terms. However, Opera has not been able to regain 
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relative market share to the levels of a decade ago. Current use of the Opera browser is 
estimated at less than 2.6 percent of the global user base. 
Prior to Opera, Telenor partnered with Tandberg in 1978 to develop video 
conferencing software and hardware (Andersen 2011). Founded in 1933, Tandberg had 
been a producer of radio equipment that attempted but ultimately failed to develop 
aligned product lines. Not unlike Norsk Data and other leading ICT firms of the late 
1970s, Tandberg entered into bankruptcy under increasing competition. Through its 
subsequent partnership with Telenor, internal restructuring, and a reorientation to video 
conferencing, Tandberg experienced rapid growth realizing 45 percent of global market 
share in teleconferencing, culminating in the $3.4B sale to Cisco systems in 2009 -  the 
largest sale of an IT firm in Norwegian history (Andersen 2011). Respondents noted 
some challenges in assimilating the two companies though Cisco continues to increase 
employment and maintains their global teleconferencing development center in Norway 
(Andersen 2011). 
Opera and Tandberg illustrate the importance of having a large, established firm 
providing the necessary investments in R&D, leading to growth in new ICT enterprises. 
The two cases are illustrative of the types of ventures that succeed in Norway and those 
that do not. Opera was a classic “dot com” software company with unrealized revenues, 
unrealistic valuations, unclear product development, and a volatile operations model. 
What makes Opera unique is that the firm had viable and marketable technologies but 
failed due to experimental firm management and organizational capabilities incompatible 
with the institutional norms of Norwegian ICT. Conversely, Tandberg focused on 
 
  210 
developing core technology for a niche market that ultimately expanded as 
telecommunication services evolved to support high bandwidth services. In both cases, 
the two firms unequivocally would have not grown to the levels they did without the 
intensive R&D efforts of Telenor supported by the state. 
Outside of R&D efforts, Telenor has expanded the Norwegian ICT sector through 
joint partnerships and direct equity stakes in other ICT firms. TeliaSonera Norge (now 
Netcom) is the second largest telecommunications provider in Norway and a direct 
competitor of Telenor, though the two firms collaborate in provisioning 
telecommunications infrastructure, services, and content (Andersen 2011). Like other 
telecommunications providers, Telenor is actively engaged in acquiring access to content 
services and applications overlaying Telenor’s infrastructure. To meet this need, Telenor 
partnered with media company Schibsted to expand online advertising in emerging 
markets and co-develop social network service and online marketplace firm 
SOBAZZAR.com (Schibsted 2015). Through direct equity stakes, Telenor is a substantial 
investor in multiple ICT and media firms. Telenor owns 33 percent in the 10th largest 
mobile carrier VimpelCom Ltd., 49 percent of mobile and data sales and distribution 
provider Kjedehuset, 48.2 percent of Norway’s second largest media company A-pressen, 
and 30.24 percent of Norway’s third largest ICT firm Evry (Telenor Group 2015). 
The ICT firms ErgoGroup and EDB Business Partner merged in 2010 forming the 
current entity Evry to “create a Nordic IT champion” (Posten Norge 2010). Telenor held 
controlling interest in ErgoGroup while EDB was a subsidiary of the Norwegian Postal 
Service, Posten Norge, originating from Statens Datasentral AS. Posten Norge continues 
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to own 40 percent of Evry along with Telenor’s noted 30.24 percent share (Posten Norge 
2010; Telenor Group 2015). Evry is thus a SEO by proxy. As Norway’s largest provider 
of IT consulting services to all of the dominant Norwegian firms and the government, 
respondents noted a “near monopoly” by Evry in specific areas, especially financial 
services. The firm consistently wins service contracts with its parent owners Posten 
Norge and Telenor along with other leading Norwegian SOEs including Statoil, DnB 
Norge, and Norsk Hydro. Because of Evry’s protected standing in the market for IT 
services, stagnant growth, lack of innovation, and limited engagement with the ICT 
community, no respondent referred to Evry as a lighthouse.74 While a national champion 
does not have to be a lighthouse firm, the formation of Evry demonstrates the Norwegian 
government’s priority to support incumbent SOEs over fostering competition and growth 
within the domestic market for IT services. 
Atea stands apart from Telenor and Evry in that the Norwegian government holds 
a relatively small stake in the firm at just over six percent through the pension fund 
Folketrygdfondet as a nonstrategic portfolio investment (Atea 2015a). Shareholder 
composition is diffused amongst another 19 investors in the top shareholders list 
accounting for 64.4 percent of total ownership (Atea 2015a). In government procurement, 
Atea has few engagements with the Norwegian government and instead secures most of 
its sizeable public sector contracts with the Danish federal and municipal governments 
                                                
74 Evry had “no material costs… recognized in respect to research and development activities in 2014” 
(Evry 2015, 37) 
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(Atea 2015a).75 The firm continues to grow at historic rates earning double digit growth 
in the previous year and garnering 17 percent market share across the Nordics (Atea 
2015b). Still, Atea is a 47 year old firm providing relatively low innovation 
hardware/software resale and systems integration services with effectively no research 
expense (Atea 2015b). Instead, the firm continues to grow aggressively through 
acquisition with more than 60 acquisitions across the Nordic and Baltic region since 2006 
(Atea 2015a). 
To summarize, a small number of old firms operating in a semi-protected 
environment with substantial direct and indirect investment from the Norwegian 
government dominate Norwegian ICT. The “big three” comprised of Telenor, Evry, and 
Atea have grown by dominating domestic markets while expanding into external markets 
through mergers and acquisitions. Unlike Ericsson in Sweden and Nokia in Finland, none 
of the big three is considered an unambiguous lighthouse providing the necessary 
conditions to support wider growth in the Norwegian ICT sector. Telenor comes closest 
through its directed R&D program, spinouts and joint partnerships, though the firm’s 
current priorities are international expansion using OEM equipment and software while 
protecting existing domestic markets through commoditized services. According to most 
respondents, Telenor’s impact on the Norwegian ICT sector has consequently diminished 
since the peak eras of the mid 1980s and the dot com era ending around 2000. Further, 
Evry and Atea provide standardized IT services with little to no investment in research 
and maintain limited engagement with the wider ICT sector, barring portfolio 
                                                
75 Atea does not publish detailed accounts of client contracts. 
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acquisitions. The big three instead utilize entrenched, protected positions to attract the 
best talent in ICT, directly undermining growth in the SME and startup community. 
Micro/small firms and startups 
There are multiple challenges for small firms and startups within the Norwegian 
ICT sector. Norway’s SME policy recommendations include increasing scientific 
community transparency, targeted R&D, increased firm collaboration, increased 
interaction with academic institutions, and focused employee training (Aslesen 2002). 
Still, the imbalance in policy supports benefitting large firms over SME/startups limits 
the overall potential of the latter. Large incumbent firms hold the majority of domestic 
market share relegating small ICT firms to providing commoditized services for local 
SMEs while startups compete for scarce financing and the talent required to access global 
markets. The lack of diversity within the Norwegian economy further limits the potential 
for emerging firms in identifying and addressing local problems that can then meet 
international demand. As one respondent stated, “You are not starting something new in 
Norway… You are doing something very specific like oil or tax.” More positively, the 
dominance of large incumbent firms and economic specialization has led to the 
emergence of a limited number of high growth ICT firms through spinoffs. The most 
successful startups are niche players associated with Norway’s dominant industries while 
small ICT firms that grow beyond sole proprietorships or micro firm size do so by 
operating domestically. 
In assessing the overall performance of high growth ICT firms in Norway, Tables 
5.7 and 5.8 show that Norwegian startups are fewer in number, generally have lower 
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valuations, and remain in Norway more so than Danish startups. Norway had three firms 
realize billion dollar valuations: Opera, FAST, and Nordic Semiconductor though none of 
these gained the multibillion dollar valuations of other Nordic startups like Just Eat, 
Klarna, Netop Solutions, Skype, Spotify, and Supercell. Because several startups 
originate from local research institutions or spinout from incumbent firms, most remain 
in Norway and list on the Norwegian Børs exchange where the state is the largest single 
investor. Opera emerged from Telenor’s R&D program in 1995 and Vizrt spun off from 
TV 2 Norway in 1997. Opticom has a lengthy history beginning in the 1980s as an R&D 
firm associated with NTNU producing polymer-based memory chips. After an infusion of 
capital from listing on the Oslo Børs, Opticom established the data search company 
FAST and the printed memory firm Thin Film in the mid to late 1990s. Both Fast and 
Thin Film then listed on the Oslo Børs with Microsoft subsequently acquiring FAST for 
$1.2B and Thin Film remaining on the Børs with a current valuation of approximately 
$344.0M. The original parent company Opticom no longer exists.  
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Table 5.7 Startup firms by status and 
location – International 
Table 5.8 Startup firms by status and 
location – Domestic 
Relocated	Internationally	or	Acquired	by	TNC	 	 Norway	
Status	 Name	 	$M		 	 Status	 Name	 	$M		
Acquired	 FAST	 	1,200.0		 	 Acquired	 Mamut	 	131.3		
Acquired	 Playfish	 	400.0		 	 Acquired	 2	Firms*	 	5.3		
Acquired	 Nimsoft	 	350.0		 	 Total	Acquired	 	136.6		
Acquired	 Siri†	 	200.0		 	 Listed	Domestically	 Opera	 	1,818.0		
Acquired	 Chipcon	 	200.0		 	 Listed	Domestically	 Vizrt	 	617.9		
Acquired	 Stepstone†	 	180.2		 	 Listed	Domestically	 Nordic	Semiconductor	 	1,030.8		
Acquired	 Energy	Micro	 	170.0		 	 Listed	Domestically	 Thin	Film	 	344.0		
Acquired	 Qt	Software	 	153.0		 	 Listed	Domestically	 Funcom	 	221.1		
Acquired	 Global	IP	 	68.2		 	 Listed	Domestically	 IDEX	 	152.9		
Acquired	 Arctic	Silicon	Devices	 	12.0		 	 Listed	Domestically	 Bouvet	 	104.1		
Acquired	 Paradial	 	7.3		 	 Listed	Domestically	 8	Other	Firms	 	418.7		
Acquired	 6	Other	Firms*	 	35.2		 	 Total	Listed	Domestically	 	4,707.4		
Acquired	 3	Other	Firms	 	Undisclosed		 	 Private	Equity	 poLight*	 	40.9		
Total	Acquired	 	2,976.0		 	 Private	Equity	 49	Other	Firms*	 	95.0		
Listed	Domestic	 Nio‡	 	259.2		 	 Total	Private	Equity	 	135.9		
Private	Equity	 2	Firms*	 	15.6		 	 Total	Domestic	 	4,979.9		
		 Total	International	 	3,250.8		 	 Closed	 6	Firms	 	11.1		
Total	International	and	Domestic	 	8,230.7		 	 Domestic	Percent	of	Total	Startup	Value	 60.5%	
Sources: CrunchBase 2015 and related data.76 
 
Single case conclusion 
In Norwegian ICT, intra-sectoral dualism favors large, established firms over 
startups and SMEs due to multiple factors including sector concentration, statist policies 
operating at the national and local level, and institutional conservatism. To start, every 
recent analysis of the Norwegian economy recognizes the unique effects of abundant oil 
and gas in directing wider sector development. Norway has neutralized most of the 
adverse effects of a substantial current account surplus by recycling oil and gas revenues 
through a state pension/central bank (i.e. sovereign wealth fund) mandated to invest 
                                                
76 (*) Denotes total funding received to date. All other values are total market capitalization for listed firms 
or firm valuation at the time of acquisition. (†) Estimated. (‡) Listed on the Oslo Børs with headquarters 
abroad. 
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abroad. The oil and gas industry, however, still impacts knowledge-intensive areas of the 
economy including ICT by offering wages and employment incentives that few small and 
especially volatile startup firms can meet. The wage and employment incentives offered 
by the oil and gas industry extend to large established ICT firms through to service 
contracts, further increasing labor competition for small firms and startups. 
Large incumbent firms further benefit from the statist policies of the Norwegian 
government through union wage setting, procurement policies, direct ownership, regional 
favoritism, and sector fragmentation. The high level of unionization in government also 
influences wage setting for private firms, especially those with government procurement 
contracts. Unionization is relatively low across the Norwegian economy with 
professional and technical workers having some of the lowest levels in union membership 
at roughly seven percent. The unionization of government employees, however, exceeds 
80 percent. According to respondents, wage setting within government then influences 
wages in proximate sectors including ICT2. Procurement again favors large incumbent 
firms as large firms have the scale required to support complex government contracts 
stipulating price efficiency over innovation offered by smaller, niche players willing to 
experiment with radical product and service development. 
The government plays an active role in the wider economy through ownership of 
controlling stakes in effectively every large firm including ICT. Norwegian state 
ownership is amongst the highest in the OECD, nearly equating to the combined 
percentages of the next highest countries of France, Italy, and Sweden. The government 
owns 54 percent of the largest ICT firm, Telenor, and controls a majority share of the 
 
  217 
third largest ICT firm Evry through state-owned subsidiaries. The Norwegian financial 
market remains dominated by the state through the substantial holdings of equities on the 
Børs stock exchange, partial ownership of the largest bank DNB, and complete 
ownership of some regional banks. State ownership of large firms effectively crowds out 
financing for smaller firms and startups with less predictable revenues flows or market 
development plans. The partial divestiture of SOEs has to date been relatively 
insignificant with no substantive impact on the ICT sector. Plans to reduce holdings in 
the largest ICT firm Telenor and technology-intensive Kongsberg have yet to advance. 
While the state has actively supported the largest ICT firms, the agency dedicated 
to growing innovative firms has not significantly helped small firms and startups in ICT. 
Innovation Norway consistently extends grants and loans to other industries over the ICT 
sector with less funding available to smaller, entrepreneurial firms located in the most 
promising region of the country. The somewhat innovative oil and gas sector receives 
considerable funding, although Innovation Norway allocates the majority of funds to low 
innovation sectors, including agriculture and maritime receiving over 50 percent of the 
total. Innovation Norway has a dual mandate to support both innovation and development 
in less prosperous areas so it is expected that the burgeoning startup cluster in Oslo 
receives less comparatively than other areas. Simple regression tests however, indicate a 
less clear correlation between need and funding further limiting the potential for 
innovation and growth. The public and now the government have rightly criticized the 
organization for its practices leading to extensive restructuring by Innovation Norway. 
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In difference to the national government, powerful local governments constrain 
efforts to develop an effective national ICT policy specifically addressing the disparities 
within the ICT sector. ICT policy has instead focused on universally supported initiatives 
expanding access to ICT infrastructure (i.e. broadband internet) and automating 
government (especially national) services. That said, such projects again favor the large 
incumbent firms in provisioning ever costlier ICT infrastructure due to already 
exceptional internet diffusion rates and in developing complex, large scale solutions 
required to automate government services. Finally, strong local governments and 
institutions geographically fracture and diffuse the ICT sector limiting collaboration from 
cluster dynamics. Local governments utilize formal and informal institutions to acquire 
funding for localized economic development and protect local labor markets from 
regional and international competitors. Even Oslo maintains two distinct ICT clusters in 
Fornebu and north-central Oslo, each with its own supporting institutions incubating 
firms but hindering collaboration across clusters. 
Embodied in the historical metaphor of a “big blue ocean” separating Norway 
from the rest of the world, institutional conservatism insulates large, incumbent firms 
from external competition while limiting the opportunities of startups in accessing global 
markets. Most ICT firms access domestic financial markets, including VC, consequently 
orienting firms toward domestic and Nordic markets. The promotion of Norwegian ICT 
appears to have an unbiased yet weak impact on both large incumbents and 
SMEs/startups. Intra-sectoral market differences are then most pronounced in the 
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leverage that large firms have in accessing foreign markets while small firms are limited 
to low innovation domestic markets and few startups realize international success. 
Norwegians describe themselves as “more Catholic than the Pope”, connoting an 
aversion to risk whether in government policy or venture creation. Prior to the discovery 
of oil and gas, Norway relied on abundant natural resources in maritime, agriculture and 
mining. Oil and gas abundance led to the development of technological excellence in 
offshore exploration and extraction though path dependency, not the advancement of a 
radical and risky ITP. Recognizing the realities of peak oil in 2001 and gas in 2013, 
Norway initiated efforts to carve out niche expertise in other sectors but without clarity or 
specification. Even with Norway’s historical advancement in computing and 
telecommunications, ICT does not appear to offer a path to sector excellence due in part 
to the inability of institutions and policy to incubate, promote, and grow new ventures 
with the potential to scale into global competitors. As such, Norwegian ICT will continue 
to favor less innovative large incumbents over high growth potential startups with muted 
aggregate performance in relation to the leading Nordic countries of Finland and Sweden.
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CHAPTER SIX: COMPARING DANISH AND NORWEGIAN ICT SECTOR 
OUTCOMES 
Divergence through intra-sectoral dualism: Testing the hypotheses 
In testing the hypotheses, I restate the ideal type and corresponding hypotheses 
before applying each to the specific dynamics within the ICT sector. The application is 
qualitative by design without discernable confidence intervals. I instead rely on the most 
relevant and verifiable pieces of evidence to support stated claims. 
Hypotheses: Denmark 
Danish movements to liberalization are most apparent in the areas of labor 
freedom, risk-based capital financing, and deregulation/privatization. The institutional 
and policy shift favors SMEs and startups over large, incumbent firms. Accordingly, I 
test three core hypotheses with corroborative evidence supporting my argument of 
Danish ICT intra-sectoral dualism: 
HD1: Danish labor force liberalization has facilitated the proliferation of SMEs 
and startup firms. Because of the relative ease in firm hiring and firing, ICT 
professionals have the incentive to manage their own careers to the greatest ends. 
Supporting evidence: high labor turnover rates, high number of SMEs and 
startups, high SME and startup revenue/valuations, developed cluster 
communities, high number of firm founders, high labor movement abroad and 
back, increased reskilling, increasing entrepreneurship programs, increase in 
number of entrepreneurs, and limited opportunities for legacy ICT professionals.  
 
  221 
Findings for HD1: 
Danish labor force liberalization continues to favor the proliferation of SMEs and 
startups through increased labor mobility, unencumbered labor contracting, 
organizational restructuring, favorable guest worker programs, extensive offshoring, and 
generalized skill development programs. Already leading the Nordics and most OECD 
countries in overall measures of labor mobility, the market for Danish ICT labor remains 
competitive and fluid. ICT labor unionization is 20 percentage points lower than that of 
the remaining labor force and union members prioritize skill development over wage and 
employment solidarity. Under conditions of limited collective bargaining, incentives then 
favor independent employment and wage setting through unencumbered labor 
contracting. Recently proposed legislation seeks to extend labor mobility and 
independent contracting through strengthened protections against employer non-compete 
clauses. 
Under conditions of low union power, corporate restructuring is more prevalent in 
Denmark as evidenced by redundancies at TDC, IBM, CSC, and Microsoft. Widespread 
offshoring in both ICT and ICT-intensive firms then limits the movement of legacy 
workers between incumbent firms and instead compels workers to seek employment 
through arms-length labor agreements as independent contractors or in small service 
firms where native language fluency and soft skills are more relevant. Reskilling 
programs favor generalized skill development for increased portability, again through 
contracting agreements with sole proprietors or SMEs. More generally, Denmark 
continues to increase tertiary education rates as it shifts to demand-based skill 
development supportive of wider labor mobility. 
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Under conditions of high labor mobility and generalized skill development but 
with limited opportunities at large incumbent firms, Danish startups continue to increase 
in number and realize high rates of growth. Unlike labor markets characterized by 
atomized and alienated workers, Danish ICT workers benefit from a strong community 
aligned under common interests balancing relative independence and inter-firm 
collaboration. Successful founders directly support next generation entrepreneurs through 
active mentoring and direct investments as serial entrepreneurs. Labor mobility extends 
internationally with several Danish entrepreneurs seeking opportunities in larger, deeper, 
and more developed financial markets. Most founders, however, maintain strong linkages 
with Denmark by establishing or maintaining domestic development centers, usually as 
small office subsidiaries. International founders also routinely return to Denmark to 
support local clusters by inspiring, mentoring, and funding new entrepreneurs. Danish 
educational policy complements the rising tide of entrepreneurship and SME proliferation 
through changes in tertiary education, which now includes entrepreneurship programs, 
support for firm incubation, and initiatives to commercialize technological innovations. 
Objective measures of labor mobility include the aforementioned unionization 
rates 20 percentage points lower than the remaining labor force, nearly 50 percent of the 
active labor force using social media for employment opportunities, and tertiary 
education rates that have risen to 77.0 percent in 2009. Concerning the dependent 
variable, Danish ICT has roughly the same distribution of SMEs to enterprise firms as 
Norway at around 98/9 percent. Danish SMEs, however, contribute 40 percent more than 
their Norwegian counterparts to the total share of value added. Further, Danish startups 
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have been far more successful with a total valuation approaching $25B – effectively 
triple Norway’s $8B. That said, wider Danish liberalization compels startups to seek 
international markets with several startups realizing high growth outside of Denmark. 
Maintaining domestic linkages under increasing labor market liberalization, then, remains 
the ongoing uncertainty that both enables and constrains domestic startups growing into 
large enterprise firms. 
HD2: Danish liberalization has increased the quantity and quality of risk-based 
financing providing growth opportunities for SMEs and startups. Denmark has 
increased the number of risk-based funding resources while access to higher 
stage funding remains relatively low. Supporting evidence: high number of SMEs 
and startups, high SME and startup revenue/valuations, number, value, and 
performance of risk-based funds, high number of founders, increase in number of 
entrepreneurs, high rate of acquisition by TNCs, high rate of funding exits 
abroad, and low rates of domestically listed public firms. 
Findings for HD2: 
Denmark continues to liberalize in aspects of finance, though limited equity 
markets constrains wider effects and privilege SMEs/startups over incumbent firms in 
ICT. For incumbent firms, Danish equities favor traditional industries like industrials, 
consumer goods, and basic materials, not ICT. TDC is the only large ICT firm listed on 
the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE) and the overall technology and 
telecommunications sector comprises just 7.7 percent of the CSE. The majority of firms 
are SMEs residing on the small cap First North exchange with reduced regulatory 
requirements. Liberal reforms have also lowered the capital required for listing on the 
exchange to just DKK 500K providing additional support to SMEs. 
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Other forms of risk-based financing include private equity (PE) which generally 
favors startups and high growth companies through related forms of venture capital (VC). 
Across several European countries, Denmark ranks first in terms of PE markets and 
second in PE industry relative to total GDP. The former measures the relative size of PE 
investments in Danish firms while the latter is the relative size of Danish PE investments. 
ICT receives a decent share of overall PE at 15.5 percent with the majority flowing to 
SMEs through small investments that average just under €3M. Where Danish financial 
liberalization has had its most pronounced effect, however, is in the institutional capital 
embodied in Danish PE funds. Danish funds have been operating longer, have a wider 
investment focus beyond domestic markets, and are more successful than comparable 
funds in Norway. Their limitation, however, is the scarcity of capital most visibly 
evidenced in the small number of higher financing rounds (i.e. beyond seed funding) and 
domestic public offerings. 
Consequently, liberalization compels high growth ICT firms to either seek 
acquisition by a large firm, usually a TNC, or obtain late stage financing from external 
markets. Of the nearly $25B valuation for Danish startups, just over 30 percent listed 
domestically, obtained domestic PE, or maintained their headquarters in Denmark. 
Instead, TNCs have acquired the overwhelming majority of high growth firms in terms of 
total valuation with Microsoft purchasing Skype and Navision for just over $10B. 
Conversely, financial liberalization has eviscerated large incumbent firms as private 
equity firms and acquisitions by TNCs generally include restructuring and wider 
redundancies. An American PE consortium purchased TDC, subsequently reduced a 
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significant portion of the labor force, and refocused the firm away from in house 
innovation and toward OEM equipment and outsourced services. IBM acquired Maersk 
IT and again reduced the labor force to increase efficiencies and profitability. The 
combined effects of financial liberalization in Denmark limit the potential for large firms 
to expand but provide the necessary supports for startups to launch. However, limited 
late-stage financing constrains the size and number of startups transitioning into large 
enterprises further amplifying intra-sectoral disparities. 
HD3: Danish liberalization has lowered regulatory burdens for SMEs and startups 
while increasing competitive forces on incumbent firms. Denmark leads in 
privatization, divestiture, and deregulation of ICT firms. Supporting evidence: 
reduced barriers to entry, market deregulation, lowered requirements for firm 
creation, high number of SMEs and startups, high SME and startup 
revenue/valuations, developed cluster communities, high number of firm founders, 
privatization of SOEs, increase in TNC competition, high rates of TNC ownership 
and acquisition, and high rates of firm restructuring/reorganization. 
Findings for HD3: 
The Danish were the first in the Nordics to fully privatize and deregulate the 
telecommunications market. Initial expectations were that deregulation and privatization 
would lead to innovation within the industry, providing expanded service offerings and 
lower costs. To do so, the Danish carrier rebranded as TDC sought a partnership with the 
United States’ regional carrier Ameritech, ostensibly to realize scale effects and increase 
market penetration. As mentioned above, the effort largely failed, leading to acquisition 
and restructuring by a PE consortium before relisting on the CSE. The Danish 
government was also the first and only Nordic country to privatize its federal data 
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centers. The move met with initial protests by displaced workers and aligned civil service 
employees, however the sale to the United States’ TNC, CSC concluded and restructuring 
ensued. IT services at the local or kommune level were also privatized with the PE firm 
EQT Partners acquiring an 85 percent stake in the firm and the Danish pension fund ATP 
holding the remainder. Further, the kommunes themselves continue to undergo 
modernization and competing strategies driven by the independent entity KOMBIT. 
Finally, ICT-intensive firms facing cost competition and the drive for wider efficiencies 
have either sold off their IT departments, as in the case of Maersk IT to IBM or 
outsourced the function to TNCs as in SAS’s 70 percent reduction of IT staff. The net 
result is that most of the remaining large firms are now more profitable but are less 
innovative and more detached from the wider ICT ecosystem. 
Conversely, Denmark has made it relatively easy for startups and SMEs to 
establish a going concern and realize sustainable or exceptional growth. The government 
plans to lower corporate taxes to 22 percent by 2016, lower than that of the United 
Kingdom. Lower corporate tax rates extended to SMEs and startups receive a further 
boost through the elimination of the “entrepreneur tax”. Administratively, deregulation 
favors SMEs and startups through the 2014 reduced capital requirements to DKK 1.0 for 
certain firms. Establishing a firm is also easier, due to administrative reforms now 
requiring minimal time and effort due to establish a firm. Once the firm is a going 
concern it faces minimal regulatory requirements up to 50 employees, consequently 
benefiting the majority of Danish ICT firms. The time, effort, and costs required to close 
a failed business has also improved, although the dissolution or restructuring of liabilities 
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remains difficult. Finally, the government recently established a radical program offering 
residency and support for international startups willing to relocate to Denmark. The 
combined effect is that large, established firms find it increasingly difficult to compete 
under increased competition and deregulation, while SMEs and startups benefit from the 
lower barriers to entry and broad based supports leading to sustainable or exceptional 
growth. 
Hypotheses: Norway 
Norway remains committed to statist social democratic institutions and policy 
predominantly through state involvement in the economy, labor rigidities, market 
protection, and directed funding. In the ICT sector, Norwegian statist social democracy 
tends to benefit large, incumbent firms over SMEs and startups. Thus, there are four core 
hypotheses with corroborative conditions supporting the argument for Norwegian ICT 
intra-sectoral dualism: 
HN1: Norwegian state involvement in the economy continues to support large, 
incumbent firms. The largest enterprises in Norway are all either partially or 
majority owned by the government as part of a strategic plan for long-term 
growth and stability. Consequently, supports for SMEs, startups, and other non-
strategic firms and industries are limited, exacerbated by the limited interaction 
between the two firm types. Supporting evidence: high incidence of SOEs, high 
ownership in financial markets, high concentration of large firms in the ICT 
sector, and high R&D concentration for large firms/strategic sectors. 
Findings for HN1:  
Norway has consistently “taken care of their own” in sponsoring national 
champions, regardless of the industry. Public sector ownership of all shareholdings stands 
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at 35 percent, far exceeding other OECD countries including France, Italy, and Sweden. 
In ICT, the largest firms comprised of Telenor and Evry are state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) that not only benefit from protected domestic markets but also access foreign 
markets using state provided capital. The dominance of large, incumbent firms does not 
eliminate the standing of several SMEs in the region with the ICT sector having a 
comparable composition of SMEs to that of Denmark. As already noted, however, the 
difference is in scalability with relatively few supports available for SMEs to grow 
revenues and employment. The intended purpose of organizations like Innovation 
Norway is to provide the necessary support to innovative ventures and especially SMEs, 
though less innovative traditional industries receive the lion’s share of support and 
funding flows to those areas where ICT development is less pronounced. 
With SOEs relatively secure in their standing, they have little incentive to develop 
innovative competencies through interaction with promising startups. Because startups 
lack the support required to scale, they effectively operate outside of established sectors 
within the Norwegian economy, lacking the visibility and inclusion required for SOE 
inter-firm collaboration. The few startups that do emerge and are able to grow rapidly 
often benefit from state-supported research and development institutions or are spun out 
from existing SOEs as in the case of Opera software. In either case, insiders have a clear 
advantage over other startups. Those operating outside of the SOE network rely on 
limited private and public supports that are far more developed in Denmark. 
HN2: Statist social democracy includes labor incentives favoring large, incumbent 
firms over SMEs and startups. Due in part to Dutch disease, SOEs, government 
wage setting, and informal labor restrictions, SMEs and startups are unable to 
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extend the salaries and stability provided by large incumbent firms. Supporting 
evidence: high concentration of firms in ICT sector, income differentials, low 
labor mobility, low labor mobility between incumbent firms and SMEs/startups, 
competition for scarce professionals, limited entrepreneurship, fewer founders, 
and a less developed startup community. 
Findings for HN2:  
The concentrated power of Norwegian SOEs and related large enterprises further 
constrains SME and startup growth by setting pay wages above the prevailing market. 
Wages at Statoil are 15.1 percent above ICT sector averages and include other benefits 
including employment stability. Other large SOEs like DNB, Norsk Hydro, Statkraft, and 
Telenor offer comparable incentives in the competition for scarce qualified labor, all of 
which then extends into the private sector through professional services procurement 
from large established ICT consultancies. ICT consultancies provide higher wages and 
employment stability as well but derive their competitive advantage primarily from 
aggressive college recruitment programs. 
Labor market freedom in Norway is significantly lower than that of Denmark, 
though most respondents found the ICT sector labor market to be relatively open and 
fluid. An important aspect of labor freedom entails the degree of unionization and wage 
coordination. Norway is distinct in that it has the lowest unionization rates across the 
Nordics and professional workers, including those in ICT, have some of the lowest 
unionization rates. Unionization in the public sector, however, is very high and in excess 
of 80 percent. Wage negotiations by government employees then direct private sector 
wages through government procurement especially for large, incumbent firms who win 
the majority of contracts. Because of their protected status and government support, large 
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incumbent ICT firms are able to meet wage requirements, whereas SMEs and startups are 
not. In every case, the Norwegian ICT labor market is relatively tight with large, 
established firms having a significant advantage in securing the best ICT professionals 
over SMEs and startups. 
HN3: The Norwegian economy maintains market protections limiting competition 
to a small number of large, incumbent firms. Because of the concentration of 
large SOEs, TNCs, and government agencies along with regional biases, 
contracting tends to favor the largest ICT firms and local providers. Supporting 
evidence: high barriers to entry, extensive contracting requirements, high 
incidence of SOEs, high concentration of large firms in the ICT sector, limited 
number of firms winning service contracts, higher domestic market focus, and 
service contracts between firms with shared ownership. 
Findings for HN3:  
Entrenched statism further grounds large incumbent firms through state 
ownership, protected markets, and limited competition in government procurement. 
Statism extends to government itself where ICT departments within government agencies 
have not undergone privatization as they have in Denmark. As with SOEs and incumbent 
ICT firms, government ICT workers are protected from the endemic restructuring found 
in Danish ICT. Worker protections offered by government agencies further undermine 
competitive labor markets with SMEs and startups unable to offer comparable incentives 
in either wages or employment stability. In domestic markets, few SMEs and startups 
have the access comparable to the large incumbent firms. Those that do are regionally 
confined due to informal institutions limiting competition across the country, further 
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constraining SME and startup growth, as cluster formation remains relatively fragmented 
and aligned with dominant industries. 
Respondents repeatedly noted the inability of SMEs and startups to access 
government ICT projects, due in part to the required scalability of large firms but also 
informal relations privileging large incumbents. Competition for government ICT 
contracts has increased in recent years, though rival TNCs like Accenture are gaining 
market share, not SMEs or startups. Large incumbents benefit from regionalization 
effects, partially due to Norway’s reliance on natural resources but also due to political 
balkanization ceding a large degree of autonomy to local kommunes. For SMEs and 
especially startups, these firms are concentrated in the metropolitan area of greater Oslo 
where protectionism is less pronounced, especially for SMEs and startups lacking the size 
and influence to gain said protections.  
HN4: The Norwegian government directs innovation funding toward other ends 
but not in support of ICT SMEs and startups. State funding disproportionately 
favors low innovation sectors, established firms, and remote regions where ICT 
firms are less prevalent. Supporting evidence: higher funding for non-ICT 
sectors, higher funding for low innovation sectors, higher funding for incumbent 
firms, and higher funding in remote regions where ICT development is limited. 
Findings for HN4:  
While large incumbent firms have access to formal financial markets and direct 
investment by the state, SMEs and startups are mostly limited to government funding 
programs. Innovation Norway is the largest such entity and yet an external review of the 
combined 10-year history of funding allocations showed the ICT sector receiving just 
NOK 995.5M in grants and loans or 5.4 percent of the NOK 18.5T total. Further, 
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Innovation Norway allocates four times as much funding to existing enterprises as it does 
to entrepreneurs and startups. The combined effects have relegated the large number of 
SMEs and startups to organic growth reliant on retained earnings and personal loans. 
The imbalances in funding allocations would be plausible if Innovation Norway 
maintained a practice of financial responsibility. However, the agency was unable to 
account for more than NOK 1B in funding since 2005 and had bankruptcy rates 15 
percentage points higher than reported. Innovation Norway has since restructured under 
the new conservative government and has committed to increasing funding for 
entrepreneurship and innovation. However, the new guidance makes no claim as to which 
industries will benefit from the new funding instruments. 
Commonalities of Danish and Norwegian ICT development 
The aforementioned arguments affirm the presence of institutional and policy 
divergence leading to intra-sectoral dualism in Danish and Norwegian ICT. The 
preference for SMEs and startups in Denmark as opposed to large incumbents in Norway 
helps to explain the relatively lower aggregate outcomes, as compared to Finland and 
Sweden. Beyond the dynamics of intra-sectoralism, there are other conditions common to 
both countries that could direct outcomes as well. Most immediately, aspects of inter-
sectoral dualism also obtain in both countries with industry supports privileging 
traditional industries over emerging sectors like ICT. Second, and related to the first, ITP 
policy prioritizes generalized objectives including ICT infrastructure diffusion and 
industry/government automation over more direct supports to the sector. Divergent ITP 
policies have led to intra-sectoral dualism in Denmark and Norway as noted throughout 
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the analysis. However, when compared with more activist ITP in Finland, supports for 
the ICT sector are less pronounced. Lastly, the promotion of Danish and Norwegian ICT 
remains relatively insignificant with employer and employee associations playing a 
modest role in profiling ICT domestically and internationally. 
Owing to path dependency, Denmark and Norway continue to support leading 
industries like shipping and food processing in the former and oil & gas and aquaculture 
in the latter. Longstanding factor endowments and supporting institutional structures 
entrench path dependency, hindering efforts to develop new industries. The confounding 
aspect in Danish and Norwegian sectoral development, however, is that both countries 
have sponsored emerging sectors, especially in renewable energy. Respondents from both 
countries consistently noted government apprehension regarding direct supports for ICT 
due to previous failures following the minicomputer crash in the early 1980s and the 
dot.com collapse of 2000. Notwithstanding the understandable apprehension in 
supporting volatile industries, the success of Finland and Sweden coupled with long-term 
growth trends in ICT begs the question as to why Denmark and Norway have forgone 
more activist policies the ICT sector. 
As a subset of wider policy advancement, Danish and Norwegian ITP share 
common priorities in advancing ICT infrastructure diffusion and automation over more 
direct sectoral supports. Relative affluence in both countries engenders increasing levels 
of and quality in ICT infrastructure, especially for broadband services. Broadband access 
is considered a right in both countries, although policies supportive of increased diffusion 
lead to diminishing returns with diffusion rates reaching near saturation. Consequently, 
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public efforts aimed at enhancing or complementing private sector initiatives may be 
counterproductive as in the case of Telenor’s government-sponsored initiative to bring 
high speed broadband to the Arctic Archipelago Svalbard. 
Owing in part to high wages, the Danish and Norwegian governments also use 
ITP to increase operational efficiency. The dilemma in every instance is that ITP 
becomes more like AP (automation policy) with relatively few gains in technological 
advancement and/or wider innovation. Respondents in both countries state that 
government automation programs under ITP seek cost effective solutions, not innovation. 
The innovations that do come from government initiatives are often bespoke solutions 
with limited opportunities for commercialization. Standouts like the Danish startup 
Tradeshift with its e-billing solution borne from an initial government contract are the 
exception, not the rule and are only possible when founders leave government contract 
work to sponsor their own product development. 
In promotion, the global recognition of Finnish and Swedish ICT compared with  
their Danish and Norwegian counterparts is telling. Finland established one of Europe’s 
largest and most successful technology startup conferences, Slush, while Ericsson 
promotes Nordic technology through partnerships with global partners including 
Facebook. Danish and Norwegian ICT firms lack comparable recognition even with high-
profile collaborations such as Telenor’s partnership with Muhammad Yunus in support of 
Grameen Phone or entertainer Jay-Z’s acquisition of the music streaming service Tidal. 
Danish and Norwegian ICT lacks international and domestic prominence due to the 
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relatively muted promotional support of government agencies and instead relies on the 
limited efforts of employer and employee associations. 
Taken together, intra-sectoral dynamics overshadow inter-sectoral dualism but 
they could complement one another in lowering aggregate outcomes. The counterfactual 
examples of Finland and Sweden lend support to the argument with relatively greater 
success in sector development, due to the institutional and policy support received 
precisely because the sector is recognized as a major contributor to economic 
advancement. While intra and inter sectoral dualism remain fixtures in Danish and 
Norwegian ICT, Nordic pragmatism offers potential opportunities to reorient institutions 
and direct policy in more productive ways to realize improved outcomes in sector 
development. The concluding chapter reviews the options available for additional 
research relevant in understanding potential pathways for ICT sector development in 
Denmark, Norway, and other areas of promise.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
In this concluding chapter I reiterate how Nordic social democracy can be a 
powerful catalyst in developing knowledge economies. However, there are wider 
implications for Nordic knowledge economy development. Therefore, I also identify 
proximate areas beyond the ICT sector that could further inform our understanding of 
Nordic knowledge sector development. Beyond the Nordics, there are also potential 
research opportunities in broader ICT development. The intentionally limited scope of the 
research project sought to draw out various firm dynamics leading to the identification of 
intra-sectoral dualism to explain lower aggregate outcomes in Danish and Norwegian 
ICT production. Intra-sectoral dualism operating within the knowledge economy is one 
such process that can enrich our understanding of how institutions and policy operate 
differently for certain economic actors and lead to variable outcomes. 
Conclusions 
More than 50 years ago Gerschenkron extended the cautionary advice that “There 
are no four-lane highways through the parks of industrial progress” (1962, 29). 
Gerschenkron’s warning is more relevant now than it was then with developed and 
developing economies experimenting with institutional and policy change with the 
intention of realizing enhanced growth, technology prominence, and wider wellbeing. As 
leading countries in fostering innovation and knowledge society advancement, the 
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Nordics demonstrate the viability of social democracy toward these ends through human 
capital investment, societal supports, and pragmatic governance. While the 
accomplishments of the Nordics are indeed laudable, each country continues to exhibit 
variable outcomes due to institutional and policy differentiation. Thus, the general 
contours of the Nordic model demonstrate a proven path in knowledge economy 
development but that intraregional divergence can lead to suboptimal outcomes through 
intra-sectoral dualism.  
This chapter documents the challenges of intra-sector dualism in which a single 
development strategy can engender countervailing factors lowering aggregate outcomes. 
Three perspectives along a spectrum of contemporary research offer potential insights 
into reconciling this dilemma. However, each has its own limitations. Structuralist 
arguments rightly stress the directing role of institutions and the importance of coherence 
and complementarity. They are, however, unable fully to explain the strong performance 
of the Nordics without also acknowledging institutional heterogeneity, adaptation, and 
actor agency. Operating from a middle position, agency-centered theorists find the 
potential for sector advancement under institutional heterogeneity, enabling 
entrepreneurial actors to carve out new opportunities under less constraining domestic 
structures. The empirical evidence for Denmark and Norway, however, shows limited 
room to move by economic actors and that institutions and policies enable opportunities 
for certain actors while constraining them for others. For these reasons, the systems of 
innovation literature offers considerable insight into the unique conditions of the Nordics 
and elsewhere by recognizing multiple aspects including structural rigidities, firm 
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agency, and codetermination in directing sector outcomes. That said, the systems of 
innovation approach is just that: a way to identify relevant factors and contingent 
processes but often with only limited localized application. 
The conclusion of this study is that institutions and policy do matter but operate 
differently depending on the type of firm. The analysis began with a structuralist 
approach in asserting unidirectional causality between institutions, policy, firm behavior, 
and sector outcomes. Danish incumbent firms, SMEs, and startups are all institution 
takers. Large firms accept the reduction if not elimination of sector supports even though 
doing so has led to the absence of an ICT lighthouse firm, corporate restructuring, the 
privatization of government ICT services, employment redundancies, and continued 
acquisitions by efficiency-driven TNCs. Conversely, SMEs and startups positively 
leverage broad-based liberal reforms including fluid labor markets, low barriers to entry, 
limited regulatory oversight, and access to seed funding. Norwegian ICT firms as well 
have been institutional takers with large incumbents still benefiting from protected 
markets, state ownership, and favorable wage rigidities. Norwegian SMEs and startups 
proliferate but few realize exceptional growth and most that do are limited to local 
markets and financing options. 
Firm agency factors into the analysis, though to a lesser degree, and more often in 
line with dominant institutions and policy. Danish large incumbents readily accept 
acquisition by foreign TNCs and/or international fund managers as evidenced in the 
purchase of TDC by a United States hedge fund consortium and the divestiture of the 
federal data center to U.S.-based CSC. Firm agency is most prevalent in the Danish ICT 
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startup community with entrepreneurs eclectically blending traditional and alternative 
institutions, greatly extended through increased liberalization. Danish startups leverage 
international capital, talent, and networks to access global markets and realize high 
growth. While liberalization compels Danish ICT entrepreneurs to look abroad, founders 
routinely return to Denmark to leverage the positive aspects of Danish cooperation within 
an established startup community. 
Norwegian ICT firms also act independently to realize additional growth, but the 
dynamics vary between large incumbents and SMEs/startups. As a protected local 
incumbent carrier, Telenor actively pursued external markets with the support of state-
funded capital. IT service firms Evry and Atea also benefit from state- funded capital and 
protected markets in pursuing market opportunities across the Nordics and Baltics 
through either service contracts or acquisitions. Norwegian SMEs and startups have been 
less successful in adopting alternative strategies and several of those that have did so by 
commercializing high technology advancements funded in part by state and local 
research institutions, not private sector R&D. 
Finally, the ICT sectors in Denmark and Norway are fluid environments with 
seemingly counterintuitive characteristics that belie both structuralist and actor-centric 
causal arguments. The Nordic model is in fact a distinct entity with its own operating 
logic that continually adjusts to small state realities in an increasingly interconnected 
global economy. Danish adherence to the highest tax rates in the OECD appears 
antithetical to increasing liberalization in support of high growth enterprises until one 
realizes that several Danish entrepreneurs are motivated to build exceptional firms, not 
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necessarily to gain extraordinary profits. Similarly, in Norway low relative unionization 
rates indicate that society is guided by regional priorities and informal institutions, 
partially obviating the need for national collective bargaining in certain sectors like ICT. 
Norwegian decentralization further enables the development of regional centers of 
excellence benefitting from informal market protections but also enabling access to 
external markets. Additional comparative research on the Nordics and other highly 
innovative knowledge economies should thus recognize the inherent diversity and 
complexity of such environments and eclectically sample from a variety of comparative 
approaches. 
Implications 
The primary finding of the research project is that intra-sectoral dualism explains 
suboptimal outcomes through the differentiated effects of institutions and policy on 
certain actors. The immediate implications of these findings apply to researchers and 
policy analysts interested in understanding knowledge economy development and the 
potential for unfavorable or unintended consequences from what might appear to be 
undifferentiated institutions and policies. Top-level macro analyses offer a starting point 
in identifying general institutional and policy frameworks and corresponding sector 
outcomes. They are, however, insufficient in discerning less obvious patterns like intra-
sectoral dualism, which requires micro-foundational research examining a wider set of 
variables and differentiating the effects on various actors. 
Given their relatively small size in global ICT, the cases selected may appear to 
offer limited insights for comparativists interested in knowledge sector development. 
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Denmark and Norway, however, are critical cases of small states engaged in pragmatic 
adaptation to advance highly innovative enterprises but with suboptimal outcomes due to 
intra-sectoral dualism. As Thelen rightly noted, the domains involved in comparative 
institutional enquiry are generally recognized while dynamics and outcomes remain 
unresolved (2012). The study examined the most relevant institutions and policy 
instruments using approaches widely recognized in the field but could only explain 
outcomes through the dynamics of intra-sectoral dualism. Viewed in this light, intra-
sectoral dualism can operate in any number of potential contexts whether at the local, 
regional, or state level or for various sectors and industries but especially those 
undergoing significant and/or rapid transformation. 
Additional research opportunities and possible future developments 
The objective of this research project is to increase the collective understanding of 
how institutions and policy direct outcomes in the knowledge economy. My interests for 
the project are twofold: to focus on ICT sector development and Nordic 
institutional/policy effectiveness leading to that end. I selected the ICT sector because of 
its highly innovative character, opportunities for economic growth, and catalytic potential 
through wider positive externalities. I relegated my case selection to the Nordics because 
they stand apart from other developed economies with exceptional innovation and 
technological advancement but with differentiated internal characteristics and outcomes. 
While the project fulfilled its mandate, additional research possibilities exist on either 
side of the causal equation in exploring general aspects of ICT sector development and/or 
future prospects for the Nordic model, especially in Denmark and Norway. 
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Because ICT is a high growth, rapid innovation, and globally diffused sector with 
increasing relevance in all aspects of economic activity, discerning the necessary 
conditions for its development is an increasingly complex endeavor exacerbated by the 
proliferation of standing institutional and policy models. The first priority for additional 
research is to improve the definitional coherence of ICT and clarify the operating 
dynamics of ICT itself. The sectoral systems of innovation literature directed at ICT did 
the most extensive work in this area. However, research becomes quickly dated, 
outpacing our ability to discern meaningful causation with contemporary relevance. More 
focused research distinguishing the multifold aspects of ICT could lead to the 
development of synthetic classifications reflecting durable and persistent trends more 
amenable to a range of institutional and policy models. 
A necessary scope limitation of this analysis is the focus on the ICT sector 
without examining in detail the related areas of ICT-intensive industries, ICT demand, or 
noncommercial ICT use and development. Viewing the entire range of ICT development 
and use could offer new insights into the contexts in which whole societies contribute to 
and benefit from ICT. Outside of operational domains, the ICT sector and related areas 
remains  heterogeneous catchall category with diverse industries and organizations 
undergoing aspects of both convergence and differentiation. One approach to 
rationalizing ICT diversity is to identify a unifying aspect with the ability to transform all 
domains including services, manufacturing, telecommunications, media, and computing. 
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Software offers a compelling point of entry given its ubiquity, intangibility, and 
location independence. Mobile communication is another possibility with observed 
diffusion rates greater than any other technology in human history. However, software 
continues to transform our interaction with ICT and the range of potential application. By 
starting with software development and its inter-industry connections within ICT, 
researchers could then develop the definitional coherence and operational clarity required 
for subsequent analyses on where development occurs and under which conditions. To do 
so will require comparative institutionalists to engage in more interdisciplinary work that 
includes core technologists and organizational experts more qualified at analyzing and 
interpreting activities within the wider field of ICT. 
Comparativists can then perform macro inductive analyses that align factor 
endowments, institutions, and policies from specific locations with instances of ICT 
development or the lack thereof. Brazil, China, Germany, France, India, Israel, South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates are all examples of rising if 
not established technology centers with diverse institutional and policy environments. 
The objective is to identify typologies of technology centers and characteristics as they 
coevolve in diverse locations. The immediate challenge in so doing is the unit of analysis 
dilemma wherein domestic or even international institutions yield relatively less 
influence in directing broad-based ICT development. The United States is the most 
obvious example with several technology centers dispersed throughout the country, many 
of which benefit from local institutions and policy. Still, the method employed in this 
analysis recognizes top-level domestic institutional and policy conditions moderated 
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through lower level regions and specific economic actors. The method, then, remains the 
same beginning with high-level macro analysis to identify potential areas of inquiry 
followed by micro-foundational assessments using multiple levels of analysis and a wider 
set of variables and dynamics.  
The second opportunity for additional research is within the Nordics themselves 
and the open question of whether the region can sustain social democracy by advancing 
knowledge sectors within the wider economy. As an example, Finland demonstrates the 
limits of social democracy and knowledge economy development with stagnant growth 
rates even while Nokia transitions into the largest telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer and ICT startups gain international prominence and market share. The ICT 
sector is in fact a relatively small contributor to total employment in every Nordic 
country and while spillover effects are significant, large segments within the Nordics 
remain less competitive exhibiting low productivity and structural unemployment. Thus, 
the next question for researchers to assess is the inter-sectoral and intra-societal dualism 
between innovative enterprises and the remaining segments of the Nordic economy and 
society. 
All of the Nordics pursue strategies to increase ICT diffusion and use to 
strengthen wider competitiveness through technological advancement and cost 
containment. This study has focused on the former, however, the latter is as relevant if 
not more so for sustaining the Nordic model. Low skill jobs are the most amenable to 
automation by providing efficiency improvements on the one hand but increased 
unemployment on the other. Remediation options then fall to traditional redistribution, 
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reskilling, or both as a means to support those impacted by occupational obsolescence. 
The Nordics will continue to utilize both options, generally privileging redistribution for 
those workers outside the labor force and reskilling others still in it. Demographic shifts 
complicate the traditional social democratic response to economic displacement while 
increased immigration offers a potential solution but with its own challenges in the 
Nordic context. 
Excluding demographic shifts and immigration challenges, technological 
advancement then offers the most promising potential for sustaining the Nordic model. 
Consistent attributes across the region include high levels of quality education, high rates 
of ICT diffusion and use, increasing automation of the private and public sector, and 
durable though variable rates of technology sector development. Because of these factors, 
the Nordics consistently rank high in competitiveness and innovation indices, however, 
sustainable productivity and growth remain persistent challenges for every country in the 
region and for developed countries generally. The apparent duality is partly manifest in 
the relative affluence leading to lowered competiveness, though it may also represent the 
limits of active ITP within social democratic economies. Research investigating whether 
rising education levels, ICT use, and automation are actually forms of consumption rather 
than investment would qualify the limits of technological advancement in sustaining the 
Nordic model. 
Beyond the wider question of Nordic social democratic sustainability, Denmark 
and Norway remain critical cases within the Nordics for understanding 
institutional/policy adaptation and the impacts on knowledge economy sectors. For 
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Denmark, the open debate is whether the country has reached the limits of liberalization 
and the associated benefits in so doing. Denmark lacks the necessary capital of its richer 
cousin Norway to utilize fully the liberalizing reforms already adopted. In effect, 
Denmark might be “pushing on a string” whereby any and all institutional/policy shifts 
yield diminishing returns due to limited factor endowments. Additional FDI and net 
immigration of high skilled guest workers with a path to citizenship could complement 
existing reforms, though would require additional liberalization, including substantial 
reductions in corporate and individual tax rates and major changes to immigration policy.  
Every respondent noted the impracticality of either possibility, even with the 
recent election of a conservative government. The new government is likely to propose 
limited reductions in corporate tax rates but also campaigned on an anti-immigration 
platform. As an initial overture on immigration policy, the government recently 
announced more stringent language requirements, a revised and more extensive 
citizenship test, and a raised standard for proving self-sufficiency (Christian 2015b). That 
said, globalization presents its own opportunities for balancing domestic social 
democracy with liberalization in specific areas. ICT firms can remain in Denmark by 
accessing international capital and labor markets through new modalities. Denmark 
already has a high percentage of international VC/PE, complemented with access to the 
world’s second largest equity market through the NASDAQ OMX exchange. Further, 
nearly every firm interviewed utilized offshore talent through arm’s-length contracting. 
With more powerful and ubiquitous ICT, the trend should continue to increase. 
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 Thus, Denmark is a work in progress as it dynamically reorients its economy to 
improve its position in the global economy. Research identifying the most active agents 
directing institution/policy change and the associated outcomes in productivity, growth, 
and social equity could indicate the mechanisms underpinning Nordic pragmatism and 
the possibilities for sustaining social democracy. Denmark has repeatedly been in the 
vanguard in implementing reforms that were later adopted by the other Nordics. How it 
has done so, whether doing so will preserve social democracy, and if the other Nordics 
will follow remains an open and important research question for the region and in 
understanding the varieties of capitalism. 
It is difficult to envision Norway maintaining its significant state involvement in 
the domestic economy and commitments to traditional social democracy without the 
support of abundant oil and gas reserves. Given the precipitous decline in energy prices 
compounded by Norway’s declining reserves, the country is now at a critical juncture in 
which longstanding commitments to the Norwegian model of economic development will 
be challenged with multiple potential outcomes. Norway’s development path over the 
recent past has been to carve out deep domains in niche industries reflecting historical 
factor endowments and path dependency. As such, it has become a global competitor in 
aluminum production, aquaculture, maritime, and offshore engineering technology, as 
well as oil and gas through its state-supported national champions. The question 
unanswered is then whether these industries will provide the necessary economic growth 
and employment opportunities to support current standards of living and government 
consumption under conditions of declining oil and gas revenues. 
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Norway’s potential options are manifold. The current strategy appears to be a 
“doubling down” in support of existing industries through directed investment, 
infrastructure, skill development, and other forms of assistance while developing new 
opportunities in related sectors. The benefit in so doing is the limited disruption to 
existing economic institutions, leading firms, and productive capabilities. However, the 
risks associated with limited sectoral diversity could make an eventual economic 
correction more severe. The alternative strategy is to focus on the development of new 
industries where Norwegian firms have an established but limited presence in global 
markets. Two immediate opportunities with mutual complementarities are in financial 
services and ICT. 
Through its sovereign wealth fund, national pension, and domestic financial 
institutions, Norway has the critical mass to become a regional financial center. It is now 
a global investor with the intellectual capital necessary to underwrite new equity listings 
and manage large portfolios for private clients. To increase its relevance in global capital 
management Norway would need to offer more competitive services and investment 
returns in relation to its more established regional competitors like the United Kingdom. 
Norway has already privatized its stock exchange and partnered with exchanges in 
London, Singapore, and Toronto. Still, the exchange remains dominated by large 
domestic firms and significant holdings by the state, consequently limiting the pool of 
capital and potential valuations for new listings. In fund management, it is again the state 
that holds the overwhelming share of total assets and the associated intellectual capital, 
with relatively few private fund managers and limited assets to invest. 
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Through its multiple holdings, investment vehicles, and fund managers, Norway 
has proven to be a capable international investor. To become a regional financial center, 
however, Norway first needs to divest itself of existing SOEs and domestic portfolio 
holdings. By so doing it will increase the share of capital available for underwriting new 
equity listings, preferably for international firms interested in relocating to Norway. 
Limited divestiture could then catalyze flows of additional investment capital expanding 
growth opportunities for existing incumbents and growing the private investment banking 
industry. Norway could also move to devolve fund management away from the existing, 
highly consolidated, state operated structure to one that includes private fund managers. 
The move would further increase both the size of capital available for investments and 
the associated private investment banking industry. Symbiotic development would then 
help to sustain a growing ecosystem and lead to the creation of a viable regional financial 
center. 
Highly correlated with financial center development is ICT sector development. 
The two sectors complement one another as increasing flows of capital and complexity in 
financial instruments require higher order ICT capabilities for transmission and 
computation. As a high growth sector, ICT as well requires extensive and deep financial 
markets to incubate new technologies and scale growth companies. As an example, the 
NASDAQ was the first online exchange with a large number of technology companies 
and is now the second largest exchange in the world. Financial services in Norway are 
already highly automated and Norwegian ICT is concentrated in a handful of large 
services firms with the capabilities required to support a regional financial center. 
 
  250 
Positive externalities would then extend to ICT startups through increased access to risk-
based capital, knowledgeable investors, and a viable path to public listing. 
For such a scenario to develop several factors would need to be addressed – all of 
which entail significant questions for the political economy of Norway. First, Norway is 
already a capital abundant country with little incentive to curry additional flows of capital 
in support of a regional financial center. Second, SOEs and publicly held funds have 
historically performed well, limiting movements toward divestiture or privatization. 
Third, the SOEs themselves enjoy a privileged position within the domestic and 
international economy and would ostensibly resist movements to change the status quo. 
Fourth, the ICT industry operates as a duopoly between a very small number of protected 
service firms and a long tail of SMEs and startups. As with the SOEs, the large services 
firms would actively move against increased competition for existing and new service 
contracts. An exogenous shock like the current depressed price of petroleum could 
provide the necessary impetus to drive divestiture and privatization if prices remain low 
enough for an extended period and Norway’s reserves prove less productive than 
expected. That said, institutions and policy are not easily unmade and radical change in a 
conservative country like Norway is rare. 
In conclusion, the potential pathways for Nordic social democracy and high 
technology development are still being mapped out. The Nordics demonstrate the 
political will to experiment, compromise, and adapt in an effort to address ongoing 
change but with the expectation of deep uncertainty. Denmark and Norway are unique 
cases in that their pathways have been relatively unambiguous through increasing 
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liberalization in the former and statist social democracy in the latter. The consequences in 
so doing have operated differently for certain actors within the ICT sector, engendering 
intra-sectoral dualism and suboptimal aggregate outcomes. In most every instance, the 
evidence indicates deliberate intentions toward these ends leaving the ongoing question 
as to whose interests these movements serve and whether either outcome will ultimately 
lead to outcomes more comparable to the other Nordics. 
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APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW RESPONSES (DEIDENTIFIED) 
Ref	 Seq	 Loc	 Comment	
1	 1	 SE	 Sweden	is	more	hierarchical	and	Denmark	is	more	consensual.	Sweden	focuses	on	global	markets	
whereas	Denmark	on	local.	
1	 2	 DK	 Denmark	was	very	liberal	50	years	ago	but	has	become	more	socialist.	
1	 3	 DK	 Danes	are	suspicious	of	success.	
1	 4	 SE	 Leaders	have	made	changes:	the	CEO	of	SAS	led	privatization	in	Sweden.	
1	 5	 DK	 IT	is	relatively	unregulated.	
1	 6	 DK	 Challenges	in	entrepreneurship:	failure	is	perceived	to	not	be	an	option.	
1	 7	 DK	 Labor	mobility	does	exist	but	there	are	two	tracks:	either	moving	around	established	firms	or	
startup	but	not	both.	
1	 8	 DK	 Bankruptcy	laws	do	not	absolve	liability.	This	then	makes	entrepreneurs	more	risk	averse	and	
requires	self-financing	and	organic	growth	
1	 9	 DK	 Firm	startup	is	expensive	but	this	is	changing.	New	laws	are	making	it	easier	to	setup	a	firm	
1	 10	 DK	 Acquisition	as	an	exit	strategy	persists,	mainly	because	domestic	markets	are	so	small	
1	 11	 DK	 'Janteloven'	persists:	you	are	not	to	think	You	are	anyone	special	or	that	You	are	better	than	us	
1	 12	 DK	 Research:	still	directed	toward	academic	life	as	opposed	to	private	ventures.	IP	licensing	is	
consequently	limited.	
1	 13	 DK	 Financing	is	the	most	limiting	aspect	with	government	funding	currently	limited.	This	also	applies	
to	student	groups	interested	in	innovation	and	entrepreneurship	
1	 14	 DK	 Policy	change	has	been	helpful	but	is	slow	and	at	the	margins.	Cultural	acceptance	is	slowly	
improving	as	well.	
1	 15	 DK	 ITB:	more	interested	in	big	firms	then	SMEs.	
1	 16	 DK	 Policy		
1	 17	 DK	 Change	is	coming	from	new	entrepreneurs	not	established	firms	(i.e.	bottom	up).	
1	 18	 DK	 More	incubation	efforts	at	the	student	level:	advice,	business	registration,	funding.	
1	 19	 DK	 CIEL,	IDA:	BOOKMARKED	
2	 1	 DK	 Startups:	easy	in	Denmark	however	the	problem	is	moving	to	1M	DKK.	There	are	seed	funds	and	
venture	capital	but	greater	funds	are	lacking.	
2	 2	 DK	 Establishing/closing	firms:	both	are	easy,	however	firm	closure	is	difficult	if	you	have	liabilities.	
2	 3	 DK	 Organic	growth:	limited	by	constraints	on	capital	accumulation	(through	taxation).	Thus,	by	the	
time	an	individual	has	accumulated	sufficient	capital,	they	are	too	old	and	now	risk	adverse.	One	
option	could	allow	borrowing	against	pensions	as	in	Singapore.	
2	 4	 DK	 Regulation:	very	limited	and	tax	policy	(while	unfavorable)	is	streamlined.	Most	legal	affairs	can	be	
conducted	without	requiring	a	lawyer.	Social	trust	obviates	the	need	for	legal	entanglements.	
2	 5	 DK	 Taxation:	limited	reforms	like	corporate	tax	but	major	reforms	are	off	the	table.	
2	 6	 DK	 Culture:	Danes	make	more	knee-jerk	decisions	than	thinking	longer-term	strategy.	
2	 7	 DK	 Welfare	state:	provides	disincentives	for	innovation	and	firm	growth,	ultimately	unsustainable.	
2	 8	 DK	 Government	spin-offs:	ISS	(cleaning	crews)	and	security,	better	than	other	countries:	France.	
2	 9	 DK	 Dominant	industry:	collectives	in	agriculture	with	connections	to	pharmaceuticals.	
2	 10	 DK	 DSV	(logistics)	and	Carlsberg	are	notable	exceptions	of	Danish	self-starters.	
3	 1	 DK	 Northstar	Project:	initiative	by	legal	counsel	to	move	investment	to	Nordics	through	increased	
exposure.	
3	 2	 DK	 Microsoft	presence:	FAST,	Skype,	Navision,	and	Nokia	
3	 3	 DK	 IT	issues:	not	a	priority	of	government,	limited	market	focus	(mostly	domestic),	limited	financing,	
and	competition	for	talent.	
3	 4	 DK	 IT	policy	solutions:	more	graduates	and	increase	connections	with	government.	
3	 5	 DK	 IT	policy:	new	innovation	strategy	from	ministry	to	scale	bureaucratic	requirements	down	to	
enable	more	collaborators.	
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3	 7	 DK	 Labor	market:	very	fluid	but	primarily	due	to	scarce	talent.	Microsoft	has	many	internal	mobility	
schemes	and	those	that	leave	are	always	welcome	back.	
3	 8	 DK	 Inter-firm	dynamics:	robust	collaboration	through	partner	network.	It	is	rare	to	work	with	startups.	
3	 9	 DK	 Outreach:	'Clover'	program	to	expand	Microsoft	footprint	through	community	engagement.	
3	 10	 DK	 Incentives:	Wages	are	not	competitive.	Stock	options	are	offered	but	taxation	treats	them	the	
same	as	regular	income.	
3	 11	 DK	 Navision:	most	innovative	because	of	highly	efficient	coding:	10x	faster	than	competitors.	
3	 12	 DK	 REPSONDENT	has	a	background	in	math	and	economics.	Previously	worked	in	public	affairs	for	
TDC.	
3	 13	 DK	 Microsoft	has	received	unfavorable	press	for	a	suit	claiming	unmet	tax	liabilities	($1B)	after	moving	
IP	from	Denmark	to	subsidiary	in	Ireland.		
4	 1	 DK	 Launching	a	startup	is	ok	if	you	are	successful.	Failure	is	not	an	option.	




4	 3	 DK	 ITEK	has	300	members	including	large	firms	and	startups	
4	 4	 DK	 Strengths	of	Danish	IT	are	early	and	widespread	technology	adoption	rates	(e.g.	Facebook	
subscriptions),	however	this	is	more	consumption	than	production.	
4	 5	 DK	 'Audi	A8	syndrome'	-	a	self-imposed	limit	on	success:	contentment.	IT	professionals	are	more	
interested	in	idea	creation	not	wealth	generation.	
4	 6	 DK	 Desire	is	to	have	major	firms/global	platforms,	although	establishing	mid-sized	firms	is	ok.	
4	 7	 DK	 Best	corrective	action:	priority	on	education	(broad	spectrum)	and	increase	EU	ICT	research	funds.	
That	said	local	R&D	is	'good'.	
4	 8	 DK	 Next	corrective	action:	make	bankruptcy	easier	and	less	costly.	
4	 9	 DK	 Education:	limited	labor	mobility	post	degree	(lock-in).	A	bachelor's	degree	is	now	insufficient.	
Goal	is	to	have	'T'	shaped	competencies	(depth	and	breadth),	however	this	is	still	rare.	
4	 10	 DK	 Problem:	acquisition	as	an	exit	strategy	is	very	prevalent.	This	affirms	the	desire	of	Danish	IT	firms	
to	stay	small	and	content.	
4	 11	 DK	 Most	startups	are	phony	ventures	used	to	access	funding	or	tap	social	services.	Those	that	are	
successful	do	so	in	spite	of	the	system.	
4	 12	 DK	 Government:	there	are	too	many	initiatives	to	start	a	business:	grants,	consultancy	services,	
education.	However,	there	is	also	considerable	administration	(paperwork)	required.	
4	 13	 DK	 Government:	established	'Growth	Teams'	for	many	sectors	but	not	initially	IT.	IT	was	trendy	in	the	
1990s	but	now	is	a	low	priority.	
4	 14	 DK	 Taxation:	reduction	in	corporate	tax	from	25	to	22%	from	left-center	government.		Does	not	affect	
banks	or	oil	companies.	
4	 15	 DK	 Inter-firm	dynamics:	competition	but	mostly	for	government	projects.	These	projects	are	not	
innovation-based	but	more	about	limiting	failure	through	exhaustive	requirements.	Digitization	of	
government	processes	is	the	priority,	or	so	it	is	said.	
4	 16	 DK	 Small	firms	are	(possibly)	more	like	those	in	Silicon	Valley:	a	milieu	forming	due	to	limited	head-to-
head	competition.	
4	 17	 DK	 Finance:	limits	in	the	middle	(good	seed	but	not	much	venture	capital).	Bank	financing	is	limited	
since	financial	crisis	and	largely	risk	adverse.	Bankers	may	not	understand	IT	business	models.	
Some	directed	government	financing.	
4	 18	 DK	 Substantial	gap	in	understanding	how	to	grow	firms.	Guidance	is	required.	
4	 19	 DK	 RESPONDENT	did	prior	work	with	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology	focused	on	ICT	policy	and	
telecommunications.	Did	speech	writing	and	political	operations.	
4	 20	 DK	 Priority	is	on	competition	as	a	fourth	skill	after	reading,	writing,	and	arithmetic.	
4	 21	 DK	 TDC	launched	Play,	a	Spotify-type	product	but	was	locked	into	TDC	(limited	growth).	YouSee	is	the	
cable	operator	offering	a	streaming	service.	
5	 1	 DK	 Risk:	easy	to	startup	and	fail	ONCE	but	no	second	chance.	
5	 2	 DK	 Jante's	Loven:	Norwegian	who	held	that	getting	ahead	is	suspicious.	
5	 3	 DK	 Government:	little	red	tape	limiting	startups;	effective	public	sector.		
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5	 4	 DK	 Acquisition:	the	three	largest	IT	firms	were	acquired	by	the	US:	Maersk	IT	-	IBM,	Infineon	Wireless	
Solutions	and	Giga	-	Intel,	and	Navision	-	Microsoft.	
5	 5	 DK	 Navision:	publically	listed,	then	acquired	Damgaard	(Axapta	product	from	IBM	joint	venture),	then	
acquired	by	Microsoft,	and	then	had	their	IP	transferred	to	Ireland.	
5	 6	 DK	 Navision:	a	cash	cow	product.	AX	is	being	pushed	with	five	verticals.	NAV	will	move	to	a	cloud	
solution	and	AX	will	utilize	the	new	architecture.	
5	 7	 DK	 Microsoft:	wanted	to	expand	GP	offering	but	was	limited	by	language	and	accounting	differences.	
Opted	for	acquisition	in	Denmark	and	Israel	then	rolled	out	versions	in	Germany,	Denmark,	and	
Spain.	Currently	have	40	versions	in	six	markets.	




5	 9	 DK	 CSC:	operations	in	Denmark	because	of	high	automation	and	redundancy.	One	labor	dispute		
5	 10	 DK	 IBM:	large	but	declining	presence.	AA	terminal	system	was	highly	innovative	but	unsuccessful.	
5	 11	 DK	 Stalled	innovation:	TDC	invented	the	first	semiautomatic	switch	but	was	the	last	to	adopt	fully	
automatic	switching.	
5	 12	 DK	 E-Boks.dk:	online	document	system	for	government	and	private	use.	Singapore	govt.	was	
interested.	
5	 13	 DK	 Strengths:	1)	high	level	of	education	and	good	number	of	engineers	and	managers,	2)	continued	
wage	increases	has	led	to	drive	for	automation,	3)	early	investment	in	IT,	especially	public	sector.	
5	 14	 DK	 Weaknesses:	1)	small	stock	exchange	and	2)	small	local	market.	
5	 15	 DK	 Opportunities:	continued	need	for	automation	in	DK,	EU	eGov	initiatives	(still	mostly	),	and	
offshoring	mixes	(utilize	local	domain	knowledge,	contract	the	rest).	
5	 16	 DK	 Early	investment:	1959	computing	center,	implemented	standard	system	for	Kommunes		
5	 17	 DK	 Universities:	slow	to	adapt	to	changes	in	demand.	In	the	early	80s,	enrolments	increased	rapidly	
but	with	low	graduation	rates.	CBS	implemented	a	two-year	degree	from	any	background	with	
mixed	results.	
5	 18	 DK	 NFS	Grundtvig:	advocated	lifelong	learning	(basic	literary	and	math)	in	1826	after	visiting	Oxford.	
Psalm:	everyone	else	can	have	the	mountains	and	the	valleys;	we'll	take	the	plains.	(E.g.	
importance	of	egalitarianism).	
5	 19	 DK	 1815	union	between	Denmark	and	Norway.	
6	 1	 DK	 Weaknesses:	1)	small	defense	sector	with	limited	spillover	potential,	2)	limited	state	direction,	3)	
limited	showcase	(assume	this	means	global	recognition),	and	4)	too	diffused.	
6	 2	 DK	 Challenge:	continued	low	productivity	in	overall	economy.	Need	to	keep	high	value-added	
manufacturing.	
6	 3	 DK	 Opportunities:	public	service	sector,	linkages	to	big	data,	open	source	community,	and	EU	
solutions.		
6	 4	 DK	 Jante's	law:	possibly	overstated.	
6	 5	 DK	 Work	organization:	collaboration,	communication,	teamwork,	and	competition.	
6	 6	 DK	 Organic:	tech	and	entrepreneur	parks	developed	organically	not	from	government.	
6	 7	 DK	 Skills:	more	technical	than	managerial.	
6	 8	 DK	 Welfare	state:	20	years	of	reform	moving	to	efficiencies.	Cuts	will	remain	limited,	no	
retrenchment.	
6	 9	 DK	 Government:	1985	established	nine	national	laboratories	for	product	development	linked	to	SMEs.	
2001	libs/cons	wanted	to	be	more	focused	in	strategic.	Late	2012	new	strategy	to	merge	three	
centers.	Continued	focus	on	basic	science.	
6	 10	 DK	 Tech	transfer:	academics	are	uninterested	and	firms	do	not	like	the	bureaucracy.		
6	 11	 DK	 Outsourcing:	remains	an	unsavory	option	for	both	labor	and	management.	Eastern	Europe	is	not	a	
threat.	No	desire	to	implement	protectionism	but	need	to	focus	on	export	orientation.	
6	 12	 DK	 Head	of	Department	with	limited	research	capabilities	at	the	moment.	Focused	on	global	
innovation	networks	beyond	the	triad:	institutions	vs.	networks.	Limited	work	on	IT,	mostly	
focused	on	agri-food	and	connections	with	pharmaceuticals.	
7	 1	 DK	 Organic	growth:	it	takes	a	long	time	to	accumulate	capital	and	then	you	are	too	old	to	take	risks.	
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7	 2	 DK	 Taxes:	marginal	rates	are	between	43%	and	56%	with	the	top	end	dropped	from	62%.	
7	 3	 DK	 FIRM	mainly	provides	IT	services,	not	products.	Their	customer-base	is	mainly	interested	in	
automating	processes	so	as	to	maintain	cost	pressures	from	high	wages.	
7	 4	 DK	 Prospects:	limited	for	Danish	IT	companies.	Growth	will	remain	marginal	due	to	saturation	and	
continued	pressure	to	outsource.	
7	 5	 DK	 Outsourcing:	Estonian	engineers	work	harder,	are	just	as	good,	and	cost	less.	
7	 6	 DK	 Historically,	being	an	engineer	has	meant	low	prestige	in	Denmark	with	low	wages.	
7	 7	 DK	 Mobility:	uncommon	to	move	around	because	you	are	locked	in	to	a	degree.	
7	 8	 DK	 Mobility:	however,	moving	around	within	the	Danish	educational	system	is	straightforward.	
7	 9	 DK	 Brain	drain:	persistent.		
7	 10	 DK	 Industry:	need	to	focus	on	a	few	industries	and	not	try	to		do	everything.	Denmark	has	a	long	
tradition	in	quantum	physics	and	acoustics	for	example.	Build	on	these.	
7	 11	 DK	 Copenhagen	cluster:	NO.	
7	 12	 DK	 About	FIRM:	MS	partner	for	ERP,	CRM,	BI,	ETC.	Also	provides	hosting,	VOIP,	and	SharePoint	
services.	DK-based	first	consolidated	locally	then	expanded	to	offices	in	Holland	and	Belgium.	
Primary	industries	include:	automotive,	food/bev,	retail,	and	distribution.	Roughly	400	employees.	
8	 1	 DK	 Strength:	government	demand	for	IT	services	including	eGov,	eSecure,	eHealth,	big	data,	and	
public	sector	digitization.	
8	 2	 DK	 Weakness:	limited	ICT	adoption	due	to	relatively	small	firm	size.	No	'local	heroes'	(aka	lighthouse).	
8	 3	 DK	 Challenges:	startup	is	difficult,	high	acquisition	rate	(both	domestic	and	international),	focus	on	
domestic	and	near	markets,	limited	access	to	public	sector	market	for	small	firms.	
8	 4	 DK	 Financing:	difficult	for	small	firms	to	access.	VCs	are	more	interested	in	the	next	big	idea,	not	
growing	small	firms	to	mid-size.	Need	bridge	financing	first.	Banks	have	no	competency	in	IT.	
8	 5	 DK	 Innovation:	good	at	coming	up	with	ideas	and	prototyping,	less	on	making	products.	
8	 6	 DK	 Adaptation:	Google	built	a	center	in	Aarhus	for	one	person.	
8	 7	 DK	 Breakouts:	limited	and	usually	through	layoffs.	Limited	interaction	between	established	firms	and	
startups.	Collaboration	between	startups	is	good	but	limited.	
8	 8	 DK	 KMD	(formerly	Kommunedata):	consolidated	multiple	Kommune	systems	to	provide	IT	and	
software	for	local	and	central	government,	as	well	as	private	solutions	with	3,000	employees.	
8	 9	 DK	 Cluster:	genuine	in	Copenhagen	and	while	geographically	diffused,	this	is	not	an	issue.	
8	 10	 DK	 ITB:	comprised	primarily	of	established	firms.	Startups	are	less	interested.	
8	 11	 DK	 Established	firms	are	interested	in	acquisitions	but	not	sponsorship.	
8	 12	 DK	 Anecdote:	a	government	panel	highlighting	startups	had	three	reps,	none	of	which	had	
government	support.	Firms	are	more	interested	in	accessing	government	contracts.	
8	 13	 DK	 Government	purchases:	from	300B	DKK	budget,	20B	DKK	went	to	IT.		
8	 14	 DK	 Regional	development:	five	regions	trying	to	collaborate.	
8	 15	 DK	 Government	licensing:	Baltic	states	were	interested	in	licensing	health	portal	3/5	years	ago	but	IP	
rights	stalled	the	initiative.	
8	 16	 DK	 Public	sector	background	transitioning	into	private	sector	issues.	
9	 1	 DK	 Public	sector	first:	public	sector	consumption	trumps	private.	Digitization	movement	to	provide	
better	service	and	reduce	costs.	
9	 2	 DK	 Jante	might	be	overstated;	more	about	contentment	(i.e.	Audi	A8	syndrome).	
9	 3	 DK	 Broadband	diffusion:	post	financial	crisis	drive	to	increase	diffusion.	Established	committee	in	
2009/10	but	concluded	that	private	sector	can	meet	needs.	Instead,	public	funds	should	be	used	to	
improve	the	public	sector.		
9	 4	 DK	 Telecommunications	were	deregulated	in	1996.	
9	 5	 DK	 Importance	of	tele-health	but	less	amenable	to	the	elderly	and	remote	areas	where	it	is	most	
needed.	
9	 6	 DK	 IT	is	mainly	services	and	consulting.	Hardware	is	mostly	imported.	
9	 7	 DK	 Growth	teams:	last	point	with	limited	funds.	Main	focus	is	on	food	and	other	sectors	with	ICT	
viewed	as	a	general	purpose	technology.	
9	 8	 DK	 Cluster:	Copenhagen	was	recently	removed	from	a	list	of	relevant	clusters	though	this	is	surprising.	
Might	be	due	to	pullout	by	Nokia.	Aalborg	has	been	headed	down.	
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10	 1	 DK	 Labor	markets:	more	apt	to	fire	in	Denmark	as	opposed	to	hiring	freezes	in	Norway.	Supportive	of	
labor	mobility	and	entrepreneurial	activity.	
10	 2	 DK	 Entrepreneurship:	'hot	topic'	but	finance	is	limited	and	most	individuals	are	risk	adverse.	
10	 3	 DK	 Markets:	entrepreneurs	think	of	the	local	first,	rare	to	think	globally.	
10	 4	 DK	 Regulation:	no	differentiation	between	a	sole	proprietorship	and	a	50-employee	firm.		
10	 5	 DK	 Innovation:	easy	to	start	an	idea	but	hard	to	get	the	people	to	work	for	it.	This	might	explain	the	
focus	on	services	over	product	development.	
10	 6	 DK	 IT	services:	mainly	agency	(temporary	worker)	based	staff	augmentation.	Temporary	workers	can	
be	let	go	with	one-day	notice.	
10	 7	 DK	 Skills:	continued	commodification	for	general,	low-end	skills	but	significant	demand	for	scarce.	
10	 8	 DK	 The	workday:	37	to	40	hours	is	fine	so	long	as	you	deliver.	50	to	60	hours	is	rare.	
10	 9	 NO	 Norway:	IT	is	more	outsourced	based.	Data	center	possibilities	are	limited.	Firms	are	fewer	but	
larger.	
10	 10	 DK	 Ballmer:	“Make	the	world	Danish”.	More	to	do	with	replicating	Microsoft's	success	in	Denmark	
elsewhere.	
10	 11	 DK	 Welfare	state	reform:	expects	more	transformation	not	reduction.	Possibly	expectations	have	
become	excessive	and	demographic	shifts	will	continue	to	add	pressure.	
10	 12	 DK	 Windmill	philosopher	
10	 13	 DK	 A	Dane	invented	Pascal	and	C++.	
10	 14	 DK	 FIRM:	spin-off	from	Nordic	Accenture	operating	in	four	countries	as	a	homogenous	region.	350	
employees	under	multiple	service	lines:	data	center,	workplace,	collaboration,	and	
communications	solutions.	
10	 15	 DK	 PhD	in	quantum	chemistry.	Background	as	a	developer	focused	on	infrastructure.	Previous	work	
for	HP,	CSC,	and	Compaq.	
11	 1	 DK	 “Extreme”	labor	flexibility.	Incentive	is	on	doing	interesting	work.	
11	 2	 DK	 More	about	contentment	than	Jante's	law.	
11	 3	 DK	 Danish	workers	are	critical	but	also	consensus	seeking:	peer-to-peer	decision-making.	Danes	take	
the	initiative	and	are	self-starters.	
11	 4	 DK	 It	is	easy	to	start	a	firm	but	failure	is	not	an	option.	
11	 5	 DK	 There	is	some	financing	for	slightly	larger	firms	and	exports.	
11	 6	 DK	 Long	history	is	important	in	explaining	Danish	success:	lack	of	corruption	and	trust.	
11	 7	 DK	 Government	is	not	helpful	in	any	way.	It	could	be	helpful	in	giving	access	to	small	firms	and	forcing	
innovation.	
11	 8	 DK	 1992	Mobilcon	corridor	is	now	fading	away.	
11	 9	 DK	 “Just	Eat”	-	Started	in	Denmark	but	relocated	to	the	UK	and	expanded	throughout	Europe.	




11	 11	 DK	 Like	many	startups,	the	value	of	the	firm	and	end	user	pricing	evolved	over	time.	
11	 12	 DK	 Dot	com	negatively	affected	the	firm	and	required	repeated	infusions	of	capital.	After	scaling	back,	
the	firm	bottomed	out	in	2003	before	turning	around	and	peaking	in	2007.		
12	 1	 DK	 Growth	is	constrained	by	limited	financing	(Maconomy	is	a	case	in	point).	
12	 2	 DK	 Pessimistic	on	the	overall	prospects	for	Danish	IT,	although	there	are	some	standouts	(e.g.	Podio,	
Go	Viral).	
12	 3	 DK	 New	regulations	favor	giving	stock	options	to	all	employees.	




12	 5	 DK	 Government	procurement	(FIRM)	is	a	challenge,	whereas	Microsoft	is	more	focused	on	the	public	
sector.	
12	 6	 DK	 Market	competition	is	tough,	although	Norway	is	an	exception:	perception	of	excess	funds.	
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12	 8	 DK	 Two	individuals	(Hugo	and	Klaus)	founded	FIRM	as	a	product	for	Macs	recognizing	an	opportunity	
in	the	advertising	sector.	Post	dot	com	required	restructuring	but	now	operations	include	220	
employees	with	140	in	Denmark.	
12	 9	 DK	 FIRM	grew	organically	and	then	listed	on	the	OMX	(Denmark)	in	2000.	
12	 10	 DK	 Another	innovation	is	with	social	collaboration	through	the	PRODUCT	also	providing	time	
management	integrated	with	Outlook.	
12	 11	 DK	 PRODUCT:	product	for	government	contractors.	
13	 1	 DK	 Long	tradition	of	small	companies	with	strong	IT,	life	sciences,	and	clean	energy	sectors.	
13	 2	 DK	 Brain	drain	persists.	
13	 3	 DK	 Academic	institutions	remain	focused	on	education	first.	
13	 4	 DK	 IT	lacks	a	lighthouse.	Microsoft	has	not	really	contributed	much	and	excessively	benchmarks.	IBM	
has	always	experimented.	
13	 5	 DK	 Large	IT	firms	are	somewhat	stagnant.	Cluster	dynamics	lack	coherence	and	always	have.	
13	 6	 DK	 Investment	is	lower	in	DK	than	NO	but	it	is	better.	Access	to	small	amounts	of	capital	is	not	an	
issue	but	there	is	a	barrier	in	obtaining	higher	amounts	(>$7.5M).	
13	 7	 DK	 Entrepreneurship	continues	to	rise	but	much	talent	moves	on	to	consulting.	
13	 8	 DK	 Incentives	are	comparable	between	the	US	and	DK	
14	 1	 DK	 There	are	many	entrepreneurs	but	they	have	limited	impact	and	possibly	only	exist	to	enjoy	the	
welfare	system.	Funds	are	limited	and	the	system	incentivizes	NOT	taking	risks.	
14	 2	 DK	 Acquisitions	and	brain	drain	are	issues.	Entrepreneurs	often	'go	it	alone'.	
14	 3	 DK	 Recent	reforms	(corporation	tax	reductions,	limits	on	education	and	minimal	social	benefit)	are	
explained	by	Denmark's	status	as	a	small,	open	economy	that	must	adapt.	The	leftist	government	
initiated	reforms	because	governing	is	required	(not	obstruction).	
14	 4	 DK	 Reform	will	continue	over	the	next	20	years	but	will	be	seen	as	'muddling	along'.	




14	 6	 DK	 The	balanced	budget	commitment	lacked	consensus	on	how	to	implement	and	did	not	include	
policies	for	growth.	This	is	now	addressed	through	the	recent	growth	teams.	
14	 7	 DK	 Standard	levers	for	growth:	education	and	tax	policy.	The	previous	years	focused	on	working	more	
to	drive	productivity…	“this	was	scary”.	The	recent	crisis	then	revealed	a	productivity	gap.	
14	 8	 DK	 One	example	sought	to	eliminate	some	work	holidays.	Unions,	firms,	and	govt.	agreed	but	later	
the	unions	pulled	out.	
14	 9	 DK	 Current	discussion	focus	on	cuts	to	the	public	sector	which	then	leads	the	private.	
14	 10	 DK	 Tax	policy:	must	have	'clever'	(e.g.	no	loopholes)	to	ensure	payment	from	everyone.	
14	 11	 DK	 ORGANIZATION	position	on	tax	policy:	broad-based	competitive	structures	but	also	special	
incentives	for	inheritance	to	maintain	investment.	
14	 12	 DK	 Tax	policy:	'picking	winners	is	still	an	issue',	less	opposition	to	closing	loopholes	and	limited	the	
growth	of	new	ones.	R&D	expenditure	can	be	paid	out	as	negative	tax	expenditure	(up	to	5M	DKK	
but	growing	to	25M	DKK).	
14	 13	 DK	 Sweden:	has	a	lower	dividend	tax	when	paid	from	your	own	company.	
14	 14	 DK	 DK	has	moved	to	offset	corporation	tax	reductions	with	an	increase	in	taxes	on	dividends.	
15	 1	 DK	 Long-standing	tradition	of	being	a	test	market	because	of	homogenous	culture.	
15	 2	 DK	 Entrepreneurship	is	viewed	positively	and	growing.	
15	 3	 DK	 Flat	managerial	structure	is	the	norm.	Danes	are	hardworking	and	focused.	
15	 4	 DK	 Four	domains:	telecom	and	spectrum,	innovation	and	growth,	company	and	business,	and	EU	and	
international.	
15	 5	 DK	 ICT	&	Digital	Growth	Department:	one	year	ago	ICT	merged	into	the	Dept.	of	Business	Affairs.	
Three	other	parts	went	to	Finance,	Defense,	and	Internal	Affairs	
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15	 6	 DK	 Focus:	government,	companies,	and	citizens	(primarily	BB	access	and	govt.	enablement	-	
MELANA).	Renewed	interest	in	productivity	
15	 7	 DK	 Public	procurement:	more	interested	in	costs	than	innovation.	
15	 8	 DK	 Public/private	collaboration:	electronic	signature	-	used	for	citizen	interaction	with	government	
then	moved	to	financial	markets.	Also	CPR	number	used	as	a	uniform	locator	and	electronic	
payment	system	across	all	Danish	banks.	
15	 9	 DK	 Startup:	1DKK	required.	
15	 10	 DK	 Firings	for	nonperformance	are	rare.	They	are	primarily	due	to	restructuring.	
15	 11	 DK	 CIS	(innovation	surveys)	-	questions	data	quality	and	notes	they	are	variable.	Identifying	IT	firms	as	
innovative	could	be	misleading	because	these	firms	often	classify	all	their	work	as	such.	
15	 12	 DK	 Danish	survey	on	ICT	use	and	innovation:	first	requirement	was	to	enable	productivity	gains	and	
reduced	costs,	however	longer-term	objectives	(3	to	5	years)	focused	on	wider	objectives.	More	
advanced	firms	were	focused	more	on	strategic	initiatives.	Finance	was	not	viewed	as	a	constraint.	
16	 1	 NO	 Startups	have	been	enabled	through	the	shedding	of	labor	from	established	firms.	
16	 2	 NO	 Business	renewal	toward	more	current	models	was	enabled	through	bottom-up	change	from	well-
educated	and	protected	individuals.	Change	through	leveraging	leading	sectors	(including	public).	
Leading	sectors	(including	oil	and	gas,	defense)	are	responsible	for	much	software	development.	
16	 3	 NO	 Kongsberg:	FMC	acquired	Kongsberg	Offshore	from	Siemens	that	became	the	most	successful	
subsidiary	driven	by	software.	Kongsberg	Weapons	acquired	by	VSA.	Both	are	detailed	in	Eli's	book	
chapter.	
16	 4	 NO	 IBM:	key	player	in	Norway	combining	high	R&D	investment	and	new	ideas	with	a	global	network.	
16	 5	 NO	 Lighthouse:	the	role	of	Telenor	is	problematic	because	they	have	followed	a	dual	strategy	of	
accessing	new	markets	AND	innovation.	
16	 6	 NO	 Norway	has	followed	a	strategy	similar	to	that	of	Finland	
16	 7	 NO	 Finance:	Norway	is	lacking	VC	and	the	knowledge	necessary	to	engage	in	risk	taking.	Growth	has	
mostly	been	organic,	never	strong	growth	initiatives.	No	long	term	planning.	
16	 8	 NO	 Historical	roots:	Norway	retains	its	roots	in	agriculture	and	raw	materials	providing	an	income	but	
not	the	necessary	capital	to	industrialize.	
16	 9	 NO	 Relations:	limited	business/academic	but	with	stronger	links	with	the	public	sector.	
NTNU/Kongsberg	is	a	limited	example	of	the	former.	
16	 10	 NO	 Internationalization:	limited	history	but	always	outward	looking.	Current	TNC/subsidiary	
interaction	appears	to	allow	autonomy	while	also	accepting	external	direction.	
16	 11	 NO	 Differences	with	Danes:	more	shrewd.	Norway	was	a	colony	and	never	developed	its	own	core	
(that	was	Copenhagen).	No	villages,	no	specialization.	
17	 1	 NO	 Hold	backs:	limited	talent,	limited	interest	by	government.	Limited	optimism	for	the	sector.	
17	 2	 NO	 Innovation	Norway:	broad-based	initiatives	like	smart	grid	trying	to	be	more	business-focused.	
17	 3	 NO	 Public	sector:	ICT-enabled	provision	of	services	but	not	necessarily	product	development.	Moving	
from	compliance	to	convenience	(e.g.	online/mobile	tax	service).	
17	 4	 NO	 Education:	PhD	funding	shared	by	firms	and	government	(split	salary)	when	aligned.	Late	
secondary	programs	are	used	to	facilitate	entrepreneurship.	
17	 5	 NO	 National	Research	Council:	defines	a	theme	(e.g.	the	internet	of	things)	and	an	international	team	
referees	submissions	to	determine	grant	funding	(provided	my	Education	Ministry).	Difficult	for	
small	players	to	complete	because	of	the	complexity	which	also	makes	scaling	up	difficult.	
17	 6	 NO	 Opera	(von	Teschner)	and	Norsk	Hydro	(metals,	energy)	are	interesting	examples.	Opera	engages	
in	cultural	diversity	while	most	Norwegian	firms	do	not.	
17	 7	 NO	 ERP:	push	to	move	down	applications	into	the	core/hardware	but	accountants	are	slow	to	adopt	
change	making	disruptive	technologies	rare.	
18	 1	 NO	 ICT	is	third	largest	contributor	to	revenues.	
18	 2	 NO	 Difficult	to	be	a	seed	investor:	'winning	is	difficult'.	
18	 3	 NO	 Engineer	is	paid	roughly	20%	less	than	in	US.	
18	 4	 NO	 Sector	is	competitive.	
18	 5	 NO	 Flat	organizational	structure.	Internationalization	has	helped	reconcile	Norwegian	autonomy	with	
US	hierarchy	to	enable	strategy	execution.	
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18	 6	 NO	 Entrepreneurial	culture	is	growing;	recognized	as	a	global	phenomenon.	Still	relatively	young	(18	
months).	Risks	are	lower	and	'cool	factor'	
18	 7	 NO	 IKT	Norge:	to	provide	the	best	possible	framework	for	IT.	
18	 8	 NO	 Sector	was	previously	dominated	by	outside	firms	and	office	machine	equipment	manufacturing.	
Norsk	Data	built	minicomputers	but	died	after	the	PC	revolution.	Sector	is	currently	dominated	by	
software	and	more	are	native	firms.	Consultancy	and	integration	are	also	significant.	
18	 9	 NO	 New	digital	initiative	with	government:	e-nable	more	public	services	and	broadband	access.	
Government	thinks	that	the	ICT	sector	can	take	care	of	itself.	
18	 10	 NO	 Traditionally,	government	has	been	focused	on	core	sectors:	fishing,	oil	&	gas,	food,	and	tourism.	
Policies	have	not	changed	much	since	1950s.	10	years	ago,	Norway	wanted	to	build	the	next	Nokia.	
It	did	not	happen.	
18	 11	 NO	 IT	is	mostly	small	and	medium	enterprises.	400	companies	are	operating	in	an	area	where	a	pulp	
company	used	to	be.	Big	firms:	Hydro	-	11B	NOK,	PE	10B	NOK,	Cisco	3B	NOK.	
18	 12	 NO	 Evry	-	software	and	services,	Atea	-	reselling	and	integration,	Telenor	-	R&D	intensive	but	also	
legacy	incumbent.	New	markets	have	sustained	Telenor,	while	the	firm	scales	back	R&D	in	favor	of	
efficiency	improvements.	
18	 13	 NO	 Research	Council:	provides	funding	for	R&D	but	is	inaccessible	for	SME	IT.	Big	firms	receive	the	
majority	of	funding.	There	are	also	tax	benefits	for	doing	R&D	and	Innovasion	Norge	provides	
funding	as	well.	
18	 14	 NO	 Branding	Report:	need	better	talent,	more	VC,	and	to	highlight	the	story.	
18	 15	 NO	 Taxation:	'formue'	(property)	tax:	on	assets	including	stock	option	valuations.	28%	corporation	tax.	
18	 16	 NO	 Conservative	parties	are	leading	in	polls.	Seek	to	change	even	scrap	the	formue	tax.	
18	 17	 NO	 Offshoring:	slow	process	with	Ukraine	viewed	positively.	
18	 18	 NO	 Simula:	programming	language	invented	in	Norway,	the	first	object-oriented	language.	
19	 1	 NO	 Shortage	of	skilled	labor.	
19	 2	 NO	 Government	is	focused	on	health	and	social	services	over	infrastructure.	Research	investment	is	
growing	slowly.	
19	 3	 NO	 Entrepreneurship	and	interest	in	business	is	rising.	
19	 4	 NO	 REFERENCE	WRITEUP	
19	 5	 NO	 IT	Sector	is	roughly	30B	NOK,	third	largest	after	oil	and	gas	and	fisheries.	
19	 6	 NO	 Historically	IT	was	comprised	of	large	TNCs.	Now	TNCs	utilize	Norway	for	sales,	marketing,	and	
support	and	manufacturing	has	been	reduced.	
19	 7	 NO	 Local	production	revolved	around	complex,	customer-specific	systems	and	hardware.	Now	
development	is	more	modular	
19	 8	 NO	 Aker	Solutions	ASA,	a	Norwegian	oil	services	company	headquartered	in	Oslo.	Previously	shipyard	
management	but	declined	due	to	competition.	
19	 9	 NO	 Network	model	(e.g.	Horten	electronics):	supplier	linkages	through	longer-term	interaction	but	
more	arms-length.	
19	 10	 NO	 Conferences:	opportunities	to	bring	in	management,	present	new	projects,	research	competitions,	
integrate	research	organizations,	government,	and	private	firms.	
19	 11	 NO	 SINTEF	(Stiftelsen	for	industriell	og	teknisk	forskning)	-	largest	research	institution	with	3B	NOK	
operating	in	Trondheim,	across	Norway,	Houston,	Denmark,	and	Brazil.	Sponsors	research	across	
industries	(including	ICT).	
19	 12	 NO	 Research	Council:	Movement	toward	more	private	sector	development.	
19	 13	 NO	 R&D	funding:	home	grown,	contracts	and	grants,	and	Innovation	Norway.	Roughly	15/25%	of	
turnover	mostly	through	external	funds	(maybe	5%	internal).	
19	 14	 NO	 NHO	(The	Confederation	of	Norwegian	Enterprise):	leading	employer	organization	complementing	
labor	organizations.	
19	 15	 NO	 Innovation	SkatteFUNN:	R&D	can	be	expensed	but	only	after	being	approved.	
20	 1	 NO	 Nordics	are	relatively	open	making	competition	easier.	
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20	 3	 NO	 Long	history	of	Nordics:	conflict	between	Danes	and	Swedes	over	toll	collection	(Oresund).	
Christianity	in	1030.	1814/5	Norway	goes	to	Sweden	from	Denmark.	
20	 4	 NO	 Norway:	greenfield	opportunity	given	non-hierarchical	environment	making	innovation	easier.	
20	 5	 NO	 Drivers	of	Norwegian	IT:	strong	but	'protected'	competition,	public	spending,	and	efficient	
government.	




20	 7	 NO	 CIO	of	Norway:	Hans	Christian	Holte.	
20	 8	 NO	 2.3	million	Norwegians	engage	in	gambling.	
20	 9	 NO	 'Blue	Ocean'	mindset	in	Norway:	gulf	between	Norway	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	
20	 10	 NO	 'IT	in	Practice':	annual	report	on	Norwegian	IT	(aka	Ramböl).	
20	 11	 NO	 Conservatives	will	prevail	in	next	election	with	a	more	pro-business	stance.	Taxes	will	probably	not	
change	significantly		
21	 1	 NO	 Cultivating	new	talent:	govt.	is	not	meeting	demand	
21	 2	 NO	 Contracting	is	very	straightforward	and	standardized.	




21	 4	 NO	 Longer-term	plans	are	to	grow	the	businesses	organically.	Other	than	a	small	grant	from	Inno	
Norway	(SkatteFUNN),	they	have	used	their	own	funds	and	retained	earnings.	Hiring	is	done	
through	the	network.	
21	 5	 NO	 PRODUCT	is	a	standalone	application	and	SERVICE	is	a	professional	services	firm	doing	
development	and	consulting.	FIRM	has	eight	employees	in	Norway	and	15	in	Poland	as	of	8/2012.	
PRODUCT	is	kept	separate	to	keep	equity	independent.	
21	 6	 NO	 Work	hours:	generally	8	to	4	but	follows	the	needs	of	the	client.	
21	 7	 NO	 Compensation:	wages	and	stock	options	in	private	ownership	of	the	company.	Salaries	are	rising	
due	to	seller’s	market	and	in	house	IT	firms	are	losing	talent	to	contract	work.	
21	 8	 NO	 Norwegian	IT	strengths:	knowledge	of	local	markets,	standard	work	hours,	and	narrowing	wage	
differentials.	
21	 9	 NO	 Networking,	clustering:	limited	organic	interaction.	Formal	networking	(e.g.	conferences)	are	
ineffective	and	mainly	opportunities	to	sell	stuff.	
21	 10	 NO	 Lighthouse:	not	necessary	in	Norway.	Widened	IT	use	would	be	more	helpful.	
21	 11	 NO	 VG.no	exposé:	Inno	Norway	wasting	money	on	failed	'innovation'	projects.	
22	 1	 NO	 Labor	mobility:	not	an	issue	for	IT.	Salaries	are	competitive.	
22	 2	 NO	 Telenor:	Norwegian	incumbent	carrier	expanding	into	global	markets.	Expansion	in	Asia	and	
Eastern	Europe	is	the	main	success	story.	National	incumbent	not	the	best	at	fostering	innovation.	
22	 3	 NO	 Telenor:	first	mover	in	NMT,	later	evolving	into	GSM.	Innovation	and	acquiring	new	talent	through	
pioneering	mobile	technology.	Recent	innovation	less	obvious	although	digital	services	is	a	notable	
standout.	
22	 4	 NO	 NTNU:	Trondheim	remains	a	limited	cluster	with	most	graduates	relocating	to	Oslo	(98%	of	
RESPONDENT'S	class).	Start	NTNU	is	a	notable	example	of	bridging	tech,	management,	and	
entrepreneurship.	
22	 5	 NO	 Telenor	labor:	low	attrition	without	much	labor	movement.	High	reliance	on	outsourcing.	
22	 6	 NO	 Telenor	IT:	movement	away	from	tailor-made	solutions	to	packages.	400	staff	that	will	steadily	
move	to	outsourcing.	
22	 7	 NO	 Evry:	partially	owned	by	Telenor	but	'not	doing	great'.	
22	 8	 NO	 IT:	relatively	lack	luster	from	a	wealth	generation	perspective.	Core	sectors	do	better.	
22	 9	 NO	 IT:	RESPONDENT	is	optimistic	on	Norwegian	IT.	Oil	dependence	is	an	issue	but	there	are	talented	
individuals	and	financing	is	improving.	
22	 10	 NO	 FOLLOW	UP	for	contact	in	Digital	Services.	
23	 1	 NO	 IT:	plenty	of	consumption,	less	on	production.	
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23	 2	 NO	 IT:	mainly	consulting	services	and	public	sector	employment.	
23	 3	 NO	 IT	labor	mobility:	relatively	mobile,	at	least	in	Norway.	
23	 4	 NO	 Public	sector	focus:	increased	inclusion	across	Norway,	ehealth	(yet	more	people	want	to	keep	
their	local	hospital),	and	use	IT	as	an	enabler.	
23	 5	 NO	 Tech	transfer	offices	are	not	very	helpful.	
23	 6	 NO	 Tax	advantages:	limited	benefits	from	R&D.	Most	IT	work	is	development	(90%)	not	research	
(10%).	
23	 7	 NO	 Acquisition	by	MNC	is	often	a	given	due	to	small	size	and	limited	markets.	
23	 8	 NO	 RESPONDENT	started	at	NTNU	doing	defense	work,	moved	to	Alcatel	fixed	networks,	then	Telenor	
mobile	international	applications.	
23	 9	 NO	 Research:	limited	due	to	small	firm	size.	
23	 10	 NO	 Telenor:	was	the	research	center	and	the	communications	provider.	
23	 11	 NO	 Public	sector:	rapid	transition	to	private	sector	contracting.	
23	 12	 NO	 Govt.	support:	businesses	want	more	direct	support	but	government	wants	IT	to	remain	an	
enabler.	Strategy	has	been	incoherent:	need	to	move	away	from	core	sectors	and	apply	more	
funds	to	ICT	and	general	research.	
23	 13	 NO	 IT	startups:	plenty	of	good	ideas	but	limited	seed	money.	Seed	money	is	fragmented	and	allocated	
to	other	interests	and	remote	territories.	Venture	capital	is	fine.	
23	 14	 NO	 Six	universities	in	Norway	with	two	in	the	north.	
23	 15	 NO	 Simla	research	center:	largest	consumer	is	Staoil.	
23	 16	 NO	 IBM	is	a	good	resource	'one	of	the	good	partners'	working	in	gas	and	oil.	
24	 1	 NO	 Labor	costs:	relatively	cost	effective.	
24	 2	 NO	 Flat	structure	and	egalitarian	ethic.	
24	 3	 NO	 Small	country	dynamic:	everyone	knows	everyone	else.	
24	 4	 NO	 RESPONDENT:	strategy	analysis	covering	welfare	societies	and	policy	development.	
24	 5	 NO	 RESPONDENT2:	software	development	and	ERP	for	Kongsberg.	Worked	on	custom	developed	
planning	system.	Also	worked	for	SINTEF	heading	the	jury	selecting	prize-winning	development.	
24	 6	 NO	 Oil	and	gas:	important	role	of	subsea	installations.	
24	 7	 NO	 Kongsberg	is	80%	software.	Implemented	serial	processing	while	US	was	still	doing	batch	
production.	
24	 8	 NO	 Big	houses	(IBM,	HP)	mainly	doing	one	off	software	coding	not	application	development.	
24	 9	 NO	 Acquisitions:	balance	the	needs	of	MNC	and	the	local	firm.	Characterized	as	a	healthy	relationship.	
24	 10	 NO	 Tandberg	to	Cisco	for	$3B.	
24	 11	 NO	 Role	of	government:	support	supply	side	instead	of	trying	to	drive	demand.	
24	 12	 NO	 OECD	26	March	2007	report:	'Norwegian	paradox'	and	the	importance	of	'invisible	innovation'.	
24	 13	 NO	 Pragmatism:	buy	the	best	and	make	the	rest.	
24	 14	 NO	 IPR:	everyone	shares	until	they	get	acquired.	
24	 15	 NO	 Important	role	of	video	conferencing.	
25	 1	 NO	 Flat	organizational	structure:	good	for	adaptation	and	sharing	ideas.	
25	 2	 NO	 Consumer	adoption	is	high.	
25	 3	 NO	 Labor	flexibility:	hard	to	fire	for	performance	but	easy	for	restructuring.	
25	 4	 NO	 Unionized	government	sets	labor	utilization	requirements	which	then	influence	'border	sectors'.	
25	 5	 NO	 Ehealth	is	a	major	initiative	given	geographic	dispersion	and	limited	interest	in	health	and	geriatric	
care.	Use	technology	instead	of	labor.	
25	 6	 NO	 Finance:	more	long-term	investment	vs.	Danish	flexibility.		
25	 7	 NO	 12	years	as	CEO	for	ORGANIZATION.	Former	member	of	ORGANIZATION	serving	two	four-year	
terms	starting	in	1989.	Once	a	leftist,	he	has	been	pro-business	working	either	in	industry	(e.g.	
Statoil,	downstream	energy	sales)	or	policy	advocacy.	
25	 8	 NO	 Abelia:	one	of	20	branches	in	the	NHO	(Norwegian	Confederation	of	Business)	focusing	on	ICT,	
research,	and	education.	They	are	the	4th	largest	branch	with	a	staff	of	25	and	1,200	members.	
25	 9	 NO	 Abelia	primary	activities:	research,	representation,	legal	advice,	and	networking.	
25	 10	 NO	 Abelia	key	govt.	issues:	labor	law	liberalization,	immigration	reform	(visas),	education/curriculum,	
and	ehealth.	
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25	 11	 NO	 Major	members:	Telenor	-	rare	example	of	successful	state	company,	Evry	-	financial	sector,	Huwai	
-	Netcom	and	Telenor,	Microsoft	-	FAST,	Samsung	-	mostly	sales.	Also	includes	several	small	
companies,	mostly	from	Oslo	and	Fornebu	(developed	as	an	IT	center).	
25	 12	 NO	 Geography:	informs	politics,	given	the	need	to	represent	all	regions.	Centralized	government	but	a	
somewhat	federated	structure	(428	kommune	but	undergoing	continued	consolidation).	
25	 13	 NO	 Espen	Andersen	project:	leverage	the	strengths	of	core	industries.	
25	 14	 NO	 Oil	and	gas:	will	remain	key	industry	driving	IT	development	(e.g.	subsea	installations	using	
extensive	data	for	control	and	exploration).	Should	oil	and	gas	slide,	development	can	still	drive	
process	control	systems	in	other	sectors.	
25	 15	 NO	 Fishing:	movement	from	harvesting	to	ownership	to	full	downstream	fish	processing.	
25	 16	 NO	 Shipbuilding:	from	manufacturing	to	design.	
25	 17	 NO	 Representation:	no	need	for	a	CIO	or	Ministry	of	IT	but	strengthening	the	PM	(like	the	Finns)	would	
help.	
25	 18	 NO	 Perspectives	for	2050:	need	6%	GDP	growth.	
25	 19	 NO	 Labor	force:	10%	on	welfare	and	unemployment	is	at	3%.	
25	 20	 NO	 IT:	focus	is	on	core	technologies	(e.g.	b2b,	engines,	etc.)	
25	 21	 NO	 BI:	a	demand-driven	university.	




25	 23	 NO	 Telenor	and	Telia	merger:	quashed	by	government	in	2000.	
25	 24	 NO	 Karl	Ove	Moene,	Univ	of	Oslo	and	'Project-Based	Norway'.	
26	 1	 NO	 Tax:	stock	options	taxed	before	being	exercised.	
26	 2	 NO	 VCs	lack	knowledge.	
26	 3	 NO	 Telenor:	2m	subscribers	and	ability	to	leverage	universal	cell	coverage.	Also	acts	as	a	services	
lighthouse.	Lacks	brand	recognition	and	resources.	
26	 4	 NO	 Opera:	on	shaky	ground	but	will	never	sellout	due	to	von	Tetzchner.	Also	won	a	court	case	against	
Microsoft	in	2004	and	2007	for	unfair	competition.	
26	 5	 NO	 Immigration	reform:	formerly	allowed	5k	in	demand	workers	per	year	but	was	eliminated	due	to	
abuses.	
26	 6	 NO	 Education:	control	taken	from	municipalities	and	given	to	counties.	Movement	toward	
consolidation	and	reduced	balkanization.	
26	 7	 NO	 Defense:	unable	to	keep	talent	and	suffers	from	budget	overruns	(e.g.	GOLF	system	7b	NOK	over).	
26	 8	 NO	 Visma:	privately-held	collector	of	enterprise	applications,	verticals,	integration,	and	'Nordic	Cool'	
(branding	for	communication,	production,	and	usability).	
26	 9	 NO	 Evry:	difficult	to	scale.	
26	 10	 NO	 Culture:	irrelevant	in	understanding	Norwegian	ICT.	
26	 11	 NO	 Brain	drain:	issue	from	acquisition	and	departure.	
26	 12	 NO	 Finance:	easy	for	seed	funding,	few	angels,	and	venture	capital	is	small	(10	to	200	NOK).	
26	 13	 NO	 Acquisitions:	firms	follow	different	strategies	(e.g.,	Qt	went	to	Nokia	then	killed	by	Microsoft).	
26	 14	 NO	 Search	(e.g.	FAST)	is	huge	in	Norway	driven	by	early	investments	by	Aftenposten.	
26	 15	 NO	 Shipstep:	family-owned	media	company	(two	largest	newschapters)	in	transition	to	digitization.	
Revamped	classified	ads.	(fin.no).	'Block	it'	was	later	acquired.	
26	 16	 NO	 Clayton	Kristensen:	disruptive	technologies.	
26	 17	 NO	 Child	falls:	Danes	will	pick	it	up,	Norwegian	will	tell	the	child	to	pick	yourself	up,	and	the	Swedes	
will	start	an	enquiry	into	why	the	child	fell.	
26	 18	 NO	 Peak	oil:	no	time	soon.	
27	 1	 NO	 Postgraduate	degrees	are	the	norm.	
27	 2	 NO	 FAST:	moving	to	machine	learning.	Hired	up	70	individuals.	
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27	 4	 NO	 GE:	leverages	R&D	work	in	ultrasound	technology	globally.	
27	 5	 NO	 Norway	carves	out	specific,	deep	niches	and	utilizes	long-term	investment.	
27	 6	 NO	 Acquisition:	viewed	as	'selling	out'	but	is	often	inevitable.	
27	 7	 NO	 Acquisition:	employees	generally	desire	stability	post-acquisition.	Personal	(competitive/relative)	
incentives	are	not	popular	and	perceived	as	beauty	contests.	Norwegians	generally	have	no	
incentive	to	get	rich.	Still,	employees	can	either	get	with	it	or	leave.	





27	 9	 NO	 Immigration:	the	most	important	issue	both	for	society	and	productivity.	Denmark	has	50%	less	
taxes	than	Norway	for	guest	workers	and	this	constrains	competitiveness.	
27	 10	 NO	 Education:	better	at	general	education	than	other	countries,	admissions	are	based	on	exams	only,	
free	at	all	levels,	recent	hard	sciences	push	at	upper	secondary	(gymnasium).	
27	 11	 NO	 Computer	science:	25	computer	science	graduates	whenRESPONDENT	finished	(circa	1985?).	
27	 12	 NO	 PhDs:	40%	are	networked	with	universities	and	connected	to	firms	and	the	degree	is	more	
versatile	and	valued	than	in	the	US.	Estimates	that	10-20%	of	ICT	PhDs	are	native	Norwegians.	
27	 13	 NO	 Dot	com:	very	good	for	Norwegian	IT	but	has	never	fully	recovered	since.	
27	 14	 NO	 Competitiveness:	6x	more	expensive	than	Singapore	but	differences	are	between	commodity	
production	and	knowing	requirements.	
27	 15	 NO	 Trondheim:	three	people	in	Trondheim	designed	the	graphic	chip	used	in	80%	of	smartphones	(but	
not	iphones).	Assumed	Falanx	later	acquired	by	UK-based	ARM	in	2006	
27	 16	 NO	 FOLLOW	UP:	Jørgen	Bardenfleth,	Sr	Dir	Strategic	Projects	at	Microsoft	and	Head	of	Danish	
Government	ICT	Growth	Team	
28	 1	 US	 Institutional	fit	varies	by	industry.	Energy	is	typically	1)	capital	intensive,	2)	long	time	to	market,	3)	
not	traditional	targets	of	VC	(and	hence	modest	performance),	and	4)	mostly	incremental	
innovation	using	40-year-old	technology.	
28	 2	 US	 Stanford	impact:	incubation	and	tech	transfer	but	mostly	the	draw	of	the	cluster	itself.	
28	 3	 US	 VC	(at	least	in	industry)	lacks	significant	expertise.	“Investing	on	gut”	is	more	common	with	limited	
due	diligence	that	is	more	science-based	(e.g.	bringing	in	a	professor	who	does	not	know	the	
industry).	A	better	approach	is	to	ask	“what	is	the	market?”	and	“what	have	you	solved?”	




28	 5	 US	 Recommends	small,	general	grants	and	loans	from	government	not	significant	investment	in	large	
firms	(i.e.	national	champions).	Cited	EU	as	an	example	of	wasted	funding.	
28	 6	 US	 Investment	performance	criteria:	1)	understanding	of	market,	2)	plan	for	commercial	success,	and	
3)	technology	readiness.	
28	 7	 US	 Exit	option	for	energy	is	still	through	IPOs	often	before	substantial	revenues.	Acquisition	is	less	of	
an	option	and	usually	for	strategic	alignment.	
28	 8	 US	 Front	Range	technology	development:	1)	not	enough	money	and	talent	(especially	managerial)	and	
2)	focus	on	IT	resulting	in	stiff	competition	with	Silicon	Valley	
28	 9	 US	 Industrial	performance	is	not	just	about	institutions	but	also	culture.	
29	 1	 NO	 Labor	costs	are	too	high	necessitating	automation.	
29	 2	 NO	 Investment	patterns	are	changing	but	slowly.	
29	 3	 NO	 High	tech	consumption.	
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29	 5	 NO	 Macro	picture:	better	conditions	in	just	two	years.	Government	change	to	investment	following	a	
systematic	approach	and	engaging	in	new	technologies	(e.g.	cloud	solutions).	Government	also	
mandated	e-invoicing	by	2014/5.	
29	 6	 NO	 Government	still	not	doing	enough.	Funding	is	politically	oriented	(good	for	the	hinterland	but	not	
in	Olso/Trondheim	where	it	can	be	better	utilized).	Government	“pissed	him	off”	15/20	years	ago	
due	to	ineptitude.	
29	 7	 NO	 Taxes:	incentives	help	on	both	supply	and	demand.	
29	 8	 NO	 Labor	incentives:	no	positive	thoughts	on	the	subject.	Norwegians	do	like	to	be	their	own	boss,	
own	their	house,	assert	a	reverse	pyramid.	Different	from	the	hierarchical	swedes.	
29	 9	 NO	 Open	source:	significant	role	in	Nordics	enabling	small	companies	in	limited	markets	to	compete.	
29	 10	 NO	 Gartner	megatrends:	1	cloud,	2	mobile,	3	social,	4	big	data.	
29	 11	 NO	 Norwegian	competitiveness:	big	vendors	but	also	bleeding	edge	niche	solutions.	
29	 12	 NO	 Prospects:	no	big	change	in	the	next	3	to	5	years.	
29	 13	 NO	 Acquisitions:	necessary	but	striving	to	maintain	talent.	Limited	successes	but	Visma	has	worked.	
They	have	succeeded	by	leaving	acquired	companies	as	they	are	(confederacy?)	recognizing	that	
easy	cost	savings	can	only	get	you	so	far.	Keeping	and	increasing	growth	are	much	more	difficult.	
29	 14	 NO	 Case	of	Cisco	in	Norway.	
29	 15	 NO	 Dugnad:	community	participation	(like	barn	raising).	
30	 1	 NO	 Pure	consultancy	and	development	(time	and	materials)	firm.	They	do	not	do	software	sales,	
reselling,	or	hosting.	
30	 2	 NO	 Founded	14	years	ago	from	scratch.	Originally	dot.com	but	also	McKinsey	and	Accenture	founders.	
30	 3	 NO	 Does	custom	(bespoke)	development	of	high-end	solutions.	Not	interested	in	building	/selling	
packaged	solutions.	Moreover,	most	work	is	so	customized	using	open	source	tools	that	packaging	
does	not	make	sense.	
30	 4	 NO	 Acquired	by	Evry	but	operates	100%	independent	(competes	with	Evry	at	times).	Claims	this	makes	
sense	for	consulting	and	possibly	products	too.	
30	 5	 NO	 6th	or	7th	largest	with	approximately	2.5%	of	market	share	in	Norway.	
30	 6	 NO	 50/50	split	between	private	and	public	consulting	with	differences	in	operating	models	and	drive	
for	innovation.	'Enterprise'	consulting	is	either	govt.	or	finance	sector.	A	big	client	is	Norwegian	
Social	Services.	
30	 7	 NO	 Top	5%	of	NTNU	graduates	come	to	FIRM	with	a	master’s	degree	in	computer	science.	Only	
Microsoft	and	Google	can	compete	with	FIRM	for	talent.	
30	 8	 NO	 Trondheim	is	used	effectively	for	recruitment	to	Oslo.	No	real	market	for	services.	
30	 9	 NO	 Norwegians	-	flat	and	consensus	seeking,	Danes	-	wheelers	and	dealers,	Swedes	-	structured.	
30	 10	 NO	 Norway	differs	with	other	cases	because	it	never	had	a	financial	crisis.	
30	 11	 NO	 “Norway	is	more	catholic	than	the	Pope”	-	very	conservative.	
30	 12	 NO	 Not	much	entrepreneurship	in	Norway.	Where	it	does	occur	is	in	offshore.	
30	 13	 NO	 Norway	should	have	more	entrepreneurship	but	does	not	because	many	factors	but	especially,	
taxation	(fortune	tax	and	options).	Better	options	are	to	buy	real	estate.	
30	 14	 NO	 Northzone	and	Verndane.		
31	 1	 NO	 InnoNorway	SF	-	networking,	advisory,	promotion,	and	finance	although	financing	is	not	provided	
from	the	SF	office.	
31	 2	 NO	 Networking	-	occurs	between	external	funds	(e.g.	Northzone),	existing	technology	firms,	and	
successful	entrepreneurs	(especially	Scandinavian).	
31	 3	 NO	 Advisory	-	limited	staff	that	share	time	at	multiple	firms.	
31	 4	 NO	 Facilities	-	subsidized	through	Innovation	House	(opened	in	2012)	providing	hoteling	and	
infrastructure.	
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31	 6	 NO	 Educational	partnership	-	engagement	with	local	schools	of	innovation	(UC	Berkeley)	where	
entrepreneurship,	value	proposition,	and	financing	are	taught	along	with	internships	at	established	
firms.	
31	 7	 NO	 Results	-	roughly	40	students	are	taken	in	the	program	with	only	3	or	4	obtaining	jobs	and	no	post-
mortems	are	held	for	those	who	return	to	Norway.	However,	those	that	do	'could'	share	their	
ideas	leading	to	new	firm	creation.	Statistics	would	be	helpful	-	FOLLOW	UP	
31	 8	 NO	 MNC	acquisition	-	generally	a	good	thing	although	difficult	in	some	instances.	As	one	example,	
Tandberg	employees	were	shocked	by	the	organizational	and	managerial	practices	of	Cisco.	
31	 9	 NO	 Industry	focus	-	IT	security,	video	conferencing,	and	sensor-based	applications	are	key.	
32	 1	 DK	 FIRM	-	started	in	Denmark	Jan	2003,	relocated	to	SF	in	2009.	Sought	to	create	a	'democratic	
company'	recognizing	that	hierarchies	are	bad.	Moved	toward	relative	incentives	later	on	mainly	
for	sales.	However,	the		main	ethos	is	to	work	with	interesting	people	to	build	cool	things.	
32	 2	 DK	 Denmark	-	'born	global'	and	'born	creative'	
32	 3	 DK	 Government	-	does	not	understand	entrepreneurship.	Offered	a	'business	expert'	for	free	who	
provided	a	report	that	was	unhelpful	with	too	many	generalities.	VCs	have	been	more	helpful.	
32	 4	 DK	 Founders	-	especially	those	from	Nokia	and	their	diffusion	into	various	clusters	has	been	key	for	
startups	(e.g.	Supercell).	Track	these	individuals	and	their	return	to	the	Nordics.	
32	 5	 DK	 Global	community	-	provided	unity	with	insights	on	starting	up	(Joel	Spolski,	Paul	Graham	-	founder	
of	y-Combinator).	Examples	include:	'Broadcasting	of	knowledge',	'Plain	Vanilla',	'Stardog',	and	
'Clarana'.	
32	 6	 DK	 Giga	-	went	bust	following	acquisition	($1.25B)	by	Intel	in	2000.	Specialized	in	high-speed	
communications	chips	used	in	optical	networks	(formerly	a	division	of	NKT	Danish	cable	company).	
32	 7	 DK	 Scandinavian	firms	are	insane.	
32	 8	 DK	 Icelanders	are	always	late	but	Danes	never.	





33	 2	 DK	 Incentives	-	mixed,	with	team-based	targets	and	rewards.	Not	super	egalitarian	and	those	that	
need	to	go	are	dropped.	His	incentive	is	to	build	something;	“it's	not	about	the	money”.	
33	 3	 DK	 Danish	entrepreneurship	-	always	scanning	for	opportunities	but	unable	to	figure	out	what	can	
actually	be	done.	Still	difficult,	viewed	as	being	a	'hustler',	Janteloven	remains.	All	entrepreneurs	
are	iconoclasts	going	against:	“You	should	always	put	your	money	in	bricks”.	
33	 4	 DK	 Finance	-	Nordic	VCs	are	emerging	as	well	as	SF	VCs	engaging	the	Nordics	(e.g.	Y-Combinator	of	
which	they	were	graduates).	
33	 5	 DK	 Govt.	-	established	the	IVS	(limited	liability	corporation)	for	1DKK	in	January	2014.	Tax	reform	is	
also	required	(liberal	perspective).	
33	 6	 DK	 “Senior	Managers	are	assholes.”	
33	 7	 DK	 “Technology	will	kill	non-transparency.”	
34	 1	 NO	 Nordics	-	offer	strong	technical	expertise	but	weak	marketing.	
34	 2	 NO	 Scan	program	-	looking	for	signals	of	early	change	by	sifting	through	abstracts	that	are	later	
summarized	with	business	implications.	Identified	30	to	40	clusters	and	includes	an	analysis	on	the	
Nordic	model.	
34	 3	 NO	 “Nordic	Entrepreneuring”	project	-	survey	that	identified	50	early	stage	companies.		
34	 4	 NO	 Statoil	-	highly	innovative	and	acquires	technology	through	startups.	
34	 5	 NO	 Acquisition	-	possibly	a	preferred	route	to	growth	as	opposed	to	equity	offerings.	
34	 6	 NO	 NRC	-	too	much	micromanagement.	
34	 7	 NO	 Innovation	Norway	-	increased	funding	for	startups;	however	this	has	led	to	complacency	by	
startups	in	becoming	hooked	on	grants.	
34	 8	 NO	 Norwegian	firms	-	flat	organizations	by	not	necessarily	open	and	transparent	(possibly	changing).	
34	 9	 NO	 Uniconsult	AS	-	a	leading	consultancy	focused	primarily	on	the	public	sector	
34	 10	 NO	 Kristiansan	-	Dean,	University	of	Oslo	
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34	 11	 NO	 Avron	-	Alto	University	
34	 12	 NO	 Burton	Lee	-	Stanford	Lecturer	and	European	Entrepreneur	
35	 1	 US	 Has	maintained	a	focus	on	continual	innovation	and	growth.	CEO	Mark	Benioff	has	led	consistent	
growth	through	clear	strategies,	much	to	the	surprise	of	Francesca	
35	 2	 US	 Salesforce.com	is	ranked	as	the	most	innovative	company	by	Forbes	for	three	years	straight	
35	 3	 US	 Mobile,	Social,	and	Open	is	the	latest	initiative	
35	 4	 US	 Salesforce	defies	the	notion	that	business	software	can't	be	radically	innovative	
35	 5	 US	 Open	-	all	year	end	objectives	are	listed	openly	to	ensure	transparency	and	alignment	
35	 6	 US	 Chatter	-	product	also	used	internally	to	foster	communication	and	collaboration	(Twitter-like).	
Can't	vote	up	ideas	(so	as	to	garner	support)	but	other	users	can	view	what	others	have	read	
35	 7	 US	 The	tech	community	has	consolidated	since	dot	com.	There	is	still	lots	of	hype	and	possibly	a	
bubble	but	largely	reigned	in	
36	 1	 NO	 Key	organizations	for	industrial	development	-	IFE	Group,	SINTEF,	and	RCN	however	IT	is	not	the	
focus	of	government.	Further,	bureaucracy	leads	to	slow	and	wasteful	processes.	
36	 2	 NO	 SINTEF	-	“Neither	fish	nor	fowl”	and	not	supportive	of	entrepreneurs.	
36	 3	 NO	 RCN	-	one	example	includes	process	simulation	in	which	four	firms	existed	in	Norway,	all	of	which	
competed	against	each	other	and	were	funded	independently.	




36	 5	 NO	 Education	-	engineering	degrees	are	too	specialized	when	generalists/interdisciplinary	are	more	in	
demand.	All	engineers	are	members	of	a	trade	union.		
36	 6	 NO	 IT	drivers	-	VC	(including	international),	vertical	specialization	(e.g.	medicine	and	GE),	but	still	
overshadowed	by	oil.	
36	 7	 NO	 Verticals	-	oil	and	gas	dominates,	security	(weapons	and	surveillance),	biomed.		
36	 8	 NO	 MNC	acquisition	-	good	for	Norway,	however	long	term	development	can	be	a	challenge	(e.g.	IBM	
failed	at	establishing	a	center	of	excellence).	
36	 9	 NO	 Incentives	-	mostly	salary	(e.g.	Kongsberg)	but	also	some	bonus	(e.g.	IBM).	Also	largely	group-
based	incentives.	
36	 10	 NO	 Organization	-	flat	but	governed	by	“small	kings”	with	strong	departmental	management	making	
coordination	across	departments	difficult.	Very	corporate	and	not	very	transparent.	
36	 11	 NO	 Oil	vertical	firms	backed	by	VC	have	risk-based	salaries	but	not	focused	on	innovation	or	utilization.	
This	might	be	Steria's	compensation	structure.	
36	 12	 NO	 Statoil	-	stems	from	a	Labor	development	plan	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	to	move	away	from	nuclear	
power	and	to	embrace	oil	as	the	domestic	economic	engine.	Mandated	that	all	suppliers	would	
have	to	partner	with	a	Norwegian	firm.		
36	 13	 NO	 Telenor	-	continuously	working	to	establish	a	cluster	around	computing	(Fornbu)	but	in	reality	is	
“Just	another	IT	company”.	
36	 14	 DK	 Denmark	-	appear	to	be	making	better	investments	and	in	10	or	15	years	could	be	further	along.	
36	 15	 NO	 RESPONDENT	-	entrepreneurial	background	and	employed	by	Norsk	Hydro	and	McKinsey	
36	 16	 NO	 SSI	Intercom,	Gulfax	
36	 17	 NO	 Yves	Christian	Halger	-	war	hero,	minister,	and	first	chairman	of	Statoil.	





37	 2	 NO	 Simula	garage	-	inspired	by	the	'HP	garage'	providing	free	housing	to	entrepreneurs.	
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37	 4	 NO	 RCN	-	new	administration	with	a	more	active	research	focus	but	not	necessarily	on	ICT.	Recent	
chapter	noted	low	funding	on	ICT	despite	(or	because	of)	companies	spending	between	33	and	
40%	on	ICT.	
37	 5	 NO	 Education	-	Norway	has	the	best	programs	and	education	for	IT	/software	professionals	however	
entrepreneurship	programs	are	very	small.	University	of	Oslo	is	a	pure	research	university	with	a	
drive	to	publish,	not	start	firms.	
37	 6	 NO	 Also	narrow-mindedness	in	programs	with	little	cross-discipline	interaction.	




37	 8	 NO	 Finance	-	investors	are	an	issue	in	that	they	try	and	rip	off	the	entrepreneur	by	requiring	a	
substantial	equity	stake.	Conditions	are	improving	through	local	actors	like	Northzone.	
37	 9	 NO	 MNC	acquisitions	-	very	positive	opinion	with	some	notable	partners	(e.g.	GE	and	Microsoft).	
Contracting	can	take	a	long	time	with	bureaucratic	US	companies.	
37	 10	 NO	 Norwegian	culture	-	trust	is	always	assumed	though	not	necessarily	transparency	(e.g.	salaries	are	
always	secret.	Strategies	are	open	and	democratic	though	a	lack	of	consensus	will	ultimate	get	a	
CEO	fired.	Some	skepticism	of	others	(e.g.	Americans)	in	collaboration.	
37	 11	 NO	 Entrepreneurs	-	challenges	in	marketing:	overestimating	potential	markets	and	knowing	the	
customer.	Great	at	research.	
37	 12	 NO	 Oil	-	a	key	sector	supporting	ICT	development	but	still	absorbs	the	best	talent.	
37	 13	 NO	 Swedes	are	better	at	industry	and	has	the	rich	families.	Norway	has	a	rich	government.	
37	 14	 NO	 “Research	Driven	Innovation”	-	an	8-year	program.	
38	 1	 NO	 Mostly	on	the	promotion	side	of	things.	Branding	is	key	
38	 2	 NO	 Oslo's	potential	-	there	was	nothing	and	now	things	are	happening.	Oil	still	draws	the	best	talent.	
38	 3	 NO	 Strengths	of	Norwegian	startups	-	technology	but	other	sectors	and	large	firms	draw	most	talent	
38	 4	 NO	 Government	sponsorship	-	big	debate.	Main	contributor	is	Innovation	Norway.	Some	funding	but	
regionally	based	and	opaque	as	to	how	the	process	works.	It	might	be	better	if	they	did	not	exist.	
The	mindset	of	government	is	risk	adverse	
38	 5	 NO	 Oslo	will	be	on	par	with	other	Nordics.	Norway	needs	to	do	everything	to	get	there.	More	
programs,	exposure,	and	connections.	More	involvement	with	founders	but	NOT	Innovation	
Norway	or	the	established	firms	
38	 6	 NO	 What	do	you	need	to	know	before	going	to	Silicon	Valley?	-	We're	working	on	that	one.	
38	 7	 NO	 Flow	between	industry	and	startups	occurs	but	not	necessarily	by	design	-	big	firms	might	be	afraid	
or	not	see	the	value	in	interacting	
38	 8	 NO	 Challenges	-	same	people	doing	the	same	thing	(i.e.	involved	in	the	innovation	scene	but	not	doing	
anything),	lack	of	openness,	and	never	seeking	feedback	




38	 10	 NO	 Founder	support	-	missing	the	connection	with	advisors	but	not	entrepreneurs	helping	
entrepreneurs.	Starting	to	connect	organically	
38	 11	 NO	 Finland	and	Sweden	are	way	ahead	both	in	understanding	and	size.	Norway	is	still	moving	too	slow	
but	does	have	some	support	from	academics	
38	 12	 NO	 Three	month	accelerator	(The	Factory)	Brian	Weisbruke,	y30	workspace,	and	LASSE	CHOR	





39	 2	 NO	 FIRM	key	initiatives	-	cloud,	big	data,	and	security.	
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39	 4	 NO	 FIRM	-	Post	acquisition	saw	less	autonomy	in	service	delivery.	FIRM	is	a	bottom-up	organization.	
Incentives	are	becoming	“more	American”	with	individual,	regional,	and	corporate	targets.	Base	
salary	is	lower	but	with	a	higher	potential	upside,	especially	for	sales.	
39	 5	 DK	 FIRM	-	more	restructuring	of	the	government	data	center	1	or	2	years	ago	but	now	ramping	back	
up.	
39	 6	 NO	 Big	players	-	Norway	has	consistently	“taken	care	of	their	own”	in	sponsoring	national	champions.	
Evry	is	the	last	big	leader	though	Argo	Group	formerly	held	this	spot	with	50%	state	ownership.	
Posten	and	Statoil	are	also	highly	relevant.	
39	 7	 NO	 Statoil	-	retains	preferences	for	Norwegian	and	even	Stavanger	firms	first	(e.g.	local	dialect	
required	to	do	business	and	previous	RFPs	were	in	Norwegian	only).	This	has	led	to	a	vendor	
cluster	in	the	region.	
39	 8	 NO	 Norway	IT	strengths	-	education	but	not	enough.	Financial	services	are	highly	innovative.	Good	
infrastructure.	Good	governance	with	regulations	that	foster	IT	delivery	improvements.	Healthcare	
is	good	but	lagging	behind	Denmark.	
39	 9	 NO	 Norway	IT	weaknesses	-	competitiveness	is	a	challenge	and	Norway	may	be	asleep	at	the	wheel.	
Government	needs	a	clear	roadmap	especially	for	healthcare	and	finance.	Fragmented	
governmental	entities	are	also	an	issue	even	with	limited	municipal	consolidation.	
39	 10	 NO	 RCN	and	Innovation	Norway	-	no	comment.	
39	 11	 DK	 Denmark	is	still	leading	and	the	government	has	done	more	to	support	IT.	
40	 1	 NO	 Professional	consultancy	firm,	no	software	or	development	sold.	Mostly	technical	consulting	and	
implementations	business	intelligence	and	portals	(i.e.	Sharepoint).	
40	 2	 NO	 Verticals	-	not	targeted	on	any	specific	industries	but	succeed	more	in	banking,	finance,	insurance,	
energy	(production/distribution),	and	media.	FIRM	targets	large	firms	but	not	the	top	50	(they	go	
with	the	top	firms).	
40	 3	 NO	 Common	techniques	are	used	across	industries	focused	on	efficiencies.	
40	 4	 NO	 70	people	strong	distributed	in	Bergen,	Oslo,	and	elsewhere.	26	years	old.	Startup	in	Oslo	then	
joined	with	Bergen.	Bergen	was	a	downscale	and	management	buyout.	Swedish	firm	was	in	Oslo.	
Then	a	management	buyout	in	2000.	




40	 6	 NO	 However,	the	forecast	is	more	specialization	(both	in	verticals	and	technologies),	less	one-stop	
shop	and	partnerships	within	the	community.	The	rest	will	be	commoditized	and	outsourced.	
40	 7	 NO	 Employee	staffing	-	senior	consulting	(5	years),	Norwegian	speaking,	skills	-	technical	and	people	
skills,	motivated	-	ascendency,	gives	advice	-	face	skills.	Still	largely	male	dominated.	
40	 8	 NO	 Innovation	-	package	implementation	remains	incremental,	however	bespoke	development	
involves	custom	applications	as	opposed	to	adaptation.	
40	 9	 NO	 Startup	community	-	Front	side:	high	education,	affluent,	and	the	risk	is	not	high.	Backside:	limited	
upside,	Janteloven,	taxes.	No	opportunity	to	change	taxes	because	of	limited	impact.	
40	 10	 NO	 Comparison	with	other	Nordics	-	Sweden	and	Finland	are	more	hierarchical.	Decision-making.	
Norwegians	may	seek	consensus	but	no	one	does	what	is	agreed.	
40	 11	 NO	 Role	of	government	-	RCN	and	Innovation	Norway.	No	impact	on	his	sector.	In	oil	and	offshore	and	
fisheries	there	are	more	benefits.	The	government	will	meet	weekly	to	discuss	'buy	Norway'	
(especially	food)	but	no	worry	in	outsourcing	the	data.	
40	 12	 NO	 Small	firms	can	move	quicker	so	maybe	this	is	where	we	should	look	for	innovation.	
40	 13	 NO	 Norwegian	IT	market	remains	fairly	closed	because	of	limited	economic	downturn.	It	has	opened	
up	over	the	last	50	years	but	remains	a	bit	protectionist	(because	of	non-EU	participation).	
40	 14	 NO	 Entrepreneurship	-	you	can	learn	entrepreneurship	but	(like	hugs)	you	can	never	do	enough.	
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41	 1	 NO	 Norsk	Data	-	collapsed	and	shed	labor	like	Nokia.	









41	 4	 NO	 FIRM	employees	-	skilled	in	financial	software	and	paid	mostly	through	fixed	salaries.	
41	 5	 NO	 FIRM	financing	-	from	venture	capital	for	about	3	to	5	million.	








41	 8	 NO	 Organizational	behavior	-	positive	culture	with	an	interest	in	the	work	and	the	freedom	to	pursue	
new	ideas.	Consensus	management	is	also	helpful	though	also	requires	lots	of	(inefficient)	
meetings	and	leads	to	recursive	decision	making.	
41	 9	 NO	 Prospects	for	Norway	-	will	remain	local/regionally	focused,	dominated	by	small	yet	innovative	
firms.	







42	 2	 NO	 FIRM	innovation	-	smart,	adaptive,	open	systems,	crowd-sourced	data,	online	systems.	
42	 3	 NO	 FIRM	organization	-	50	to	60	employees	with	some	Indian	contracting.	Drive	to	expand	into	new	
markets	through	additional	languages.	Incentive	structure	is	changing	under	expanded	firm.	
42	 4	 NO	 FIRM	finance	-	self	funded	originally	but	now	accessing	SkatteFUNN	from	Innovation	Norway	which	
has	added	rigor	through	the	need	to	create	business	plans.	
42	 5	 NO	 Learning	from	US	-	helped	in	developing	distribution,	sales,	and	marketing.	Contends	that	
Norwegians	have	a	high	study	abroad	rate	that	could	help	in	identifying	the	best	ideas.	Motivation	
for	FIRM	was	to	see	if	the	idea	could	be	successful.	
42	 6	 NO	 Norwegian	weaknesses	-	tax	disincentives	
42	 7	 NO	 Previous	experience	working	for	Adobe	and	Quark	
43	 1	 NO	 Organizational	behavior	-	consensus	seeking	where	everyone	can	speak	his	or	her	mind.	However,	
push	down	a	clever	idea	and	that	person	will	leave.	High	level	of	trust	and	reasonable	
transparency.	Not	great	at	articulating	the	mission.	
43	 2	 NO	 Entrepreneurial	community	-	Failure	is	not	an	option	and	finance	is	limited.	




  305 
Ref	 Seq	 Loc	 Comment	
43	 4	 NO	 Government	procurement	-	preferred	vendor	agreements	are	less	of	an	issue.	The	RFP	process	is	
fair	but	certain	vendors	(especially	Accenture)	are	winning	more	than	others	are.	Bouvet	and	Cap	
Gemini	are	also	notable	contenders.	
43	 5	 NO	 RCN	and	Innovation	Norway	play	a	positive	role	but	feudalism	remains	an	issue.	Innovation	
Norway	is	a	weak,	unimportant	player	failing	to	see	the	long	view.	RCN	is	a	different	story	doing	
good	work	to	direct	funding	and	drive	cluster	development.	





43	 7	 NO	 Danish	Govt.	comparison	-	digitalization	initiative	with	lofty	goals	from	previous	government:	'pipe	
dream'.	1NOK	company	seems	unlikely.	Revisions	to	enterprise	architecture	succeeded	in	DK	but	
died	in	committee	in	NO.	Further,	infrastructure	may	not	be	the	answer.	
43	 8	 NO	 Lighthouse	-	necessary	but	NO	lacks	a	clear	leader.	Telenor	is	big	and	successful	but	not	a	
juggernaut.	Pending	layoffs	of	10%	of	NO	laborforce	at	Telenor.	Others	are	non-contenders:	Evry,	
Atea,	FAST	(too	niche),	Autonomy	(acquired	then	diffused	by	HP).	
43	 9	 NO	 OECD	report	-	critical	on	NO	tax	policy,	shows	NO	as	'middle	of	the	pack'	for	entrepreneurship.	
43	 10	 NO	 TNCs	-	slow	learning	by	firms	and	naivety.	Bonuses	introduced	in	some	industries	but	less	so	in	ICT	
(not	a	key	driver).	
44	 1	 DK	 History	-	established	as	'Kommunedata'	in	1972	by	the	Kommunes	(200)	who	held	them	for	30	
years.	Mandate	was	to	develop	commuter	programs	for	Kommunes	and	local	hospitals	
44	 2	 DK	 Original	data	house	started	from	local	payroll	machines	that	were	left	by	the	US	military	following	
WWII	
44	 3	 DK	 Sold	in	1989	and	rebranded	as	'KMD.	Still	supporting	local	communes	(~75%)	but	expanded	into	
other	sectors	as	well	
44	 4	 DK	 CSC	-	manages	the	national	government	and	is	thought	of	as	KMD's	'twin'	
44	 5	 DK	 Organizational	change	-	constant.	Currently	17	individual	business	units	which	sound	to	be	
organized	around	verticals.	The	most	important	change	came	with	the	cultural	shift	toward	'the	
economy'.	It	used	to	be	about	making	the	best.	Now	it's	about	profit	and	quality	(e.g.	SLAs)	
44	 6	 DK	 Major	competitors	include:	NNIT,	Netcompay,	CSC,	and	IBM,	some	of	whom	also	utilize	offshore	
capabilities	including	KMD	
44	 7	 DK	 KMD	continues	to	benefit	from	monopoly	systems	(DKK	1B)	however	an	equal	proportion	is	in	
competitive	development	environments.	One	example	of	the	latter	was	the	2006	deal	with	SAP	for	
document	systems	to	ride	on	top	of	SAP's	ERP	
44	 8	 DK	 Limited	relationship	with	universities	for	R&D.	The	major	objective	is	recruitment	
44	 9	 DK	 KMD	does	not	really	benefit	from	the	entrepreneurial	initiatives	of	government	as	they	are	too	big.	
Beyond	that,	it	is	always	the	same	argument	in	lowering	taxes.	Thus,	it	is	the	demand	side	of	local	
government	that	is	most	important	for	KMD	
44	 10	 DK	 Big	thing	now	in	Denmark	is	technology	meeting	the	social	system.	This	follows	two	main	themes	
with	education	(learning	intelligence)	and	online	care	(i.e.	telemedicine)	
44	 11	 DK	 The	kommunes	themselves	are	driving	change.	Change	involves	standardization	(best	practice,	
common	data)	and	vendor	competition	within	the	public	sector.	KOMBIT	is	driving	this	change	as	
an	independent	entity	that	devolved	out	of	the	communes.		







45	 2	 DK	 FIRM	-	independent	firm	in	2007	acquired	by	FIRM.	Allowed	some	autonomy	to	coexist	with	
'Swedish	masters'.	HQ	sets	overall	EBITDA	targets	and	then	each	office	sets	the	agenda.	
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45	 3	 DK	 FIRM	innovation	-	high	in	customer	satisfaction	but	not	viewed	as	an	innovator,	just	an	enabler	of	
innovation.	Thus,	new	drive	to	balance	revenue	generation	with	a	priority	to	innovate.	Issues	
remain	with	how	to	share	innovations	with	royalties	becoming	more	prevalent.	
45	 4	 DK	 Prevas	activities	-	innovation,	development,	manufacturing,	support,	and	sustaining.	




45	 6	 DK	 Nokia	DK	diaspora	-	800	employees	with	most	going	to	the	three	large	hearing	aid	companies.	
46	 1	 DK	 Strengths	-	trust,	social	and	economic	equality,	income	mobility.	Domestic	IT	consumption	and	test	
markets.	












46	 4	 DK	 Support	services	-	education,	legal	advice,	and	collectivized	salary	determination	through	surveys.	
46	 5	 DK	 Movement	away	from	“taking	to	the	streets”	toward	more	professionalization	(e.g.	real	lawyers	
and	secretariat)	however,	given	changes	in	worker	agreements,	mobilization	and	solidarity	are	
once	again	advocated.	Thus,	membership	and	unionization	can	be	separate.	




46	 7	 DK	 Unionization	trends	-	declining	overall	but	growing	in	some	areas.	Collaboration	across	countries	
(e.g.	Netherlands)	has	inspired	new	approaches	“Independent	but	together”.	




46	 9	 DK	 Government	-	most	relevant	on	the	demand	side,	along	with	financial	services.	Collaboration	
between	both	in	implementing	the	NEM	ID;	a	standard	ID	for	citizens.	
46	 10	 DK	 CFIR.DK	-	was	a	cluster	experiment	between	14	partners	following	the	triple	helix	approach	
including	employer	associations.	Rarely	has	cross	entity	interaction	occurred.	Met	8	times	a	year.	
Established	a	consensual	“Cluster	Network”	subsequently	renamed	“Innovation	Network”.	
46	 11	 DK	 Anders	Ekeland	-	teaching	researcher	anders.ekeland@online.no	or	@ssb.no.	
47	 1	 DK	 FIRM	-	established	14	years	ago,	grew	to	35	employees	before	being	acquired	by	FIRM.	Provides	
Oracle	support	and	service	but	is	trying	to	break	away.	
47	 2	 DK	 Firm	development	-	easy	to	get	started	but	difficult	to	sustain.	
47	 3	 DK	 ORGANIZATION	-	established	to	support	experimentation	outside	of	revenue	generating	activities.	
Has	been	wound	down	(no	longer	needed)	but	a	new	incarnation	more	focused	on	global	markets	
ORGANIZATION	has	emerged.	
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47	 5	 DK	 Founders	-	are	more	relevant	than	government	activity.	An	example	is	Just	Eat	founder	who	moved	
to	Spain	but	regularly	returns	to	Denmark	to	support	startups.	
47	 6	 DK	 Financing	-	traditional	investors	want	the	opportunity	but	do	not	understand	the	startup	process.	




47	 8	 DK	 RESPONDENT:	self-taught	in	IT	before	consulting	at	IBM	and	other	big	houses.	He	was	once	a	
billionaire	on	paper.	
47	 9	 DK	 Thomas	Masmukler	-	leading	the	#CPFTW	town	hall.	
48	 1	 NO	 FIRM	-	game	developer	launched	by	current	CEO	as	a	side	project	while	working	fulltime	as	an	
education	software	developer.	Uses	the	Unity	engine.	Pursued	fulltime	once	first	game	became	a	
US	app	of	the	week.	Received	local	press	coverage	and	sponsorship.	
48	 2	 NO	 Growth	-	organic	with	13	employees.	Possible	partnership	and	desire	to	grow	internationally	but	
looking	for	the	right	partnership	wherever	they	might	be.	Not	interested	in	Silicon	Valley	per	se,	
becoming	big,	or	being	absorbed	by	a	large	company.	




48	 4	 NO	 Norwegian	startups	-	Unity	enables	a	platform	for	subsequent	game	development.	As	well,	the	
collapse	of	funcom.com	helped	in	shedding	labor	(two	landed	there).	Interestingly,	funcom.com	is	
not	really	involved	in	supporting	the	community.	
48	 5	 NO	 Government	-	considerable	help	but	recent	changes	have	limited	funding.	More	lobbying	is	
required.	Innovation	Norway	mainly	works	with	media	companies	but	has	sent	a	representative.	
48	 6	 NO	 Collaboration	-	high	amongst	other	studios	including	large	players,	however	geography	limits	some	
interaction.	
48	 7	 NO	 Bioshock	is	closing	down.	
48	 8	 NO	 Noregs	forskingsråd	=	Research	Council	of	Norway.	
49	 1	 DK	 Taxes	are	too	high	and	need	reform	for	stock	options,	labor	market	is	tight	(Swedes	are	willing	to	
work	and	have	the	skills).	Being	independent	still	viewed	suspiciously.	Lighthouses	are	important	if	
for	no	other	reason	than	to	inspire	other	entrepreneurs.	




49	 3	 DK	 RESPONDENT	-	lecturing	computer	science	at	CBS	in	2005	while	also	consulting.	Sought	to	remain	
independent.	Moved	into	IT	support	along	with	a	colleague	doing	everything	from	printers	to	web	
development.	Then	moved	to	build	a	product	“Site	Attention”	doing	SEO	before	focusing	on	FIRM.	
49	 4	 DK	 Triton	Partners	and	Nordic	Capital	-	private	equity	funds	focused	on	central	Europe	and	Nordics.	
50	 1	 DK	 Government	-	experimental,	continually	flipping,	with	the	minority	acting	like	the	majority	when	in	
power	thus	always	centrist.	1980s	endured	first	financial	crisis.	
50	 2	 DK	 Labor	-	desire	to	ensure	skill	development	for	all	citizens.	Social	safety	net	there	when	you	fail.	
Education	for	life.	Everyone	wants	to	be	OK.	Flat	organizational	structure.	
50	 3	 DK	 Danish	firms	-	always	small	companies	and	most	are	not	very	innovative.	
50	 4	 DK	 Lighthouse	-	IBM	(Maersk	IT)	possibly.	10x	larger	than	FIRM	in	Denmark	with	the	third	largest	
office	in	the	world.	Reduced	headcount	since	over	past	15	years	but	still	a	significant	presence.	
Close	relationship	with	Danske	Banke	and	Maersk	IT.	
50	 5	 DK	 Education	–	govt.	created	ORGANIZATIONS	
50	 6	 DK	 Crisis	-	1973	oil	crisis	exacerbated	by	Social	Dems	social	spending	in	1960s.	Priorities	then	became	
fixing	the	national	debt,	become	a	net	exporter	of	oil,	and	support	business.	
50	 7	 DK	 FIRM	-	primarily	server	sales,	PCs,	and	services	(following	acquisition	of	EDS	-	$13.9B).	
50	 8	 DK	 FIRM	DK	-	sales	office	with	80	employees	following	acquisition.	HP	didn't	know	what	to	do	with	the	
group	so	they	were	left	alone.	FIRM	culture	fits	well	with	Danes.	
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50	 9	 DK	 RESPONDENT	on	Nordics	-	“a	lot	of	pragmatism	that	just	works	but	probably	can't	be	replicated.”	
50	 10	 DK	 CSC	-	similar	public	outcry	as	the	sale	of	Nets	to	Goldman	Sachs.	They	can	probably	do	better	
running	it	than	the	government,	given	historical	inefficiencies	and	“dead	wood”	that	could	not	be	
fired.	Several	individuals	were	under	skilled	and	never	actually	qualified.	
50	 11	 DK	 Microsoft	-	small	accounting	solution	that	expanded	into	Europe.	Founders	bail	post	acquisition,	
then	reorganization	keeping	some	of	the	remaining	core.	
50	 12	 DK	 Danes	-	the	Italians	of	Scandinavia:	comparably	open	being	traders	before	farmers.	
50	 13	 DK	 Farmers	-	celebrated	and	romanticized	in	Denmark	(e.g.	Morten	Koch	and	“De	Røde	Heste”).	
50	 14	 DK	 1864	war	with	Germany	almost	ended	Denmark	but	led	to	an	inferiority	complex.	
50	 15	 DK	 RESPONDENT	-	engineer	starting	in	late	1980s	
50	 16	 DK	 1	DKK	company	-	not	a	big	deal.	




51	 2	 DK	 FIRM	second	entity	-	organic	growth	with	fixed	shareholder	allocation	and	a	standby	agreement	as	
needed	that	was	fully	paid	off	in	2007.	Currently	30	employees.	
51	 3	 DK	 FIRM	-	provides	cloud-based	mobile	support	solutions	primarily	to	international	carriers.	Targets	
dense	markets	with	language	expertise:	English	then	Portuguese,	Spanish,	etc.	
51	 4	 DK	 Denmark	IT	environment	-	comparable	to	dot.com	era	in	terms	of	funding	but	with	more	
governance,	covenants,	and	milestones.	Investors	continue	to	court	FIRM	but	have	very	high	
expectations.	
51	 5	 DK	 Danish	labor	costs	-	high	salaries	(relative	to	Brazil,	for	example).	Solution	is	to	use	local	
contractors	for	translation	services	and	development	(if	possible)	under	at	will	(3	month)	notice	
agreements.	
51	 6	 DK	 Danish	taxes	-	still	too	high	and	double	taxation	with	several	countries.	Apparently,	works	well	
when	you	have	income	but	not	with	losses.	
51	 7	 DK	 Acquisition	-	have	had	several	discussions	but	is	a	time	consuming	process	and	a	distraction.	North	
American	partners	are	desirable	but	a	nonstarter	without	a	toehold	in	the	NA	market.	
51	 8	 DK	 Nordic	strengths	-	perception	that	they	know	telco	but	not	really.	Education	is	not	keeping	up	and	
other	competitors	are	just	as	good	at	a	lower	cost.	
51	 9	 DK	 RESPONDENT	-	long	history	in	IT	beginning	with	providing	MS	support	for	the	8080.	Completed	
business	school	then	MBA	at	Rotterdam,	including	study	abroad	in	Melbourne	for	6	mo.	Started	a	
firm	in	Paris	for	4	mo.	





52	 2	 DK	 B2B	requires	a	focus	on	customers	and	revenues	as	opposed	to	market	share.	
52	 3	 DK	 Education	-	good	technical	skill	development	but	entrepreneurship	remains	poor.	Would	like	to	
see	Grundtvig	extended	to	all	ages:	travel,	experiment,	whatever	so	long	as	you	learn	something.	




52	 5	 DK	 Taxation	is	not	an	issue.	No	desire	for	hyper-capitalism.	
52	 6	 DK	 Stockholm	success	-	weather	is	a	factor.	Dark	and	cold	during	the	winter	so	nothing	else	to	do	but	
work.	Free	higher	education	that	is	heavily	subsidized	is	the	second	factor.	Funding	came	
serendipitously.	
52	 7	 DK	 RESPONDENT	-	runs	a	startup	and	co-works	in	a	cooperative.	
52	 8	 DK	 Qliktech	-	founded	in	Lund,	Sweden	providing	BI.	
53	 1	 DK	 DK	vs.	SE	-	SE	is	more	hierarchical	and	formal	but	Danes	are	shrewd,	international,	and	supportive	
of	a	good	life.	
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53	 2	 DK	 Danes	don't	have	a	breakout	mentality	like	in	the	US.	Failure	is	not	an	option	because	everyone	
knows	everyone	and	will	gossip	about	you:	“We	are	a	village.”	
53	 3	 DK	 Danes	are	less	ideologically	driven	politically	and	instead	focus	on	efficiency.	
53	 4	 DK	 FIRM	-	600	employees.	A	personal	relationship	brought	FIRM	to	DK	with	the	expectation	that	DK	
would	have	autonomy.	Sales	are	mostly	to	small	business	and	remain	strong.	Ideas	are	important	
and	“hurricane	capitalism”	is	not.	
53	 5	 DK	 PRODUCT	-	group	work	solutions	supporting	team	collaboration.	




53	 7	 DK	 Navision	founder	-	now	broke.	Not	sure	who.	The	listed	founders	all	look	relatively	successful	still.	
53	 8	 DK	 Denmark	level	of	ideas	-	middle	of	the	road.	Not	low	like	Germany	nor	high	like	Korea	
54	 1	 DK	 Denmark	-	most	entrepreneurial	of	the	Nordics.	High	government	investment	in	IT	mostly	at	the	
federal	level,	less	so	at	the	regional	but	balkanized	with	lots	of	legacy	(e.g.	COBOL).	Lagging	in	
security.	High	levels	of	trust.	High	taxes.	Janteloven.	
54	 2	 DK	 Labor	-	high	flexibility,	questionable	productivity,	and	challenges	in	moving	forward	due	to	
indecision.	











55	 2	 DK	 Kommunes	-	received	a	windfall	in	taxes	through	the	sale	of	grid	services,	subsequently	
established	KOMBIT	to	facilitate	competition	and	build	a	service	platform.	It	is	still	a	work	in	
process	with	an	effective	duopoly	in	place.	




55	 4	 DK	 Contracting	-	fixed	price	contracts	continue	to	dominate	with	time	and	materials	relatively	fixed.	
Risk-based	finance	is	growing	somewhat,	however	upside	is	usually	capped	and	accountability	for	
failure	remains	contested.	
55	 5	 DK	 Role	of	TNCs	-	inevitable	given	Denmark's	small	size,	however	practices	are	flexible.	Usually	core	
standards	are	imposed	but	adaptability	is	allowed.		






56	 1	 DK	 Vækstfonden	-	provides	loan	guarantees	but	losses	became	expensive	further	exacerbated	by	the	
financial	crisis.	Loans	are	provided	to	all	with	a	focus	on	wider	objectives	beyond	profitability.	
Focused	on	lending	to	those	who	are	otherwise	overlooked.	
56	 2	 DK	 VC	-	makes	between	4	and	6	investments	out	of	20	total	in	partnership	with	Vækstfonden.	
56	 3	 DK	 Pension	funds	-	dot.com	collapse	significantly	reduced	participation	and	they	continue	to	hold	
back.	Management	spun	off	as	Sunstone	more	internationally	oriented	and	focused	on	technology	
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and	life	sciences.	Sunstone	is	expected	to	move	toward	later	stage	financing	but	remains	largely	
early	stage.	
56	 4	 DK	 Deal	flow	-	mostly	network-based	but	inbound	is	around	200	with	4	or	5	receiving	funding.	
Standout	candidates	must	meet	a	variety	of	performance	criteria	not	limited	having	a	competent	
team	and	a	clear	exit	market	defined.	
56	 5	 DK	 Entrepreneurship	-	limited	role	models	though	some	founders	(e.g.	Lets	Eat)	have	been	helpful.	For	
the	most	part,	entrepreneurs	need	to	go	elsewhere	(e.g.	Silicon	Valley)	for	mentoring	and	funding.	
56	 6	 DK	 Analytics	-	still	ongoing	especially	for	initial	factors	indicating	future	success.	





57	 2	 DK	 Danish	IT	-	historically	more	academic	(e.g.	DTI	and	Navision)	and	focused	on	consulting.	Possibly	
more	similar	to	Finland	but	unlike	Sweden.	Danish	entrepreneurs	learned	everything	from	scratch	
and	it	is	not	known	how	exactly	the	Danish	story	unfolded.		
57	 3	 DK	 Startup	community	-	taking	off	but	with	a	lot	of	people	around	the	scene	doing	nothing.	
Entrepreneurship	schools	are	improving	but	again	limited	real	engagement.	Others	like	Helsinki's	
SLUSH	are	ahead	of	the	game.	Danish	cluster	will	retain	linear	growth	unless	there	is	a	breakout.		
57	 4	 DK	 Pipeline	-	effectively	all	outbound	deal	making	through	networking.	1,400	deals	come	through	with	
roughly	20%	comprising	unsolicited	inbound.	




57	 6	 DK	 Competition	in	capital	-	Stockholm	is	intense	due	to	Spotify's	presence	but	still	with	an	equal	
footing	across	Europe.	Silicon	Valley	remains	unchallenged	for	funding,	however	time	differences	
are	an	issue.	
57	 7	 DK	 Pension	funds	-	less	relevant	and	guided	by	indices	not	picking	good	VCs.	
57	 8	 DK	 Taxes	-	less	of	an	issue	on	capital	gains	though	income	tax	is	prohibitive.	Strike	options	could	be	
more	helpful	for	specific	industries.	
57	 9	 DK	 Student	grants	-	could	be	extended	to	meet	living	expenses	for	entrepreneurs	instead	of	just	
providing	assistance	with	studies.	
57	 10	 DK	 Immigration	policy	-	holds	Denmark	back	because	IT	professionals	are	not	interested	in	welfare	
state	benefits	
58	 1	 NO	 1)	startup	(he	was	there)	everyone	got	rich	and	the	talent	was	good.	Printing	a	web	page	was	an	
opera	invention	as	well	as	saving	to	a	file.	
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58	 5	 NO	 Future	-	The	CEO	is	only	focused	on	making	a	profit	even	if	it	means	killing	the	browser	and	going	
into	ad-related	activities.	Won't	ever	become	an	innovator.	
58	 6	 NO	 Opera	is	an	exception	to	the	rule.	It	is	too	expensive	and	you	have	to	raise	a	family.	Limited	angel	
investors	but	you	can	always	get	a	job.	If	you	want	to	try	something,	you	are	on	your	own.	








59	 1	 DK	 IDC	-	a	government	organization	working	in	partnership	with	the	Danish	embassy.	
59	 2	 DK	 IDC	-	consultancy	based	offering	advisory	services,	promotion,	boot	camps	and	limited	financing.	
59	 3	 DK	 Copenhagen	cluster	-	challenge	is	in	accelerating	growth.	Firms	appear	to	be	stalling	beyond	a	
certain	size.	Funding	remains	a	challenge.	
59	 4	 DK	 Much	of	startup	success	is	from	special	individuals	(e.g.	founders)	making	it	happen.	Round	trips	
by	founders	are	increasing	but	marketing	remains	limited.	
59	 5	 DK	 Startups	-	finance	is	less	of	an	issue	through	new	developments	like	crowd	funding.	Challenges	
remain	is	developing	an	idea	for	a	global	market	and	promoting	the	product	to	customers	and	
investors.	
59	 6	 DK	 B2B	is	a	strong	suit	for	Danish	startups,	possibly	due	to	building	robust,	quality	products	in	
otherwise	dull	process	areas	and	industries.	
60	 1	 NO	 Entrepreneur	focused	on	revenues	not	speculative	growth.	
60	 2	 NO	 Disagrees	with	"failing	is	good"	philosophy.	Yes,	changes	culture	but	also	breeding	unqualified	
entrepreneurs.	
60	 3	 NO	 Participated	in	TINC	program,	now	has	locations	on	four	continents.	
60	 4	 NO	 Pessimistic	of	overall	startup	scene	in	Norway.	Not	enough	is	being	done.	
 
